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Abstract
“The Emergence and Decline of the Delaware Indian Nation in
Western Pennsylvania and the Ohio Country, 1730-1795”
Richard S. Grimes
Many past and current generations of historians, anthropologists, and literary writers have
acknowledged the existence of a Delaware Indian nation. They, however, have failed to
thoroughly understand or address the historical and cultural dynamics that contributed to
both the formation and quick decline of this Indian nation. This multidisciplinary study
includes the oral traditions and oratory of Delaware Indians, the observances of Moravian
missionaries and colonial-revolutionary officials, and contemporary anthropological and
historical sources, to construct the building of the Delaware nation during the eighteenth
century.
Once decentralized and living in the Delaware River watershed, three phratries or animal
tribes (Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf) of Delawares, in response to their unfair treatment at
the hands of the Pennsylvania-Iroquois alliance of 1732, moved west to the Allegheny
Valley of western Pennsylvania and eventually across the Ohio River into the
Muskingum River valley. Western Delawares developed a sense of common cause and
weathered the turmoil of imperial conflict between the French and British during the
Seven Years’ War in western Pennsylvania. A regional identity was greatly enhanced
when western Delawares by 1765 separated themselves politically from their eastern kin
who remained on the Susquehanna.
This dissertation also considers the creation of a National Council or Lupwaaeenoawuk,
the influence of Moravian missionaries, and the importance of visionary leaders, such as
Tamaqua, White Eyes, and Captain Pipe--three important factors, imperative to the story
of Delaware centralization and nationhood in the Ohio. The stability of a lasting political
Delaware nation, however, was undermined by the stress of factionalism in the Great
Council as the American Revolution divided Delaware leaders in 1780.
This study will also examine the processes, which led to the fractured state of the
Delawares after Washington’s Indian War in the Old Northwest Territory and the
subsequent Treaty of Greenville that followed in 1795. The story of the Delawares from
1730-1795 demonstrates a dramatic and arduous struggle for autonomy, identity, and
political union. In the end, however, the Delaware nation became weakened and broken,
driven from the Ohio and forced to migrate west once again.
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1Introduction
“A powerful nation with a very large train of connexions and allies . . .”
Through their missionary work, the Moravians David Zeisberger and John Heckewelder
came to know and befriend the Lenape or “Delaware” Indians. Zeisberger, a German, and
Heckewelder, an Englishman, were sympathetic to the Delawares in their struggles to sustain
themselves as a people in the midst of a turbulent Anglo-American colonial and revolutionary
world. They were, for the most part, keen observers of Delaware life and respectful of native
worldviews, social structures, and cultural values.
Zeisberger and Heckewelder sat in Delaware councils and witnessed first hand both the
quest for national unity, the push for political consensus, and the rancor of factionalism among
Delaware leaders. In what could be seen as an early American version of public relations work,
they exaggerated the political strength, influence, and prominence of the Delawares as a nation.
Zeisberger noted that the “Delaware nation [was] looked to for the preservation of peace and
entrusted with the charge of the great belt of peace and the chain of friendship” that bound
together the Anglo-Indian world of colonial America.1 Heckewelder saw the Delawares as “a
powerful nation with a very large train of connexions and allies.” He considered them to be the
spearhead Algonquian nation of a metaphorical “great National Council Fire burning on the banks
of the Delaware” including other Indian peoples such as the Mohicans, Conoys, and Nanticokes.
Heckewelder recognized the Delawares as the greatest of the Indian nations who resided in the
                                                
1 David Zeisberger in Nathaniel Schwarze, trans., Archer Butler Hulbert, ed., “David
Zeisberger’s History of the Northern American Indians,” Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly 19 (Jan. and April, 1910): 35. Delaware derived from Sir Thomas West,
Lord de la Warr, who was appointed governor of Virginia in 1610. Captain Samuel Argall named
the Delaware River in West’s honor, and those Indian tribes who were settled along this
waterway were eventually referred to as Delawares. See John Heckewelder, An Account of the
History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the
Neighboring States, William C. Reichel, ed., Philadelphia: Memoirs of the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania 12 (1876), 26; C. A. Weslager, The Delaware Indians: A History (New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 31-32; Anthony F. C. Wallace, King of the
Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763 (1949; reprint, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990),
6-7.
2“National Council House”-- a symbolic longhouse that stretched from the Hudson River to the
“head tide” of the Potomac.2
Both missionaries described the Delaware collective as a union of three large phratries or
extended clans. They were Unami and Munsee speakers from the Algonquian linguistic family.
Those who spoke the Northern Unami dialect belonged to the Turtle or Packoango tribe
(“unfeathered animal”), while southern Unamis made up the Turkey tribe, known as Unalachtigo
or Blem (“scratching fowl”). Lastly there were the Munsee speakers or Ptucksit (“round paws”),
which was the Wolf tribe. The Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes were hierarchically ranked and
comprised the ethnic core of what would eventually become the Delaware political nation.3
Despite the reliability of Zeisberger and Heckewelder as sources for Delaware history, the two
Moravians haphazardly referred to the Delawares as a national entity that had existed since the
beginning of time. They failed to grasp the dynamics of historical processes that contributed both
to the emergence and the decline of the Delaware groups as a nation.
Others in the colonial world made the same assumptions of Delaware nationhood. At Fort
Pitt in July of 1759, the Indian agent George Croghan greeted the “principal counsellors and
warriors of the Delaware nation” when he sought to “ratify and confirm the peace” in the Ohio
country.4 In October of 1775, Kiashuta, the Seneca orator of the Six Nations of Iroquois,
announced to a delegation at Fort Pitt that his people were bound “fast in Freindship” with the
Delaware nation.5 In September of 1778, the Delawares were once again recognized as a tribal
                                                
2 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, xxvi, xxxix-xliii, 53. 
3 Schwarze and Hulbert, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,” 92; Heckewelder, An Account of
the Indian Nations, 50-53, 249-250. For an in-depth view of what peoples comprised the
Delawares and the historical debates centering on the ethno-political composition see Appendix
1: “An Ethno-Political Definition of the Delaware Indians.”  
4 “Minutes of Conferences Held at Fort Pitt, in July, 1759,” in I.D. Rupp, ed., Early
History of Western Pennsylvania, and of the West, and of Western Expeditions and Campaigns
from MDCCLIV to MDCCCXXXIII (1846; reprint, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods
Publishing, 1995), 132-133.
5 Kiashuta at Fort Pitt Conference, Oct. 12, 1775, in Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise
Phelps Kellogg, eds., The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777  (1908; reprint, Port
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970), 108.
3nation at Fort Pitt. Virginia commissioners, on behalf of the United States Congress, attempted to
seal a “perpetual peace and friendship” with the “aforesaid Delaware Nation.” 6   
The idea of a Delaware nation entered into the writings of the early American novelist
James Fenimore Cooper. Greatly influenced by the observations of Heckewelder, Cooper in his
early Leatherstocking Tales (The Pioneers written in 1823 and The Last of the Mohicans in
1826), refers to the Delawares as the “favoured people” of the Great Spirit. They were a people
honored by Cooper’s hero, Uncas, the prominent Mohican warrior of the Turtle totem. In The
Last of the Mohicans, Uncas reminds the Delawares that they and the Mohicans are united as
one. He also urges the Delawares to remember their greatness as a nation:  “Men of the Lenni
Lenape!  . . .  my race [Delawares and Mohicans] upholds the earth! . . . My race is the
grandfather of nations!” The Delawares offer Cooper the tragic symbolism of a powerful and
prestigious Indian nation being swept aside by the Anglo-American advance, to become a “nation
of mourners”-- a people “scattered, like broken herds of deer. . . .” 7
These observations, whether historical or literary, regarding a functioning and cohesive
Delaware nation, bypass the story of a very real struggle among Delawares to gain unity
throughout the eighteenth century. The Delaware story of nationhood is hard to unravel. First of
all, Anglo-American record keepers, oblivious to the deeper meanings and nuances of events, did
not chronicle much of this historical development. As James Merrell mentions, many of the key
moments in American Indian tribal evolution have been “lost in the bushes.” 8 Secondly, the term
“nation,” when applied to Native American social and political organization remains a difficult
definition to pin down. However, the process of shifting identities, whether white or Indian,
remains an important feature of American history. In gaining a clearer picture of the Delaware
nation, another piece of America’s history is unearthed. The Delaware story of nationhood,
                                                
6 Fort Pitt Treaty, Articles II and III, Sept. 17, 1778, in Colin G. Calloway, ed.,
Revolution and Confederation, vol. 18 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws,
1607-1789, Alden T. Vaughan, general ed., (Bethesda, Maryland: University Publications of
America, 1994), 167.
7 James Fenimore Cooper, The Last of the Mohicans: A Narrative of 1757, vol.1, bk. 2,
The Leatherstocking Tales (1826; reprint, New York: The Library of America, 1985), 778, 821,
830, 865. For more on the demise and dislocation of American Indians as being part of a changing
American landscape see Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1995).
 8 Correspondence with James H. Merrell, July 31, 2003.
4which is no exception, is a history that needs to be studied and pondered. The story of its rise
and deterioration was symbolic of a revolutionary historical period in which many Americans
were caught in the dynamic advancement of upheaval and transition.
Throughout the first decades of the 1700s, bands of Delaware Indians, in close
geographical proximity and with an ethnic commonality, began the migration from their eastern
homes in the Delaware River basin to the Susquehanna and eventually beyond the Allegheny
Mountain range to the far reaches of western Pennsylvania and Ohio country. The migration
west became the catalyst in the development of a Delaware national identity. The story of this
increasing nationalism reflects the dramatic changes underwent by the Delawares during the
eighteenth century as the Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes faced new challenges in the west. There
the Delaware groups clung to their ethnic roots on a phratry level and eventually strove for
autonomy and solidarity on a national level. However, in the west the Delaware tribes could only
temporarily sustain a political nation. During the period 1730 to 1795, the process of nation
building among the Delaware tribes was gradual, piecemeal, uneven, and in the end, unfulfilled.
The story of their political unification is complex and reflects the strong influence of other
cultures and nationalities. The Delawares during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not
live in a vacuum. Their history was shaped by a plethora of peoples during the eighteenth
century--Dutch, Swedes, Quakers, Pennsylvanians, Virginians, British, French, Iroquois, and
Shawnees. Their emergence from autonomous bands into a more centralized consensual polity
was indeed influenced by these Europeans and Indians with whom they interacted. These
interactions were crucial in the transformation of the Delaware tribes.
When Europeans entered the regions of the Delaware Indians, they discovered a people
who combined hunting with agriculture. They were comprised of autonomous and kin-based
bands scattered throughout the Delaware River watershed (or, as it was known, the
Lenapewihitak, meaning “River of the Lenape”) east to the Hudson River.9 These bands “lacked
the strong, cohesive tribal organization” that existed among other tribal entities of that time such
as the Iroquois and Huron confederations. Each band had 100 to 250 square miles of hunting
                                                
9 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 50-51;  Hitakonanu’laxk (Tree Beard),
The Grandfathers Speak: Native American Folk Tales of the Lenape’ People (New York:
Interlink Books, 1994), 6.
5territory.10 In 1600, throughout the eastern seaboard, there was an estimated population of 8,000
Unami and Munsee Indians.11
Europeans first met Delaware Indians in 1609 when the English navigator Henry Hudson,
sailing for the Dutch East India Company, anchored in what would become Delaware Bay.
During the seventeenth century, Delaware Indians came in contact with Dutch and Swedish
settlers. By 1664, the English under Charles II claimed the heart of Delaware Indian country-- the
territory from the Delaware River valley to the Schuylkill River on which the Lenapes and
Munsees (also known as Minisinks) resided. Charles then gave this region to his brother, the
Duke of York.12 In 1682, York relinquished to the Quaker William Penn his claims to the
                                                
10 Thomas Sugrue, “The Peopling and Depeopling of Early Pennsylvania: Indians and
Colonists, 1680-1720,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 116, No. 1
(January 1992): 10; Marshall Becker, “The Okehocking: A Remnant Band of Delaware Indians,”
Pennsylvania Archaeologist 46  (1976): 25; William A. Hunter, “Documented Subdivisions of the
Delaware Indians,” Bulletin of the Archaeological Society of New Jersey 35 (1978), 20-21; Ives
Goddard, “Delaware,” in Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Northeast. Vol. 15 of Handbook of North
American Indians, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant, (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution,
1978), 213-215, 225; Marshall Becker, “The Lenape Bands Prior to 1740: The Identification of
Boundaries and the Processes of Change Leading to the Formation of the ‘Delawares,’” in
Herbert C. Kraft, ed., The Lenape Indian: A Symposium (South Orange, New Jersey:
Archaeological Research Center, Seton Hall University, 1984), 22. Unami-speaking Delawares
lived in such towns as Gweghkongh, Hespatingh, and Mechgachkamic in what is now northern
New Jersey, and Katamoonchink, Clistowacka, and Playwickey in eastern Pennsylvania.
Munsees and affiliated peoples resided at Papagonk in Ulster county, New York, Peckwes (near
current day Hackensack, New Jersey), and Cashiehtunk near the Pennsylvania-New Jersey line
of the Delaware River. See John R. Swanton, ed., The Indian Tribes of North America, Bulletin
145 (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of American Ethnology, 1952), 50-54. For this study, the term
“band” is in reference to a local unit of fifty to two hundred people, within the tribe. A band
lived together in a village, or in Northeastern Woodland Indian terminology, a town. See Sharon
O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments  (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989),
313-314.
11 Swanton, ed., Indian Tribes of North America, 54-55. These numbers dwindled to
3,000 during the eighteenth century; in the Census of 1910, the Delawares were estimated at a
population of 985.
12 C. A. Weslager in collaboration with A. R. Dunlap, Dutch Explorers, Traders and
Settlers in the Delaware Valley, 1609-1664  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1961), 11-12. According to Delaware oral traditions, it was on Manhattan Island that Henry
Hudson and the Dutch introduced alcohol to the Delawares. The Delaware term
Mannahachtanink means “the island or place of general intoxication.” See John Heckewelder, in
Colin G. Calloway, ed., The World Turned Upside Down: Indian Voices from Early America
(Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 34-38.
6Delaware River and all territory as far north as the 43rd parallel. Penn, given a massive land grant
by Charles II in 1681, became proprietor of Penn’s Woods; with it, he gained jurisdiction over
the majority of Delaware Indians.13 At Shackamaxon, outside of modern Philadelphia in
November of 1682, a group of Lenape sachems presented Penn with a wampum belt of oyster-
shell beads and fine leather to symbolize a lasting peace and friendship between the Indians of the
region and English colonists.14
Negotiations in land sales with the Pennsylvania provincial government were done
independently by local chiefs and without consent from other Delaware communities. These
chiefs were “often of uncertain authority and undefined jurisdiction.”15 Traditionally Delawares
had no leader to speak for all the animal tribes and bands. The Swedish geographer-engineer Peter
Lindestrom visited six Delaware towns on the Schuylkill River in 1654 and noted that all were
                                                
13 C. A. Weslager, The English on the Delaware, 1610-1682 (New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 224; Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 155-156.
14 Illustration of a facsimile of the wampum belt presented by Lenapes to Penn at
Shackamaxon, November 1682, in Jean R. Soderlund, ed., William Penn and the Founding of
Pennsylvania 1680-1684: A Documentary History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1983), 145. Wampum belts were symbolic devices made of cylindrical beads and used as
records of the meetings. Turning a belt over to read the next belt was the equivalent of turning a
page of a book or newspaper. Wampum belts were also used to convey proposals--white belts
for peace, a red mark of a hatchet painted on black belts, for war. If the receiver of a wampum
belt rejected the proposal, he might refuse to look at it or he might kick it away. For details on
council meetings and the function of wampum, see Zeisberger in Hulbert and Schwarze, eds.,
“Zeisberger’s History,” 94-99; Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 107-112;
William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois
Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 224-233; Michael K. Foster,
“Another Look at the Function of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils,” in Francis Jennings,
William N. Fenton, et. al; eds., The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An
Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1985), 99-114.
15 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain
Confederation of Indian Tribes With English Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty
of 1744 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), 263; Paul A.W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser,
1696-1760: Friend of Colonist & Mohawk (1945; reprint, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania:
Wennawoods Publishing, 1996), 41. With regard to the selling of land, Indians received goods for
their land and they rationalized that this was an exchange of gifts between friends. This exchange
did not imply that Indians gave up their land. They were giving Europeans the right to use the
land, not sole ownership. See Weslager, Dutch Explorers, Traders and Settlers, 109.
7“under six sachems or chiefs, each one commanding his own tribe or people under him. . . .”16
Penn considered the Delawares to be lacking unity and less “politically minded” than other tribal
groups.17 He noted, however, that within every community, the chief had a council, which
consisted of “all the Old and Wise men of his Nation.” While these chiefs (Penn called them
Kings) wielded great authority in their individual towns, the chief was sensitive to the will of his
people. Penn witnessed the presence of local councils; no reference was made to any form of a
consolidated council of many Delaware tribes.18
Observers noted well into the 1730s that Delaware bands and phratries remained
independent of one another and were defined geographically. For instance, Brandywine River
Delawares met in their own council and were politically separate from the Tulpehocken
Delawares of Pennsylvania.19 Various land sales carried out in New Jersey and Pennsylvania
identified Delaware Indians as “Schuylkill Indians,” “Fall[s] Indians” (those who lived near the
Delaware Falls), and “Christiana Indians.”20 
Early Europeans who settled along the Delaware River drove a wedge between the
Delaware communities in eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey. As Pennsylvania Delawares sold
their lands and moved west into the Susquehanna and Schuylkill river valleys, New Jersey
                                                
16 Peter Lindestrom, Geographia Americae with an Account of the Delaware Indians,
Based on Surveys and Notes Made in 1654-1656, Amandus Johnson, trans., and ed.
(Philadelphia: Swedish Colonial Society, 1925), 171.
17 William Penn in Paul A.W. Wallace, “Conrad Weiser and the Delawares,” Pennsylvania
History 4 (July 1937): 144.
18 Albert Cook Myers, ed., William Penn: His Own Account of the Lenni Lenape or
Delaware Indians, Tercentenary Edition  (1937; reprint, Wilmington, Delaware: The Middle
Atlantic Press, 1970), 36. Regarding the decentralization of Delaware bands: throughout the
summer of 1682, Delaware leaders such as Kowyockhickon, Attoireham, Essepamachatte,
Kekerappamand, Nahoosey, among many others, made their marks and sold tracts of land to
Penn without the restrictions and constraints of a centralized tribal council. See Deed of the
Treaty of June 23, 1683, in Myers, ed., William Penn: His Own Account of Delaware Indians,
83.
19 Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 263.
20 Bill of Captain Lasse Cock, presented to Penn, Sept. 24, 1682, in Soderlund, ed.,
William Penn and Founding of Pennsylvania, 145. Lasse Cock was a Swede who worked for
Pennsylvania Governor William Markham as an interpreter and messenger to the local Indians.
8Delawares became isolated. Thus the two tribal bodies had different relations with whites and
divergent histories until they merged in the Ohio country at a later date.21
Despite this geographic separation, Delaware Indians had a favorable relationship with
William Penn and his government. Penn’s “Holy Experiment” gave Lenape groups preeminent
status over all Indians within Pennsylvania. Penn’s death in 1718 and Pennsylvania’s need to
secure its frontiers from French intrigues with western Indians altered this arrangement with the
Delawares. During the 1730s, the government of Pennsylvania entered into a political alliance
with the Six Nations of Iroquois (the Mohawk, Seneca, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and
Tuscarora nations).22 The Delawares became outcasts in their own homeland. As a result, the
Delawares lost their lands and autonomy as they became (by definition of this alliance between
Pennsylvania and the Iroquois confederation) subservient to the Six Nations. Alienated from the
Penn government, many groups of Delawares moved to the Allegheny and Ohio countries. In this
region Delawares gravitated towards powerful leaders who sought independence, defended the
Ohio from Anglo encroachments, and forged new political identities.
By the 1780s, influenced by decades of frontier wars (the Seven Years’ War and the
American Revolution), western Delaware bands became, by necessity, more politically and
ethnically united, in defense of both their independence and their new homeland. Delawares
eventually embraced a common vision of nation--a polity structured in time of crisis to counter
Anglo-American power and aggression. In this sense, the frontier expansion of British America
intensified the Delaware need for unification and centralization and thus forced Anglo-Americans
to take notice and respond accordingly. These Indians slowly evolved from localized matrilineal
families within their respective phratries to specific ethnic groups and lastly, to the defined
political divisions that eventually formed the Delaware nation.
                                                
21 Hunter, “Subdivisions of the Delaware Indians,” 21.
22 The Six Nations of Iroquois consisted of the Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas,
Mohawks, and Tuscaroras. Between the years 1712 and 1732, the Tuscaroras sought refuge
among their Iroquoian relatives of the Five Nations. This southern Iroquoian group had escaped
annihilation during disastrous Indian wars in the Carolinas known as the Tuscarora War. See J. N.
B. Hewitt, “Tuscarora,” in Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, ed. Frederick W.
Hodge, Bulletin, U. S. Bureau of American Ethnology, 30, Part Two (Washington, D. C.:
Smithsonian Institution, 1910), 847.
9The process of change has always intrigued scholars. Bernard Bailyn, Jack Greene,
Edmund Morgan, and Gary Nash, among others, have studied the shifting of cultural and political
identities, a definitive feature of colonial Anglo-America. Within the last two decades, historians
have explored similar changes among the American Indians of the same era. Trailblazing works
such as The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca by Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Invasion Within by
James Axtell, James H. Merrell’s, The Indians’ New World, and Colin Calloway’s, The
American Revolution in Indian Country have successfully addressed both the factors contributing
to changing identities and the adaptive strategies used by natives to counter those challenges.23
Little concern, however, has been shown for changing political structures among American
Indian groups of the colonial and revolutionary era. The historical experiences of the Delaware
Indians during this period present the potential for more study on the phenomena of transformed
tribal organization. Michael N. McConnell, in A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and
Its Peoples, 1724-1774, chronicles the meshing of eastern Indian migrant groups and how they
re-established themselves in the Upper Ohio Valley during the eighteenth century. He notes that
Delawares “reconstituted in the west” and coalesced into an ethnic nation. McConnell alludes to
“the process of Delaware consolidation,” but does not fully explore the historical dynamics of
this procedure.24 Gregory Dowd, in his study of pan-Indian movements in the Ohio country and
Great Lakes during the 1760s, maintains that the Delawares were in a continual state of disunity
until they reached the Ohio. By the 1750s, he notes that a “sense of commonality as a people
had emerged.” According to Dowd, Delaware bands united under a “shared sense of experience”
(the migration west) and a common language.25 With these enticing, yet general observations,
                                                
23 Anthony F. C. Wallace, with the assistance of Sheila C. Steen, The Death and Rebirth
of the Seneca (New York: Knopf, 1969); James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of
Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); James H.
Merrell, The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact through
the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Colin G. Calloway,
The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American
Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
24 Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples,
1724-1774  (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 225.
 25 Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the
British Empire (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 31-33.
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McConnell and Dowd have left open for deeper inquiry the saga of nation building among
Delaware tribes.
Duane Champagne and Amy Schutt have also examined the process of Delaware national
evolution. They, however, broached only one dimension in the complex history of the Delawares.
Both Champagne and Schutt write on the role of religion as the chief ingredient for political
unification and a national formation. In “The Delaware Revitalization Movement of the Early
1760s,” Champagne focuses on the nativist movements that spawned among the Indians in the
Ohio and Allegheny valleys in the later part of the French and Indian War. During this nativist
movement, spiritual leaders among the Delawares, such as Neolin, encouraged Indians to reject
the materialism of commercial trade with Europeans and to return to more traditional ways of
life. Champagne maintains that the Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes of Delawares, in reaction to
revitalist trends, united as a centralized political structure. According to Champagne, the
Delawares “formed a national unit with recognized chieftainship, a principal chief, head warriors
in each phratry, and a national council for collective decision making.” 26
Schutt stresses that the Delawares, influenced by the Moravians, drew upon native
frameworks, such as the selection of phratry leaders and adapted to “new conceptions of tribal
organization” (a centralized structure).27 She insists that Moravian missionaries and their
converts gained a “reputation as reconcilers” and led the Delawares to political unification and the
forging of a national identity.28
The views of McConnell, Dowd and in particular, the research of Champagne and Schutt,
need strong consideration in the story of the building of a Delaware Indian nation. While the role
of religion (whether revivalist spirituality or Christianity) common language and common
experiences can all be seen as influential in nation building, they were not the sole driving forces
as the means. There are many more important factors and dynamics to be included in the mix.
John Moore, an anthropologist who specializes in the socio-political organization of the
Cheyenne Indians of the Great Plains, observes:
                                                
26 Duane Champagne, “The Delaware Revitalization Movement of the Early 1760s: A
Suggested Reinterpretation,” American Indian Quarterly 12 (Spring 1988): 121-122
27 Amy C. Schutt, “Forging Identities: Native Americans and Moravian Missionaries in
Pennsylvania and Ohio, 1765-1782” (Ph. D. diss., Indiana University, 1995), 260.
28 Ibid., 186.
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Nations, like all social institutions of whatever size, have a beginning and
an end. But neither the beginning nor the end of a nation’s history is
determined by chance. Rather, both are controlled by conditions of
political economy that can be described in scientific terms. A nation is like
a biological individual. It is born from the shared needs of possibly diverse
people who group[ed] together out of self-interest.29
Much of this analogy could be applied to Delaware Indian groups of colonial America.
Delawares slowly unified throughout the eighteenth century in response to their repressive
treatment at the hands of the Pennsylvania-Iroquois alliance, their sense of common cause as they
migrated west, and their need to persevere in the geo-political environment of the Ohio country.
This regional identity was further enhanced once western Delawares permanently separated
themselves, at least politically, from their eastern kin remaining on the Susquehanna. In doing so,
they removed themselves from their traumatic past to become reborn as a people, exposed and
receptive to new possibilities of political integration.
 In their new western homeland, influential tribal leaders, such as Tamaqua, Shingas,
White Eyes, Captain Pipe, and Buckongahelas came to the forefront to express and lobby for
their distinct visions of Delaware destiny to a Great Council, congregated inside a national council
house. Most importantly, while McConnell, Champagne, and Schutt treat the political
consolidation as a finished product, there is a need to take the story a step further--a need to
make a more realistic appraisal of the Delaware nation as it entered the nineteenth century.
Delaware unity was fragile and short-lived. The three animal tribes of Delawares
consolidated by 1765 and did so in response to the presence of British military in the Ohio.
McConnell, Champagne, and Schutt have each contributed to an invaluable foundation in
unraveling the story of the Delaware Indian nation. They, however, have failed to see the
paradoxical nature of this national growth. When the American Revolution entered Indian country
in 1780, a consolidated nation, as furthered by McConnell, Champagne, and Schutt, became
greatly undermined by forces brewing beneath the surface. As Delawares strove for unifying the
12
three animal tribes, the nation was being simultaneously torn apart by factionalism, that being the
internal conflict between the pro-American faction of White Eyes and the pro-British Captain
Pipe. Unity was not strong enough; the Delaware nation was not mature enough to withstand the
factionalism that disrupted both the Great Council and the trajectory of a developing nation. By
1795, with an American military invasion into Ohio, the Delaware nation was greatly weakened.
Delawares became geographically, ethnically, and politically scattered once again.
This dissertation will examine the tangents in the forming of a Delaware nation, but also
consider the factors that led to its quick decline by 1795. Historians have scratched the surface or
established a plausible framework for explaining the growth of the Delaware Indian nation. This
study, however, will show the full progression of the Delaware nation and also detail the long-
ignored facet of national decline and downfall. Thus the story of Delaware nationhood from 1730
to 1795 demonstrates a fight for independence and unity and the futile struggle to erect and
maintain a stable political edifice. In the end, however, the Delaware polity became fragmented--a
quasi-Indian nation forced, as in the past, to migrate west.
                                                                                                                                                            
29 John H. Moore, The Cheyenne Nation: A Social and Demographic History (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 14.
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          Chapter I
“We Conquer’d you; we made Women of you”:
The Six Nations-Pennsylvania Chain of Friendship and
the Western Migration of the Delawares, 1730-1750
In Philadelphia on July 9, 1742, Pennsylvania governor George Thomas met in council
with chiefs of the Six Nations of Iroquois, Sassoonan (also known as Alumapees) of the
Schuylkill Delawares, and Nutimus, a leader of the “Fork Indians” (Munsee-Delawares). The
purpose of the meeting was to remove Nutimus’s people from the land surrounding the Forks of
the Delaware River when they failed to honor a treaty allegedly made fifty years earlier, which
relinquished Indian rights to this region.1 Thomas condemned the “Insolence” of those Delawares
who had sent written protests to Pennsylvania magistrates regarding this recent land cession.
Delaware leaders contended that Pennsylvania officials had cheated them out of their remaining
homeland. Thomas accused the Delawares of treating the proprietors with the “utmost
Rudeness” and asked the Iroquois delegation to “punish them as they deserve.” 2 Three days
later, on July 12, the Onondaga orator Canasatego asserted his authority as a powerful
spokesman and chastised his “Cousins” (Nutimus and other Delaware leaders) for selling land
that he believed they had no right to sell, and then wanting the land back. He called the Delawares
an emasculated and conquered people who did not have the strength to hold onto their land.
Nutimus and the Delaware council left in disgrace and bitterness.3
By these actions in 1742, the Six Nations formally proclaimed their dominance over the
Delawares of Pennsylvania. The scathing rhetoric of Canasatego demonstrated the political
                                                
1
 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania From the Organization to the
Termination of the Proprietary Government, 16 vols. (1851; reprint, New York: AMS Press
1968), 4: 575-576 (hereafter MPCP). Sassoonan’s Schuylkill Indians were southern Delawares
and were distinct from Nutimus and the northern bands. See William A. Hunter, “The Ohio, The
Indian’s Land,” Pennsylvania History 21 (1954): 342.
2  MPCP 4: 575.
3
 Canasatego in ibid., 4: 579. The term “cousin” is also confusing. It does not suggest
equality. According to Conrad Weiser, 1696-1760, Indian agent to the Mohawks, the term cousin
signified one “under Command” of another. See Wallace, Weiser, 271, 450.
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climate in Pennsylvania at that time. The Iroquois placed a stigma on the proud Delawares when
they ridiculed their status as peacemakers or women. Iroquois dominance led to tensions between
the Delawares and the Proprietors of Pennsylvania and accelerated the migration of Delawares
from their homeland in the Delaware and Susquehanna River valleys to land west of the
Allegheny Mountains. Many Delawares became involved in the search for a new homeland and
strove to retain their self-esteem as a people.
The Six Nations-Pennsylvania alliance drastically transformed the world of the Delaware
Indians. However, the very nature of colonial Pennsylvania at that time, with its expanding white
settlements, the rum trade, and the lack of game was equally detrimental to the Delawares. These
demographic pressures forced them to seek solutions through western migration.
The final straw was the humiliation heaped upon Delaware leaders by Canasatego. Much
of Canasatego’s rhetoric can be seen as bluster--a political maneuver to elevate Iroquois influence
in the eyes of the Anglos at the expense of vulnerable Delaware leaders. Canasatego threatened
Nutimus: “You ought to be taken by the Hair of the Head and shak’d severely till you recover
your Senses and become Sober . . . Your Cause is bad, your Heart far from being upright, and you
are maliciously bent to break the Chain of friendship with our Brother Onas (the Pennsylvania
governor). . . .”  He then tried to alter the once-honorable intention of the diplomatic metaphor of
“woman.” Canasatego reminded the Delaware leaders, “We conquer’d You, we made Women of
you, you know you are Women, and can no more sell Land than Women.” 4 Canasatego then
claimed for the Iroquois the rights to land south of the Kittatinny Mountains, a territory to
which the Six Nations had no rights.
Canasatego represented a confederation of Indian nations that carried great clout in the
Anglo-Indian world of colonial America. The Iroquois Confederation was very important in the
story of the development of a Delaware nation. The role and subsequent actions of the Five, and
later after 1730, the Six Nations, influenced directly or indirectly by Europeans, had immense
impact upon the politicization and unification of once-decentralized Delaware bands.
The relationship of the Delawares with the Six Nations is embedded in both native oral
traditions and the colonial historical record. Key to this relationship was the transformation of
                                                
4 For Canasatego’s speech on July 12, 1742 see MPCP 4: 579. For a narrative on this
event see Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 342-346; Wallace, Teedyuscung, 37-38;
Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 190-192.
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the cultural / diplomatic metaphor of “woman” and how it applied to the Delawares throughout
history. In Lenape oral history, they at one time lived near the Namesi Sipu, the “River of Fish”
(Mississippi River). In this western country, the Lenape lived close to the Mengwe (Iroquois).
As both people moved to the east in search of a permanent homeland they came across the
Alligewi or Allegheny tribes of the Ohio. 5 The Allegheny tribes became alarmed when the
Lenape and Iroquois entered their country. They “made a furious attack” on the two groups.6
Lenape and Mengwe warriors united to fight the Alligewis. A great battle ensued in which
“Hundreds fell.” The Allegheny tribes deserted their towns on the Alligewi Sipus (Allegheny
River) and fled to the Mississippi country.7 Eventually the allied Lenape and Iroquois tribes
separated and moved to new homelands. The Lenape settled on the “four great rivers,” the
Hudson, Susquehanna, Potomac, and Delaware. The Iroquois moved to inhabit the region
between the Hudson River to the western shores of Lake Erie and north to the periphery of the
St. Lawrence River. They became known as the Haudenosaunee (“We of the Extended Lodge”). 8  
After generations of peaceful relations, tensions arose between the two neighbors.
According to the Lenape traditions, the Iroquois became jealous of Lenape strength and
treacherously conducted war excursions into Lenape'hokink (Land of the Lenape), “frequently
surprising them at their hunting camps.” 9 The Mengwe, “finding that they were no match for so
powerful an enemy as the Lenape,” entered into a confederation of five Iroquois nations—“by
which they would be bound to make a common cause, and meet the common enemy with their
united force. . . .”10
                                                
5 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 47-49.
6 Ibid., 49.
7 Ibid., 50.
8 Ibid., 50-51; Hitakonanu'laxk (Tree Beard), Grandfathers Speak, 6.
9 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 54.
10 Ibid., 55. This is the Delaware version (as related to Heckewelder) regarding the
formation of the Iroquois Great League of Peace, sometime during the fifteenth or sixteenth
centuries. Of course, the Iroquois rationale regarding the formation of this league is quite
different. Their oral traditions maintain that the five tribes of Iroquois were in constant warfare
with one another. The Huron prophet Deganawidah, together with the Onondaga war captain
Hiawatha, traveled from village to village teaching the Iroquois the value of strength and unity as
a way to gain peace and security. They brought the Great Law of the League to the Iroquois
Confederation. The period of their gradual formation has been estimated from 1142 to 1580. See
Arthur C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law
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Bloody conflict followed, with the Delawares being the victors on many occasions against
the Five Nations during the early seventeenth century. At the same time the French settled in
Canada and placed great pressure on the confederated Iroquois tribes. The Five Nations could no
longer afford a war on two fronts. The leaders of the Iroquois tribes sought peace and entered
into an alliance with the Delawares.11
An arrangement between the Lenapes and Iroquois was reached at Nordham's Kill
(outside of present-day Albany) in the early 1600s. The Five Nations needed a powerful ally to
gain border security and did so by making an alliance with the Delaware tribes.12
This plan was very deeply laid, and was calculated to deprive the Lenape
and their allies, not only of their power but of their military fame, which
had exalted them above all the other Indian nations. They [the Delawares]
were to be persuaded to abstain from the use of arms, and assume the
station of mediators and umpires among their warlike neighbours. In the
language of the Indians, they were to be made women.13   
                                                                                                                                                            
(Albany: New York State Museum, Bulletin No. 184, 1916), 97-113; Fenton, Great Law and
Longhouse, 51-65; Leon Shenandoah, foreword to Paul A. W. Wallace, The White Roots of
Peace: The Iroquois Book of Life (1946; reprint, Santa Fe: Clear Light Publishers, 1994), 13.
11 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 55-56.
12 Ibid., 60-62. Heckewelder gained information from a Reverend C. Pyrlaeus, who
contended that the Dutch arranged for this alliance at Nordham’s Kill. The Dutch wanted to
disarm the Delawares, whom they saw as a serious military threat. Most importantly, neither
Pyrlaeus nor the Moravian missionary David Zeisberger (both of who intimately knew the
Iroquois) heard of any epic battle in which the Five Nations routed and conquered the Lenapes.
This battle seems to be entrenched in Lenape oral traditions. Zeisberger maintains that the title of
“woman” meant the Delawares were highly respected as peacemakers. The Iroquois “recognized
the superior strength of the Delawares” and wanted to avoid a war that they might lose. See
Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,” 34. Delaware traditions also recognized
themselves as the prominent peacemakers and the Five Nations as the warriors in this alliance.
See Daniel Brinton, The Lenape and Their Legends; With the Complete Text and Symbols of the
Walum Olum (1884; reprint, New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1969), 110, 114, 120. Delawares may
have also inflated their own importance, as did the Iroquois when they asserted a mythical
dominance over other tribes.
13 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 56. For a more in-depth
historiographical discussion and cultural analysis on the term “woman,” see Appendix 2.
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Delaware oral traditions argue that only a “powerful nation” could be designated as
women in an alliance. During the 1820s, an aged Lenape informant told John Heckewelder that
“As men they had been dreaded; as women they would be respected and honored, none would be
so daring or so base as to attack or insult them. . . .”  Heckewelder contends that the term woman
was not a label of weakness or subjugation. Only a people of strength, wisdom, and influence,
such as the Lenape, could attain the title of women among Algonquian speakers.14 Once again the
Moravians may have invented or elaborated upon the potency of a collective Delaware people.
In the written historical context, there are other explanations regarding this relationship
between the Delawares and Iroquois. In 1677 New York Governor Edmund Andros, together
with Daniel Garacontie of the Onondagas, united his colony and his Iroquois allies with other
English colonies to form the Covenant Chain of Peace. This chain became a “bisocietal structure
including both tribes and colonies”--an alliance of New York, New England, Maryland, and
Virginia with the Five Nations of Iroquois, refugee Algonquian tribes from King Philip’s War
who now resided in Andros’s colony, and all tribes who were tributaries of the Iroquois. Both
the English and the Five Nations needed to ally with each other as a way to counter French
presence on the periphery of English northern colonies and, in the case of the Iroquois, to counter
the increasing-strength of Algonquian tribes in the west. Since many of the Delaware bands at
this time lived within the confines of New York colony, they became part of this alliance.
Delawares, alarmed at the increasing racial violence on the borders of Virginia and Maryland
between Indians and colonial militias, sought the protection offered by Andros and his covenant.
The Iroquois gave the Delawares the metaphorical title of women. This title only “implied a
degree of subordination” to the Five Nations and was a political “by-product” of this Covenant
Chain.15
                                                
14 Ibid., 58.
15 Francis Jennings, “The Delaware Indians in the Covenant Chain,” in Herbert C. Kraft,
ed., A Delaware Indian Symposium (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum
Commission, 1974), 90; Mary Lou Lustig, The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund
Andros, 1637-1714 (Madison, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), 85-86;
Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 160-161. Andros sought a powerful alliance between New
York and the Five Nations, but he also wanted to protect his colony from the encroachment of
New Englanders who entered New York and offered the Mohawks bounties for the scalps of
refugee New England Indians. These Indians had fled to New York at Andros’s invitation in the
aftermath of King Philip’s War in 1675--a violent uprising of Algonquian tribes against the
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In theory, as part of the Covenant Chain of 1677, the Delawares, in the prestigious role of
peacemaker, had the responsibility to mediate between the Five Nations and all eastern
Algonquians. In this alliance, the Delaware groups were made tributaries, in a political sense, of
the Iroquois, even though the Five Nations had not conquered them. Under the structure of the
Covenant, the Iroquois would act as spokesmen for the Delawares in addressing the government
of New York.16
In reality, there was a great deal of confusion and misinterpretation regarding the actual
status of the Delaware groups brought into the chain. The Iroquois believed that the Five Nations
held a political domination over all Indian people within the Covenant. However, the Delawares
refuted much of Iroquois claims of dominance and at the same time, the Delawares exaggerated
the importance of their gender designation as women.
Despite the delusions of Iroquois supremacy, from the Delaware point of view, they
underwent a “tribal transformation” during the European colonization of America. Delawares had
a military potential comparable to that of the Six Nations, but without a cohesive political
structure such as the Iroquois Confederation, the majority of Delaware bands veered towards a
course of pacifism and thus gained the symbolic metaphor of  “women.” In Regula Trenkwalder
Schonenberger’s study of the Delawares and their alliance with the Six Nations, she contends that
the “burdens of international alliances and bloody wars fell to the Iroquois.” In accepting their
gender designation as women, the Delawares embraced an ethos of  “pacifist resistance.” 17 They
                                                                                                                                                            
Puritans of New England. Andros, concerned at the potential problems posed by these New
Englanders, created the alliance of the Covenant Chain. Andros also offered refuge to
Susquehannocks and protected them from Maryland revenge. Maryland wanted to use the
Iroquois to police the Chesapeake frontiers and to deliver some of these Susquehannock refugees
to Maryland where they would be tried for frontier atrocities against their colonists. Andros
would not permit the Five Nations to serve Maryland as policemen. Also see Stephen Saunders
Webb, 1676: The End of American Independence (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984),
355-405; Lustig, The Imperial Executive in America, 67-98. At the covenant treaty talks in
Albany, Maryland colonial officials referred to the Delawares as “Mattawass or Delaware
Indians.” See William Hand Browne, ed., Archives of Maryland: Proceedings of the Council of
Maryland, 1693-1697, 69 vols. (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1887-1903), 5: 269.
16 Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 160. It is Jennings’s point that the Five
Nations served as the spokesmen to the government of New York on behalf of the Delawares.
17 Regula Trenkwalder Schonenberger, Lenape Women, Matriliny, and the Colonial
Encounter: Resistance and Erosion of Power (c. 1600-1876) (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, Inc.,
European Academic Publishers, 1991), 243.
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believed that they had entered into this alliance from the point of strength and honor. Whatever
the hidden agenda of the Iroquois might have been, it is hard to accept that a martially skilled and
diplomatically savvy people like the Delawares would have accepted such a status if they felt it
was derogatory.
With the entrance of the Penn proprietorship in 1681, the Delawares remained as
members of the Covenant Chain, despite the exclusion of Pennsylvania from the alliance. Iroquois
influence in Pennsylvania was minimal. Delaware leaders in Pennsylvania and New Jersey
interacted with Penn’s government “without Iroquois supervision or participation.”18 Delawares
vacillated in recognizing their tributary status with the Iroquois League; perhaps for political
expediency. In 1712, a Delaware delegation led by Scollitchy and Sassoonan of the Turtle phratry
presented Pennsylvania Governor Charles Gookin with thirty-two wampum belts. These belts
chronicled the history and obligations of the Delaware - Iroquois alliance. The belts also
acknowledged the Delaware role as women and a subdued people within the Covenant Chain.19
Delawares were not always so humbled with regard to their political status within the
Chain. There is evidence that the Delawares resisted this politically subservient position with the
Iroquois Confederation and exhibited a degree of independence. Pennsylvania tribes ignored
mandates from the central council fire at Onondaga as early as 1694. In that year, Delaware and
Conestoga (previously known as Susquehannocks) leaders refused to join the Five Nations on a
war expedition against the French and returned the wampum belts of war. Delaware leaders
received a curt message from the Five Nations: “You Delawares do nothing but stay at home and
boil your pots, and are like women; while we Onondagas and Senecas go abroad and fight against
the enemy.”20 Sassoonan, a proponent of the alliance between his people and the Iroquois, noted
in 1718 that despite their status as peacemakers, his people had the rights to sell their own land.
                                                
18 Jennings, “Delaware Indians in Covenant Chain,” in Kraft, ed., Delaware Indian
Symposium, 93.
19 Delawares in council with Governor Gookin, Philadelphia, May 16, 1712, in MPCP 2:
57-574.
20  Message of the Iroquois as relayed by the Delaware orator named Hithquoquean to
Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor William Markham in Philadelphia, July 6, 1694, in MPCP 1:
410-411.
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“Those Nations [Iroquois] have their own Lands and Countrey and these here [Delawares] have
theirs, and each of them are to Manage their own concerns.” 21
In 1726 or 1727 the Six Nations issued orders to Delaware and Shawnee headmen to help
them with an assault on English settlers, who had moved beyond the Susquehanna and whom the
Confederation feared were gradually encroaching upon Iroquoia. The Six Nations incited these
Pennsylvania tribes: “our Land is goeing to bee taken from us, Come brothers assist us Lett us
fall upon and fightt with the English.” The Delawares and Shawnees refused to participate in this
war against white settlers. In anger the Six Nations told the Delawares, “Since you have nott
hearkened to us, nor Regarded whatt we have said, now wee will [put] pettycoats on you, and
Look upon you as women for the future, and nott as men. . . .” They then commanded the
Shawnees to “Look back toward Ohioh” and return home. To save face, the Six Nations agreed to
cease hostilities against the English settlers and “Lett them have all this Land.” 22 These incidents
demonstrate that “Iroquois hegemony over tributary tribes was not absolute rule.”23
However, the Iroquois Confederation remained a potential military threat to the
Delawares. This reality determined the Lenapes’ need to remain on amiable terms with the
                                                
21 Sassoonan quoted in Jennings, “Delaware Indians in Covenant Chain,” in Kraft, ed.,
Delaware Indian Symposium, 93-94. The Delawares were required to pay tribute in wampum to
the Iroquois. Delawares were called Hiyonwaate (nephew) by the Cayuga and put under the
Iroquois Great Tree of Peace as a younger relative of the Five Nations. The Iroquois considered
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Aboriginal Delaware Life,” Pennsylvania Archaeologist 17 (1947): 21-22.
22 A Shawnee chief named Newcheconner relayed this story, at a later date, to
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Archives, Samuel Hazard, ed., 1st series, 12 vols. (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns and Company,
1851-1852), 1: 329; Indian speeches in Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds.,
Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical
and Museum Commission, 1941), 6-7.
23 Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, xix, 215, 301. According to Jennings, despite
the importance of the Covenant Chain as a cornerstone of Anglo-Iroquoian solidarity, the
Delawares “paid little attention to Iroquois pretensions of superiority.” In fact, the label of
Delawares as “weakling women” was pure nonsense, for the Delawares “constituted one of the
most powerful eastern tribes” of the colonial era. Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, xix, 215.
Jennings, a long-time skeptic of Iroquois imperial supremacy over other tribes, is skeptical of this
relationship between Delawares and Iroquois. He has always disregarded what he sees as the
mythology of Iroquois imperial status--his direct challenge to the Francis Parkman-Lewis
Morgan hypothesis of “super Iroquois.”
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Iroquois within the Covenant Chain. Hence, while Penn’s Indian policy of friendship and
protection were welcomed, Delaware bands remained concerned with Iroquois power and
influence and accepted their status as women, providing it remained an honored title.
It is highly probable that Delaware tributary status was corrupted because the English
associated tributary status with European concepts of feudalism, which was characterized by
subservience, responsibilities, and dominance. The Delawares were not a conquered people, and
for the most part, refused to succumb to Iroquois authority when it overstepped the boundaries
of reciprocal relations. This obstinacy towards the Iroquois also increased when Delawares
experienced a positive relationship with William Penn and his agents, who, according to Thomas
Penn, had “treated them as his Children & Friends. . . .” 24 Penn negotiated directly with the
regional Indians and placed the Delaware tribes under his protection. In Pennsylvania the
Delawares were subordinate to Penn and not the council fire at Onondaga. The Delaware tribes
were acknowledged as Pennsylvania’s Indians.25   
The Delawares received equitable treatment from the Penn government and in return got
along well with the increasingly large numbers of European newcomers who entered the Delaware
River region.26 With this growth, Pennsylvania’s “borderlands became a more complicated, more
contentious place.” New settlers slowly encroached upon the lands of the Delaware and Shawnee
tribes. The death of Penn in 1718 changed the destiny of the Delawares as they gradually became
diminished players in Pennsylvania’s relationship with Indian nations.27
In a shocking turn of events for the Delawares, Pennsylvania authorities befriended the
Iroquois. A shift in Pennsylvania politics in 1726 drove Governor William Keith from office to
be replaced by Patrick Gordon, who in turn, reappointed the influential Secretary James Logan to
head Pennsylvania’s Indian policy. In July 1727, several chiefs of the Five Nations came to
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Philadelphia and met with Gordon and Logan. They were willing to gain a stronger relationship
with Pennsylvania by offering to cede their claims of the Lower Susquehanna River region to
Pennsylvania.28  Gordon and Logan saw a golden opportunity to gain a powerful ally and to use
the power of the Six Nations to prevent the French from gaining influence with Indians on the
periphery of the Pennsylvania colony. Logan, exaggerating the Iroquois control over their allies,
announced: “A treaty should be sett on foot with the Five Nations, who have an absolute
authority as well over the Shawanese as all our Indians.” 29
This assertion of authority would not be an easy task for the Iroquois Confederation. The
Six Nations could not control the Delaware bands that lacked a centralized council and were
scattered geographically from the Delaware to the Susquehanna River valleys. Because of
demographic pressures, Delaware Indians by the beginning of the eighteenth century settled in
three principal geographic regions. The Schuylkill Indians, recognized by William A. Hunter as an
“aggregation, and at least a partial unification of bands” from southeastern Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, would slowly evolve to become the heart of the Delaware nation. These Indians chose
Sassoonan to be their chief spokesman. Most of these Unami-speaking Indians lived in the
cultural area known as Tulpehocken, in current – day Berks and Lebanon counties. Delawares
called this place “the land of the Turtles.” 30
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29 Statement of James Logan, 1731, in Julian P. Boyd and Carl Van Doren, eds., Indian
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Another locality, the Brandywine River area, accommodated mostly New Jersey
Delawares who migrated into the valley of the Brandywine in southeastern Pennsylvania.
Independent of the Schuylkill Indians, the Brandywine bands selected Checochinican (“person of
few words”) to speak for them. Lastly, there were other New Jersey Indians who migrated across
the Delaware River to settle on the west branch of the Lehigh River where it joined the Delaware
River to the Blue Mountains. Nutimus and Tishcohan, both of the Wolf phratry, and the Turtle
leader known as Lappawinzo, led these “Forks” people, an amalgamation on northern Unami and
Munsee speakers. They contended that they were not newcomers to the forks and that this
region was the land of their ancestors. 31 Each of the three, though connected to one another in
geographical closeness, had a singularly strong regional distinctiveness and had not reached any
degree of unification on a national level.
  Ironically, while this decentralized state worked to an advantage for the Delawares, it
also made the Delawares politically impotent as a voice in colonial Pennsylvania. They could not
fully oppose or show resistance to the new relationship between Pennsylvania and the Six
Nations. According to John Heckewelder, the eventual alliance had left the Delawares
“defenceless” and was forged “for the purpose of shutting their mouths, prevent them from
stating their complaints and grievances, and asking redress” from the Pennsylvania government.32
Pennsylvania’s alliance with the Iroquois was a severe and sobering blow to the
Delawares. The Iroquois and Pennsylvania solidified peace by forming a southern branch of the
chain, independent from the original Covenant Chain among the Iroquois, New York, New
England, and the Chesapeake colonies.33 On October 13, 1736, in Philadelphia, James Logan
hoped that Pennsylvania’s Treaty of Friendship with the Six Nations would last “so long as the
Sun, Moon, & Earth [shall] endure.” 34 
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32 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, xxxiii.
33 Jennings, “Delaware Indians in Covenant Chain,” in Kraft, ed., Delaware Indian
Symposium, 96-97; Merrell, Into the American Woods, 174-175.
34 Logan to an Iroquois delegation in MPCP 4: 90; Frederick B. Tolles, James Logan and
the Culture of Provincial America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1957), 169.
Pennsylvania declined to be part of the Covenant Chain with colonial rival New York. To
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In this new alliance, Logan permitted Iroquois war parties safe passage through
Pennsylvania as they moved south to attack their traditional Cherokee and Catawba enemies. He
promised the Iroquois that he would confine the rum trade to the Susquehanna area and keep
these traders away from Iroquois warriors as they moved south on the war trails of
Pennsylvania. Logan guaranteed the Six Nations a more “reasonable” and better quality of trade
goods “than from those of New York. . . .” 35    
In return, the Iroquois agreed to police the frontiers of western Pennsylvania and keep
this region secure from French encroachment and western Indian aggression.36 Kanickhungo, the
Seneca orator, reassured Logan that though a few Iroquois were living in peace with the French in
Canada, they would “bring back our People” to defend the peripheries of Pennsylvania “if any
new Breach [in the peace] should happen.” 37
 The Six Nations Confederation was also given jurisdiction over Pennsylvania’s Indians.38
The Proprietary Thomas Penn hoped that Logan’s new Indian policy would “strengthen the
hands of the Six Nations, and enable them to be the better answerable for their Tributaries.” 39
The Iroquois leaned heavily upon the “rights of conquest” theory as they reminded colonial
officials that they had defeated the Conestogas and assumed territorial control of their land.40
                                                                                                                                                            
accommodate their own interests, Pennsylvania created an independent southern part of the
Covenant Chain with the Iroquois. The Treaty of Friendship had originally been concluded in
1732, but not finalized until 1736. Leaders of the Six Nations were reluctant to come to
Philadelphia, which suffered through smallpox epidemics. Also see Fenton, Great Law and
Longhouse, 404.
35 Logan to Iroquois in Philadelphia, Oct. 14, 1736, in MPCP 4: 93-94.
36 Jennings, “Delaware Indians in Covenant Chain,” in Kraft, ed., Delaware Indian
Symposium, 96-97; Wallace, Weiser, 44-45.
37 Kanickhungo to Thomas Penn and James Logan in Philadelphia, October 2, 1736, in
MPCP 4: 85.
38 Pennsylvania was slowly veering towards this alliance with the Iroquois. Years before
the signing of the treaty, Pennsylvania officials told Confederation leaders that with an alliance,
the Iroquois would have “an absolute Authority” over all Indians in Pennsylvania, and would
have the right to “command them as they please.” See Pennsylvania officials to Iroquois,
September 1, 1728, in MPCP 3: 329-330.
39 Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, Jan. 10, 1756, Penn Letter Books, Philadelphia:
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 4: 205-207.
40  Francis Jennings, “The Delaware Interregnum,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of
History and Biography 89 (April 1965): 184-185. For the details on the defeat and subjugation of
the Susquehannocks (later known as Conestogas), see Francis Jennings, “Glory, Death, and
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Kanickhungo declared that he not only spoke for the Confederation, but also spoke for “the
Delawares, Canayes [Conoys], & the Indians living on the Sasquehanna, & all the other Indians
who now are in League & Friendship with the Six Nations . . .” 41 The Iroquois, however,
respected Lenape rights to land drained by the Delaware River.42 At least for the time being. 
In the Treaty of Friendship between the Six Nations and Pennsylvania, “men in the
Iroquois capital of Onondaga and Philadelphia worked to control the native peoples living
between them.” 43 Thomas Penn reminded the Six Nations that “We will constantly keep a Fire
for you here at Philadelphia and the Towns of the Six Nations, which we will on our parts, clear
from every Grub, Stump & Log, that it may be straight, smooth & free for us and you.” The
once-honored Pennsylvania tribes of Delaware Indians were not only metaphorically reduced to
debris and obstacles but also in a demeaning tone, referred to by Penn as “our Indians.” 44 The
Delawares had lost their diplomatic stature and eventually were wrested from their homelands.45
  Land became a major point of contention as Pennsylvania sought to extinguish the last
Lenape claims to the Delaware River valley. In essence, the Pennsylvania alliance with the Six
Nations helped to “simplify the transfer” of the Susquehanna and Delaware valleys to
Pennsylvania.46 The Pennsylvania proprietors hoped that the strength of this political
arrangement with the Six Nations would help the colony’s economic and geographic expansion.47
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44 Thomas Penn to an Iroquois delegation at the proposals for the Treaty of Friendship
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The Iroquois-Pennsylvania alliance challenged the Delawares and much of their rights to
their homeland. In 1737, Thomas and John Penn, in concert with Logan, sanctioned the
fraudulent “Walking Purchase.” Delaware leaders had allegedly agreed in 1676 to acknowledge
Pennsylvania’s boundaries in the Delaware Valley by permitting provincial claims to extend as
far as a man could walk in a day and a half. In a treacherous act, Pennsylvania officials had a path
cut through the woods before the planned walk and hired three trained “fast walkers” to cover
more ground than that of an average man. Delaware observers protested when these walkers
covered sixty miles in one day and thus claimed most of the Lehigh Hills. The Forks leader
Tishcohan accused Pennsylvania of duplicity: “You Run, thats not fair, you was to Walk.” 48
Lappawinzo complained that the walkers did not “sit down to smoke,” did not take the time to
“shoot a squirrel, [and did nothing but] run, run, run all day long.” 49 The Delawares were forced
to relinquish more land than intended.
Logan fomented much of the Delaware alienation. At the 1736 talks in Philadelphia, the
Iroquois initially refused to claim Delaware lands because they feared that “they shoud doe
anything amis to their [cousins].” 50 The Iroquois clearly understood that they “laid no manner
of Claim to the Lands on [the] Delaware River or on the Waters running into” that river. Logan,
however, was adamant; he understood the importance of the Iroquois taking control of these
lands from their tributaries. He hoped that the Six Nations would “Declare that they release to
the Proprietors of Pennsylvania . . . all [Lenape] Lands Between [the] Delaware and
Susquehannah and as far to the north as the Blue Mts [Kittatinny Mountains].” 51
                                                
48 Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 189; Richard C. Adams, The Delaware Indians: A
Brief History (1906; reprint, Saugerties, New York: Hope Farm Press, 1995), 20. Richard Adams
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51 James Logan to Conrad Weiser, August 18, 1736, Logan Papers, Philadelphia:
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 11:26; Jennings, “Delaware Interregnum,” 185. This region
from Easton up to the Delaware River, including the Lehigh Valley, and to the Kittatinny
Mountains was again hotly contested. In 1759, the eastern Delaware chief named Teedyuscung,
instigated by anti-proprietary Quakers, maintained that the Delawares had been cheated out of
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It was the proprietors who pressured the Six Nations to assert their authority over the
Delawares. In 1738, Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor George Thomas asked that the Iroquois
“remove immediately . . . those vile ones from the Forks of [the] Delaware.” 52 Logan wanted the
Six Nations to “assume total suzerainty over all the Indians” in Pennsylvania, including the
Delawares.53 He believed the Delawares were “weak and too often knavish” and not worthy to
strike a treaty on their own, without Iroquois supervision.54 Four principal Iroquois leaders
cooperated with Logan by denying Delaware rights and ceding the forks of the Delaware to
Pennsylvania.55  Most importantly, they told Logan and the Proprietors never to purchase lands
from the Delawares, who were a “people of no virtue and have nowhere a fire burning and deal
very often unjust with our friends and brethren the English.” 56  Here the Iroquois were
reminding Pennsylvania that the Delawares, without a central council, were impotent props of
the League.
                                                                                                                                                            
this tract of land. He demanded fair compensation. In June of 1759, the Board of Trade for the
British Crown ordered Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern
Department to settle the issue. Johnson met with Teedyuscung and other eastern Delawares in
Easton during the summer of 1762 and confirmed that the Proprietors had not cheated the
Delawares out of this land. Johnson suggested that the Pennsylvania government give the
Delawares gifts (to be valued at two hundred British pounds) “as a Token of their friendship for
them. . . .” Teedyuscung and other Delawares agreed to renounce claim to this region and
recognize Pennsylvania as the rightful owner. See the letter from Sir William Johnson to the
Lords of Trade, Aug. 1, 1762 in James Sullivan, et al; eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14
vols. (Albany: State University of New York, 1921-1965), 3: 850-851.
52 Lieutenant Governor George Thomas, in Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties by Benjamin
Franklin,  xxxi-xxxii, 31.
53 Jennings, “Delaware Interregnum,” 181.
54 Logan quoted in Jennings, “Delaware Indians in Covenant Chain,” in Kraft, ed.,
Delaware Indian Symposium, 96.
55 Wallace, Weiser, 75.
56 Petition of Iroquois leaders to Thomas Penn, Nov. 19, 1737, in Boyd, ed., Indian
Treaties by Benjamin Franklin, xxvii. For the most part, the Six Nations were more concerned
about compensation for their claims to land on the Susquehanna and Shenandoah from the
governments of Virginia and Maryland. It could be surmised that these Iroquois believed that if
they cooperated with Logan regarding the removal of Delaware Indians, Logan might intercede on
their behalf to help the Six Nations receive “just” compensation from Virginia and Maryland.
Also see Jennings, “Delaware Interregnum,” 185. Julian Boyd mentions that the Proprietors set
aside 6,500 acres of land in the Delaware Forks for Lenape use until 1757. This tract was not cut
up for survey until 1789. Regarding motives: Pennsylvania diligently pursued possession of the
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 The metaphor of woman became further misinterpreted when the Pennsylvania
government sought to remove the Delawares from the Delaware and Susquehanna River valleys
to allow for white settlement. The obliging Six Nations of Iroquois now decided that a petticoat
signified weakness rather than a peace-making ability once attributed to the Delawares. When the
Onondaga orator Canasatego addressed the Delawares in 1742 that “We [the Iroquois] conquer'd
you, we made Women of you,” 57 he was well aware that Pennsylvania officials were watching.
Canasatego sought to elevate Iroquois status by denigrating the Delawares. The metaphor
continued to lose its original meaning and through misinterpretation and manipulation became a
title of derision.58
Despite the political posturing of Canasatego at the Philadelphia talks, he made a
“peremptory Command the Delawares did not dare to disobey.” He ordered them to leave the
forks of the Delaware River and to move to the Shamokin and Wyoming valleys on the
Susquehanna River in northeastern Pennsylvania where the Six Nations could “have you more
under our eye.” 59 At Shamokin, on the forks of the Susquehanna River (modern Sunbury,
Pennsylvania), the Six Nations had earlier in 1728 appointed the Oneida chief known as
Shikellamy (“He Enlightens Us”) to preside as vice regent over the bands of Delawares,
Shawnees, and Iroquois in this multi-tribal town.60 By these actions, the Proprietors gave carte
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58 Also see Nancy Shoemaker, “An Alliance between Men: Gender Metaphors in
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60 Fenton, Great Law and Longhouse, 399, 404, 424. Shamokin, because of its proximity
to Philadelphia and trade and diplomatic activities became “the hub of the Pennsylvania Indian
universe.” Also see James H. Merrell, “Shamokin, ‘the very seat of the Prince of darkness’:
Unsettling the Early American Frontier,” in Andrew R. L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute, eds.,
Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750-1830
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 16-59. Sassoonan in Jennings,
“Delaware Interregnum,” 190. Shickellamy, an Iroquois, represented the interests of the Six
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blanche to the council at Onondaga regarding control of Pennsylvania’s Indians. As Francis
Jennings observes, “To the Delawares the Chain of Friendship was a rather unfriendly sort of
chain.” 61
The Six Nations-Pennsylvania alliance became “a blatant tool for provincial expansion.”
Delawares and Shawnees found themselves “trapped in an Iroquois-Pennsylvania vise.” 62  The
Delawares, stripped of all titles to land as Pennsylvania sided with the land claims of the Six
Nations, became outcasts in their own country.63 In this new Pennsylvania Indian policy,
Delaware autonomy was suppressed and all their bargaining power was “made invalid” by Logan
and the schism he created.64 The Iroquois enjoyed their exalted status. They boasted to
Pennsylvania officials: “We are the Chief of all the Indians.” 65 The Six Nations reminded the
Penn government that “their Cousins, the Delawares, have no lands to dispose of ” and, in order
to avoid future Walking Purchase controversies, “not to buy or accept of any Grants of Lands
from them.” 66 This blatant injustice, aimed at the Delawares, would serve later as a rallying
point in the formation of a Delaware nation.
While the Chain of Friendship aggravated a discontent among Penn’s Indians and
contributed in driving them from their homelands, other dynamics entered into the assault on the
Delawares. The ramifications of colonial settlement: overcrowding, disease, lack of game, and the
rum trade, became interwoven with the machinations of the political alliance of the Six Nations
and Pennsylvania, to become the crucial factors that led to Delaware western migration.
In 1728, Pennsylvania officials permitted newly arrived German Palatines to settle in the
Tulpehocken Valley, encroaching upon the homeland of the southern Unami groups of Delawares
                                                                                                                                                            
Nations in Pennsylvania. He looked over Delaware affairs at the town of Shamokin. See Milton
W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson: Colonial American, 1715-1763 (Port Washington, New York:
Kennikat National University Publications, 1976), 47-48.
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Ziegler Printing Co., Inc., 1927), 122-133.
62 McConnell, A Country Between, 57.
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1742” (Master’s thesis, Duquesne University, 1966), 60.
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and pressuring them to sell this country. Sassoonan was shocked and said, “he could not himself
believe the Christians had settled” in the place known as the “land of the Turtles.” He had to see
“with his own eyes . . . the Houses and Fields they made there.” 67   
Brandywine Delawares suffered the same fate as Sassoonan’s Schuylkill Indians. In 1729,
Checochinican complained to the Pennsylvania council that his Delawares were being crowded
out of their homes by German settlements. These intruders also disrupted the hunting and fishing
of the Brandywine people. Checochinican, whose complaints fell upon deaf ears, lamented, “we
are redused to great wants & hardships not withstanding. . . .” 68   Some Brandywines moved to
uninhabited parts of the Upper Susquehanna. By 1732, those who remained in the Brandywine
Valley departed to live at Paxtung (current day Harrisburg). Eventually the Brandywine Indians,
subsumed by the other Delaware bands at Paxtung, lost their group identity. 69
Delawares had to face a steady influx of new settlers, who entered into the Susquehanna
country and contributed to the depletion of game. Conrad Weiser, the Pennsylvania agent to the
Iroquois, noted that the Susquehanna Delawares were in a state of crisis. On a visit to a Delaware
town on the north branch of the Susquehanna in March of 1737, Weiser witnessed the squalor
found among these people as he was surrounded by “bony little children who crowded around
with tears on their stolid faces.” He could only offer these children a weak soup made of corn
meal and ashes. Most of the people in the town, unable to find game, subsisted for weeks on
maple juice and sugar water.70 A Delaware elder told Weiser that the Delawares had brought
about the demise of animals when they over-hunted. He maintained that his people had become
overly fond of alcohol and killed too many animals for their skins to trade for rum. The old man
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Archives, 1st series, 1: 239-240.
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believed that the Great Spirit had “driven the wild animals out of the country,” would not bring
them back until the Delawares “cease from [their] sins” and shun “strong liquors.” 71
 The rum trade was as disruptive as were the intrusions of white settlers. Sassoonan
complained that “ill People amongst the Christians” were bringing too much rum into the
Delaware towns, resulting in violence and “Mischief.” He urged Pennsylvania Governor Patrick
Gordon to regulate the rum trade and keep the traders from entering Shamokin.72 Two members
of the Pennsylvania Assembly warned that if the rum trade were not controlled, “some fatal
Quarrel with the Indians” would result. They condemned the traders who entered Delaware and
Shawnee communities in the Susquehanna Valley and brought “Spirituous Liquors amongst them,
their Cheating of them of their Skins and Wampum, and Debauching their Wives. . . .” 73
In search of food and weary of colonial settlement, bands of Delawares (mostly southern
Unami) and Shawnees increasingly hunted and lived west of the Allegheny Mountains. This
gradual move to the hunting camps in the western reaches of the Allegheny and Ohio had started
as early as the 1720s. Shawnees, who were anti-British and who lived close to Lenape towns in
the Lebanon and Delaware valleys, instigated bands of Delawares to move with them west, out of
the reach of increasing Iroquois dominance and the rush of Anglo settlers. The Six Nations
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dismissed these Ohio Indians as “mere hunters” and not important in the greater scope of
Iroquois affairs.74
In 1725, the Turtle and Turkey tribes of Delawares led by Shannopin established a
principal town on the banks of the Allegheny River and called it Kittanning (“at the Big
River”).75 In two separate land dealings arranged in 1731 and 1732, the Penns purchased the rest
of the lands belonging to “Sassoonan . . . Sachem of the Schuylkil Indians.” Delawares of the
Turtle totem, without the consent of either Sassoonan or Pennsylvania officials, eventually
relocated to western Pennsylvania.76 Others remained in the east and moved with Sassoonan, the
ancient figurehead King of the Delawares, to Shamokin. However, many more Delaware Indians
escaped the demographic pressures and uncertainty of the east and migrated to the west.77
The “migratory stream” of Delawares and Shawnees “accelerated rapidly” after the late
1720s; by 1731, an estimated 400 to 500 Indians moved into the Allegheny and Ohio regions and
established communities such as Kiskimineta’s Town, Shannopin’s Town, Frankstown, Tioga,
and Pymatuning--all of which stabilized the new cultural environment of migrant Indians and
both Anglo and French traders.78 Thomas Penn and Governor Gordon became alarmed that
French traders in the Ohio were seeking to win over the Pennsylvania tribes. Pennsylvania
officials, through the intercession of the Six Nations, sent messages to Shawnees and Delawares
in the west. A Seneca leader named Tyoninhogarao told the old Shawnee chief Kakowatchy that
his people “should not look to Ohio, but turn his face to us [the Six Nations],” who “never
intended to hurt the Shawanese.” He then sent a message to Sassoonan and reminded him that his
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Delawares “must all come back from Ohio, for they should not settle there. . . .” 79  Penn later
met with Delaware and Shawnee leaders in Philadelphia and asked them why “they should retire
such a distance from us. . . .” They told him that the “place where they are now Settled [suits]
them much better than to live nearer” to the government in Philadelphia. They concluded that
they could live much better in the west than “any where on the Susquehannah.” 80 To alleviate
the concerns of Penn and Gordon that the Ohio Indians would fall under the influence of the
French, they warned Opakethwa and Opakeita of the Shawnees that “while the French [were]
civil to them . . . they [the Indians] must not prefer any other People to the English . . . their true
friends.” 81 This reminder by Pennsylvania officials did not deter the Shawnees from remaining in
the Ohio and moving closer to the friendship of the French. Many Delawares, assessing their
reduction in importance to the Penn government, were quick to follow the Shawnees.
By the early 1740s, most Forks and Munsee Delawares moved with bands of Shawnees
to the north and west branches of the Susquehanna, where they remained until the end of the
Seven Years’ War. After that time, the northern Unami and Munsee Delawares moved into the
Allegheny Valley of northwestern Pennsylvania. Other Delaware bands migrated from the
Wyoming Valley to the Ohio. On the Ohio River, north of the three rivers, Delawares established
the principal multi-tribal diplomatic and trade center of Logstown (modern-day Ambridge,
Pennsylvania).82
In 1742, the Wolf and Turkey tribes established a cluster of four towns in the Beaver
Valley (from current-day New Castle, Pennsylvania, to the west along the Mahoning River)
known as Kuskuskies. The Kuskuskies eventually became the political focus of Delaware
military and political activity in the west.83 In these towns, Indians and British traders from
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Pennsylvania “bartered merchandise, swapped information, and forged personal alliances that
promoted both business and a sense of common interests,” all of which helped to build a “new
regional identity.” 84  Much of this identity revolved around Delaware migrants being immersed
in a region that allowed for both independence and a new sense of political-economic
empowerment. Their ethnic identity intensified as other migrant Indian nations moved in, seeking
the same kind of new start as the incoming Delawares. The polyglot environment of peoples in
the Ohio did not water down Delaware ethnic and political similarities. Rather, gradually as more
Lenapes and Munsees entered into the Ohio, a stronger sense of commonality was enhanced
among the western Delawares.
Indicative of the mix of the Ohio country were the multi-national Indian towns, such as
Logstown. The Delawares shared Logstown with Shawnees and bands of western Senecas and
Cayugas, who as transplanted Indians to the Ohio became known as Mingos.85 In 1733, a “very
great sickness [probably smallpox] amongst the Six Nations” 86 drove bands of Senecas and
Cayugas west into the hunting grounds of the Upper Ohio. In 1741, more groups of Senecas
moved into the Ohio to escape a life-threatening drought and poor corn harvests. These Senecas
settled at the junction of the Mahoning and Shenango rivers and named the town Kuskuski.87 
Despite the potential for ethnic blurring, western Delawares embraced the Ohio country
and all it offered. The Ohio region reinforced their push for freedom from the Proprietors of
Philadelphia, the council fires at Onondaga, and the territorial intrusions of Anglo settlers. This
political self-sufficiency could only be supported by the Ohio country itself--a country rich in
game and with access to both the rivers and Euramerican traders. These factors were crucial for
Delaware independence and eventual nationhood.
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Delawares entered this new territory as “pioneering newcomers” rather than invaders.
The Ohio was once a game-rich haven for such tribes as the Eries, Monongahelas, Mahonings,
and Akanseas. This region became a “no-man’s-land” when the Iroquois devastated or scattered
these tribes during the Beaver Wars of the 1670s and 1680s.88 After this period, western
Pennsylvania and the Ohio country “was altogether deserted, and free for any People to enter
upon. . . .” 89
Not all Pennsylvania Indians were willing to leave their homelands to seek a better life in
the Ohio. Delawares who adhered to the dictates of Onondaga and remained in the east gradually
witnessed the destruction of their social world and autonomy. They were called “tame” or
“settlement” Indians to differentiate them from the frontier Delawares--the “remote or wild”
natives. Peaceful Delawares who remained at their traditional lands on the Forks of the Delaware
River “were tiny islands in an alien, forbidding sea” of white settlements.90 Other groups, mostly
Munsees, were scattered to Ulster and Orange counties in New York. Munsee-Delawares who
remained in settlements at Crosswicks, Coaxen, and the mission town of Cranbury in New Jersey
had their land relinquished by that colony in 1758. By 1747 many of the Delawares had relocated
in the Ohio country, while those who remained in the east were slowly absorbed into the multi-
ethnic communities of Quakers, Germans, Welsh, Moravians, Scots-Irish, and free blacks of the
Susquehanna and Delaware valleys.91 The main opponent of the Walking Purchase, Nutimus,
moved to a Shawnee village on the north branch of the Susquehanna called Nescopeck with his
family. He too became subsumed into the ethnic mix of peoples as he maintained an English-style
farm aided by five black slaves.92
Although temporarily distant from white settlement, it was a harrowing time for those
Delawares who moved west from their eastern homes. Joseph Peepy (Weholelahund), a
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Delaware who became a Presbyterian convert, lamented on the plight of his people as migrants to
the Ohio Valley:
Our fathers told us, how numerous the Indians were in their days, & in the days
of their fathers. Great towns of Indians were all along the sea shore, and on the
rivers, and now you, if you travel through that country, you will scarcely see an
Indian; but you will see great and flourishing towns of white people who possess
the land of our fathers, and we are cut off, and fall back upon these distant rivers,
and we are reduced to a small number.93
This migration can also be seen as both a desired relocation and a tragic diaspora. As
Delawares crossed the Alleghenies, they approached this westward movement as “Kwulakan.”
This term had a double meaning, for it pertained to the need of Lenapes to move from their
traditional homes when this environment became corrupted and tainted by white settlement.
With the scarcity of game becoming a reality and Iroquois dominance becoming intolerable,
Delawares migrated to a new country that offered the potential for peace, harmony, and bounty.
Kwulakan became an ideological mechanism to escape disaster. Delawares also believed that
Kwulakan referred to a threshold that, when crossed, would rouse the deities to take pity and
intervene in tribal matters by showing benevolence to the Delawares.94
The richness of the Ohio offered such an opportunity for eastern native migrants.
Marquis de la Galissoneire, the Governor of Canada noted that the “Delawares left their eastern
Pennsylvania” homes for “want of Game and Korn and removed to Allegheny . . . a Fine Country
watered by the branches of the Miamis, Scioto, and Muskingum Rivers.” 95
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Despite their alienation from the Pennsylvania Proprietors, the Delawares were not
“weakling women,” dominated by the Iroquois.96  Eastern Delawares, who remained in the
Wyoming Valley and Upper Susquehanna under the supervision of Iroquois vice-regents such as
Shikellamy, simply chose not to migrate westward with the other Delaware groups.97 To remain
in their eastern homelands, these Delawares had to accept Iroquois and English pretensions of
subjugation.98
An ethos of imperial prominence, though acknowledged by the Iroquois, was only partly
accepted by the Delawares and Shawnees who moved out of the grasp of Onondaga and
Philadelphia. Ohio Indians saw the Six Nations as agents of British Indian policy. By
acknowledging Iroquois preeminence in Anglo-Indian relationships, the western Delawares and
other Ohio Indians believed that they were assured of British trade goods and, if needed, British
military protection. While eastern Delawares remained under Iroquois supervision, western-
migrating Delawares accepted Iroquois supremacy only on a metaphorical level; necessary to
stay on good diplomatic terms with the Six Nations and most importantly, with the British.
The Delawares, however, were reborn in the west. Delaware clans and bands remained
intact as they moved beyond the Alleghenies.99 Their totem tribal identities of Turtle, Wolf, and
Turkey became more pronounced in terms of specific political-ethnic identities. These identities
became contributing factors in the concept of Delaware nationhood.
Pennsylvania officials, at this time, haphazardly referred to the Delaware, Shawnee, and
Mingo bands in the Ohio collectively as “Indians on the Allegheny.” 100 In the Allegheny region,
the various tribes each established their own core towns. The Delawares of the Allegheny were
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found mostly at Kittanning on the Ohio. There, over one hundred and fifty Turtle and Turkey
Delawares under the leadership of Shannopin and Captain Hill (Merhegoakehuk) resided. These
leaders identified themselves on wampum belts sent to Philadelphia as “Chieffs of ye Delawares
att Alleegaeening.” 101
Kittanning Delawares were quick to identify themselves as separate from other Ohio
Indians, as were most Delawares who migrated into the Ohio. One specific colonial document is
exemplary of this strong affinity the Delawares had towards phratry socio-political expression.
And yet there was a hint of a nationalistic attitude among the western Delawares. In August of
1732, seven Delaware chiefs living in Allegheny country respectfully declined to meet with
Governor Patrick Gordon. They could not travel “att Such a far Distance” and were preparing for
hunting season.102 The bottom of their letter, declining a visit to Philadelphia, contained a
pictographic drawing of the three phratries--Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf. The Turtle column
included the signatures of Captain Hill, Shannopin, Allemykoppy (this was Sassoonan), and
Ohahmondamaw, while under the pictograph of the Turkey were the X marks of Quoowahoune,
Oppohwhyeckun, and Queekoikahwin. Most interestingly, there is a line drawn across the Wolf
emblem. The Wolf tribe, though considered part of the Delawares, failed to place a mark on this
document (possibly because of distance; the Munsee-Wolf group at this time lived on the
northern and western branches of the Susquehanna).103 The pictographic drawing that
accompanied the note revealed a great deal about the western Delawares. Despite the lack of a
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Wolf signature, it was the first time in an official document that the three animal tribes appeared
together as distinctive components of what could be construed as a Delaware nation.
The western movement slowly increased Delaware ethnic and political identity but at the
expense of the Six Nations and Pennsylvania. An Iroquois spokesman noted that the
Susquehanna Delawares were always on the move and asked them to “remain where you are, and
not abandon your village.” He requested that Delawares living on the forks of the Ohio, to move
to the Upper Allegheny towns of Kuskuskies where they could be better supervised by the Six
Nations. After much deliberation, the Turkey and Turtle tribes refused to leave the Ohio.104 In
1737, Logan lamented to Lieutenant Governor George Clarke of New York that “the most of our
Delaware Indians” have been “drawn off to the branches of Ohio for the Conveniency of
game.”105 He failed to acknowledge Pennsylvania’s anti-Delaware policy as a contributing factor
in this move.
Increasing French presence in the Ohio and a weakened provincial economy, caused by
fewer Indians to provide fur pelts, altered the attitude of Pennsylvania. Officials from
Philadelphia now admitted they had erred in their treatment of the Shawnees and Delawares,
which incited them to move across the Alleghenies.106 Another difficulty arose when the Six
Nations, aware of social disruptions in Indian villages because of the rum trade, asked
Pennsylvania to recall its traders from the Ohio, Allegheny, and Susquehanna. In response,
Pennsylvania made futile demands that the Iroquois recall their “tributaries” from the Ohio and
resettle them on the western branch of the Susquehanna. They rationalized, “the [Ohio] Indians
cannot live without being supplied with our Goods: They must have Powder and Lead to hunt,
and Cloaths to keep them warm; if our People do not carry them, others will, from Maryland,
Virginia, Jersey, or other Places.” 107 These demands fell upon deaf ears--western Delawares did
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not budge. The Ohio Delawares had “placed themselves well beyond the grasp” of the Covenant
Chain of Pennsylvania and the Six Nations.108
Richard Peters, the Provincial Secretary noted in 1750 that “many Indians [Senecas and
Cayugas] have left their towns among the Six Nations and gone and settled to the westward of
the branches of the Ohio.” He warned Proprietor Thomas Penn that the Ohio tribes, including the
Delawares, made a “formidable body, not less than fifteen hundred” that kept in “appearance a
sort of dependency on the Council at Onondaga” but for the most part were merely humoring the
Six Nations. 109
While the Delawares and other Ohio Indians were quite aware of “their strength,” 110
they also recognized their responsibilities to preserve the “Chain bright” and to keep diplomatic
relations with the Six Nations.111 The Ohio Indians were in a quandary. They became alarmed at
the increasing strength of the French and their Indian allies to the west and the Great Lakes.
While the Ohio Indians saw the Iroquois as representatives of British policy; not dreaded
conquerors, they were disillusioned with the neutral stance of the leaders of the Six Nations. Not
content to listen to the “old men at Onondaga,” the Ohio Indians appealed to the British to
furnish them with “better Weapons, such as will knock the French down.” 112 They desired to
“kindle a [council] fire” in the Ohio and to invite “all the Indians at a considerable distance” to
come and unify as a body of warriors.113   
The young warriors of the Ohio were energetic and bold, willing to fight to maintain their
territorial rights to this region. It was necessary to gain British support, and to do so they had to
deal with the Six Nations and their pretensions as conquerors and overlords of this region.
Western Delawares were aware that to remain within the British sphere, they needed to show
deference to Onondaga in certain matters without sacrificing too much integrity.
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Eventually attitudes of those principal men in Philadelphia and Onondaga, who treated
western Delawares as malcontents in the Covenant Chain, changed. This change occurred when
geopolitical realities, including the struggle for imperial dominance between England and France
and shifts in the Anglo-Indian diplomatic focus from Iroquoia to western Pennsylvania, brought
western Delawares and the Ohio Indians to center stage in North America.
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Chapter II
“They assumed a tone of defiance”:
The Ascension of the Western Delawares, 1750-1756
Francis Parkman noted that Delaware Indian movement westward to the Ohio country
helped to free these Indians as tributaries of the Iroquois Confederacy and gave them a
confidence which they had lacked since being driven from their traditional homelands in the
Delaware River watershed. In typical Parkman fashion, garnished with drama and romance, he
wrote “Dwelling under the shadow of the tyrannical Confederacy, they [the Delawares] were
long unable to wipe out the blot; but at length, pushed from their ancient seats by the
encroachments of white men, and removed westward, partially beyond the reach of their
conquerors, their native spirit began to revive, and they assumed a tone of defiance.”1
Parkman’s observations, though true, were highly exaggerated and void of an
understanding of historical processes as it pertained to the Delawares. Their westward migration
initiated the push for unity and self-determination. It also opened up new possibilities regarding
political organization. These goals were intertwined and attained very slowly and cautiously,
with regard to their relations with Pennsylvania, the Six Nations, and most importantly, the
British. The western bands of Delawares especially had to contend with the meddling from
Onondaga that seemed to follow them across the Allegheny Mountains.
The geopolitical environment of western Pennsylvania and the Ohio River Valley before
and during the French and Indian War served as a spawning ground for Delaware militancy,
which in turn increased their assertion of independence and contributed to a greater
centralization of Delaware tribes. The Delaware tribes living in Ohio country had entered into a
perfect situation of realpolitiks--a no-lose situation which, temporarily at least, helped to
resurrect these Indians as a political and military power. Their migration to the west helped
reduce the political slight suffered by the Delawares as a result of the Treaty of Friendship
between Pennsylvania and the Iroquois Confederation.
At the onset of the Seven Years’ War, most of the Delawares had moved west to reassert
a tribal political independence with only minimal Iroquois interference. During the early 1750s,
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they rebelled against the Six Nations when the confederation sought to select a Delaware leader
who would be compliant with the governments at Onondaga and Philadelphia. Also, seeking
vengeance for their political emasculation at the hands of Logan and the Proprietors, the
Delawares, in a brutal fashion, rebelled against Pennsylvania. Despite these actions of rebellion,
western Delawares did not desire to sever their relations with the British. They sought to
establish both national unity and autonomy for themselves, without destroying a more beneficial
and necessary diplomatic relationship with the British.
To maintain positive relations with the British, western Delawares, as supposed
tributaries of the Iroquois League, still acknowledged their responsibilities and limitations within
the Covenant Chain. They only rejected certain uncomfortable intrusions by the Iroquois. One of
these encroachments concerned the selection of a headman for all Delawares, east and west, who
would be acceptable to the Six Nations, Pennsylvania, and most importantly, the Delawares
themselves.
From a historical perspective, Delawares were “drawn into diplomatic relations with
Pennsylvania,” which required certain adaptations. Despite the lack of centralization among the
Delaware tribes, English colonial officials in general insisted upon negotiating with a specific
Indian leader. Eventually they propped up certain people and empowered them to speak for all
Delawares.2 From 1683 to 1697, William Penn recognized Tamanend of the Turtle tribe as the
principal leader of Unami Delaware speakers.3 By 1715, Sassoonan had inherited much of
Tamenend’s authority and was recognized by Pennsylvania as chief spokesman of the
Delawares. He attained and maintained a positive relationship with Pennsylvania governors.
Despite his struggles with blindness and alcoholism (Conrad Weiser claimed that Sassoonan had
“lost his Senses and [was] uncapable of doing anything”) in his later years, Sassoonan held onto
this title until his death in 1747 at Shamokin.4
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This Schuylkill leader, honored in the east, did not have the same clout among Delawares
who had migrated to the west. As Sassoonan sought diplomatic solutions with Pennsylvania
leaders, western Delawares saw this as appeasement and accommodation. Delaware leaders at
Kittanning and Logstown ignored Sassoonan’s continuous overtures for them to bring back their
people to the Susquehanna. 5
In the waning years of Sassoonan’s leadership, the Pennsylvania-Six Nations alliance
intervened in the political affairs of the Delawares. Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton
hoped that with the demise of Sassoonan, the Delawares would be prepared to name a new
headman, suitable to all Indian and colonial parties.6 Delawares, in other words, had to meet with
the alliance’s stringent standards for an accommodating leader.
In 1741, the Iroquois vice-regent Shickellamy and Pennsylvania’s Secretary James Logan
rejected the selection of Pisquetomen by Sassoonan to be his future replacement as the principal
man of the Delawares.  Pisquetomen, who formerly lived at Shamokin, was strongly opposed to
the Walking Purchase. He was the nephew of Sassoonan and the eldest brother of the prominent
leaders of the Turkey tribe named Shingas (“Wet Marshy Ground”) and Tamaqua (King Beaver).
All three in this “royal family” moved to the Ohio and lived at Kittanning--a town slowly
becoming the center of coalescence for Unami-speakers of the Turtle and Turkey phratries living
in the west. Delawares regarded Pisquetomen “high in authority among the Delawares in the
West.” Sassoonan believed him a perfect choice to be “the person who is to have the chief
command and to be the mouth of his [Delaware] people.”7
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Pisquetomen was also a Delaware leader who could unify the Delawares, both east and
west. His experiences were indicative of what the Delawares were facing in Pennsylvania. He
had experienced displacement, when his people were forced from the Tulpehocken Valley in
1732, and yet tasted a sense of freedom and independence when he moved his followers west
into Kittanning town. Logan saw Pisquetomen as an obstructionist to Pennsylvania’s political
agenda, which favored a powerful Iroquois hegemony on the frontier.8 Pisquetomen was not a
likely pliable figurehead who would help the Six Nations in their attempted control of the
Delawares.  Most importantly, both Pennsylvania and the Six Nations saw Pisquetomen as a
dynamic leader who epitomized the increasingly obstinate and independent nature of western
Delawares and a man who could influence eastern Delawares to take a similar stance of defiance.
Logan, who wanted a leader with the weight and the determination to recall all Ohio Delawares
back to the Susquehanna region, quickly saw that Pisquetomen lacked the will to bring the
Delawares back, as much as Sassoonan had lacked the authority to command Delawares back to
the Susquehanna.9
Pisquetomen’s rejection did not sit well with many western Delawares. They refused to
accept a puppet chief assigned by Onondaga and Philadelphia.10  Logan, Shickellamy, and Indian
agent Conrad Weiser worked hard to block Pisquetomen’s appointment.11 Within a month of
Sassoonan’s death in September of 1747, Weiser considered Lappapitton “to be the fittest” in
terms of a successor to Sassoonan. Lappapitton, out of respect for Pisquetomen, declined the
offer.12    
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 With the snub of Pisquetomen, an interregnum existed among the western Delawares.
They would not yield to the demands of the Proprietors, but they also knew that until the crisis
was resolved, western Delawares remained in a state of diplomatic limbo. Whatever voice or
influence they had maintained with the Pennsylvania government was now silenced.
Patience wore thin within the alliance. Hamilton was eager to settle the matter and to give
the Delawares one last chance. He hoped they would  “agree about the Affair” of choosing a new
leader; a headman palatable to all parties.13 At the Logstown Treaty talks (about sixteen miles to
the north of Pittsburgh, along the Ohio River) on May 28, 1751, the Irish-born trader and Indian
agent George Croghan, speaking on behalf of the Six Nations and Governor James Hamilton,
prodded the Delawares to “choose amongst Yourselves one of your wisest Counsellors and
present to your Brethren the Six Nations and me [Hamilton] for a Chief, and he so chosen by you
shall be looked upon by us as your King. . . . ”14 Remembering the Pisquetomen debacle, the
Delawares were hesitant to do so. Tamaqua was fully aware of the importance of a leader who
would represent all Delawares, east and west, and address their concerns to the Six Nations and
Pennsylvania. He reminded an interpreter named Andrew Montour that it “would take some time
to consider on a Man that was fit to undertake to rule a Nation of People” such as the Delawares.
He also wanted to appoint a leader without opposition from the Pennsylvania-Six Nations
alliance.15   And yet Tamaqua was aware that this leader needed to recognize the autonomous
status of Ohio Delawares.
The interregnum continued into the spring of 1752. The second treaty talks held at
Logstown altered the situation and ended the crisis. In late May of 1752, Virginia commissioners
met with Delawares at Shannapin’s Town on the east bank of the Allegheny River (two miles
from current-day Pittsburgh). They noted that the Delawares had no king, but were represented
by Shingas and his brother Tamaqua, both of whom, supplied with coats and hats by the
commissioners, “were dressed after the English fashion.” Both wore “silver Breast Plates and
[had] a great deal of Wampum about them.” They made favorable impressions with the
                                                                                                                                                              
would be “bewitched” by supporters of Pisquetomen. See Weiser to Logan, Oct. 15, 1747, Logan
Papers, 11: 33.
13 Governor Hamilton to George Croghan and Andrew Montour, Feb. 7, 1750, in
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Series, 2: 146-147.
14 Croghan to Delawares at Logstown, May 28, 1751, in MPCP 5: 533; Weslager, The
Delaware Indians, 209.
15 Tamaqua to Montour at Logstown, May 29, 1751, in MPCP 5: 536-537.
47
commissioners, who informed the Delawares that they were to meet the Six Nations at Logstown
to further positive relationships between the King’s representatives and the Ohio Indians.16
At the Logstown Treaty talks in June and July of 1752, the Ohio Land Company of
Virginia and Virginia commissioners sought to gain confirmation of the 1744 Lancaster Treaty
in which the Six Nations supposedly gave up territory to Virginia that bordered the Ohio River
on the southeast. They wanted permission from the Ohio tribes to build a fort at the forks of the
Allegheny and Monongahela rivers. They also sought to open a fair and adequate trade with the
Ohio Indians and to exploit the potential of a half-million acres of unsettled land.17 The Six
Nations refused to attend. Onondaga instead sent their half-kings (Ohio Senecas or Mingos) to
supervise the affairs of the Ohio tribes and to protect Iroquois interests.18
At Logstown, the Virginia and Pennsylvania delegates turned their attentions to the
Delawares and Shawnees and reminded them to “beware of French Councils” and to “adhere to a
strict friendship” with the English colonies and the Six Nations.19 Tanacharison (also known as
Half King), the Seneca supervisor of Ohio Indian affairs, sensed that the Virginia commissioners
were recognizing the prominence and autonomy of the Ohio tribes. Grandstanding in front of the
colonial officials and traders, he asserted the rights of the Iroquois to administer the affairs of the
Ohio Indians. Tanacharison scolded both the Delawares and Shawnees for their war excursions
into Cherokee country after they had made peace with them: “I take the Hatchet from you; you
belong to me, & I think you are to be ruled by me, & I joining with your Brethren of Virginia,
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order you to go to war no more.”20  The Iroquois “took it very ill” that the Virginia officials
treated with other Indian nations “without first consulting them.”21
The Iroquois also made it their business to assign a leader to the Delawares and put an
end to their obstinacy. Onondaga instructed Tanacharison to end the interregnum and decide on a
leader acceptable to all parties. At Logstown, the half-king presented Shingas of the Turkey
phratry as his choice. Tanacharison contended “that is our right to give you a King” to represent
the Delawares in “all publick Business” between the Delawares, Six Nations, and the British.22
Under the illusions that western Delawares were receptive to the dictates of Onondaga, he
announced to the Virginia commissioners, “we have given our Cousins, the Delawars, a King,
who lives there, we desire you will look upon him as a Chief of that Nation.” 23  Shingas was not
present at that time. Tamaqua “stood proxy for his brother and was presented with a lace hat and
jacket and suit.”24
The rhetoric of the Logstown talks revealed much about waning Iroquois influence and a
subtle reassertion of Delaware independence in the west. The Half King’s scolding of Delaware
war endeavors, much like the oratorical bullying of Canasatego a decade earlier at Lancaster,
demonstrated that Tanacharison was posturing on behalf of the Six Nations in the presence of
Virginia officials. The Delawares, who by definition of their status as tributaries were forbidden
to go to war unless given permission, were moving away from Six Nations’ control. They feared
the wrath of Virginia more than they feared the Iroquois. The appointment of Shingas also
disclosed much about the Delaware struggle to gain self-rule. While the Delawares opposed the
“overlord intervention and manipulation” of the Six Nations in the selection of a leader, for the
most part they favored Shingas.25  He was their choice and he would prove to be “far from being
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a lickspittle client of the Iroquois or of the English.”26  Ohio Delawares, by accepting Shingas as
a favorable compromise, were on the verge of gaining political recognition as a distinct Ohio
Indian nation. Though dismissed as “warriors & hunters” by Tanacharison, the mutual
acceptance of Shingas terminated a potentially dangerous situation and both the Six Nations and
the Delawares saved face in the matter.
The Six Nations did not fare as well in other diplomatic areas. Tanacharison reminded the
Virginia officials “that the lands then sold [by the Six Nations at Lancaster in 1744] were to
extend no further to the sunsetting than the hill on the other [eastern] side of Allagany Hill.”27
By the conclusion of the Logstown conference, the Ohio Company of Virginia pressured a
reluctant Tanacharison to accept Iroquois land cessions to go beyond the Alleghenies. The
Delawares and the Ohio Indians opposed any land cessions of Ohio country, but requested that
Virginia build a “strong House” at the mouth of the Monongahela River--a small trading fort to
provide protection and to supply them with needed trade goods. And yet the Ohio Indians did not
agree to allow for Anglo settlement of the region. 28  The Oneida half king to the Shawnees
named Scarouady warned, “we [the Ohio Indians] intend to keep our country clear of
settlements.”29
Regarding western Delawares and their push for autonomy from Six Nations’
intervention, Conrad Weiser saw things a bit differently than Pennsylvania official Richard
Peters had in 1750. According to Weiser, unlike Peters’ contentions that the tributary tribes in
Ohio were humoring the Iroquois, the Ohio Indians understood the close connection of the
Iroquois to the British. To cover themselves, they acknowledged their relationship to the
Iroquois, even on a symbolic level. When Delawares and Shawnees on the Ohio sent wampum
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belts to Onondaga in the spring of 1754, asking to be relieved of their status as non-warrior
tributaries, they were in essence also appealing to the British. Western Delawares exploited their
image as tributaries to manipulate the council at Onondaga.30 They pleaded, “We expect to be
killed by the French . . . We desire, therefore that You will take off our Petticoat that we may
fight for ourselves, our Wives and Children; in the Condition We are in You know we can do
nothing.”31 
The Logstown Treaty of 1752 demonstrated that the world of the western Delawares and
Ohio Indians was about to undergo drastic change. For the Delaware leaders at Kittanning and
the Kuskuskies, it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a symbolic vassalage to a
Confederation that lacked the power to assert over lordship. Delawares demonstrated a sense of
strength despite the compromise on the issue of a new political leader. They also managed to
keep aligned with the British as a link in the Covenant Chain. Positive relations with the British
were necessary for survival in their new homeland. Contending European empires were aligning
themselves in preparation to fight for the valuable resources of the Ohio region. The Ohio
Indians would eventually be dragged into the fray as the French increased in numbers in the
west.
The French accelerated their presence in the Ohio in 1749 when the Governor of New
France, Marquis de la Galisonniere, sent Captain Bienville de Celeron to enter the Ohio and
warn off English traders, “interlopers and vagabonds.” Celeron found a group of traders on the
Ohio and ordered them to leave. They returned “with all their effects” to Philadelphia.32 Most of
the Ohio tribes were greatly attached to and dependent upon British traders and were not
impressed by Celeron’s posturing on behalf of the French empire or his claiming of the Ohio
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territory in the name of the King of France (Celeron had lead plates placed at the mouth of
rivers and tin plates nailed to trees claiming the Ohio as a French possession).33
In his expedition, Celeron was rebuffed by Delawares at Kittanning, an amalgamation of
Ohio Indians at Logstown, and Shawnees on the Scioto River. Dejected, he admitted that such a
small force of military made little impression on the Ohio Indians, who were “very badly
disposed towards the French, and are entirely devoted to the English.”34
Because of Celeron’s failed mission, the French altered frontier policy and embraced a
more conciliatory, diplomatic approach towards the Ohio Indians. Rather than threatening non-
compliant Indians, the new Canadian governor, Marquis de la Jonquiere, reformed French policy
in the west. He restored alliances with the Great Lakes tribes of Ottawas, Wyandots,
Potawatomis, Miamis, and others in hopes that they would influence the Ohio Indians. The
French then recognized the sovereignty of Indian tribes, such as the Delawares, and their rights
to tribal lands. Lastly, to counter British economic presence, the French assaulted British traders
and slowly built a military presence as they constructed a series of forts.35
While the Ohio Delawares did not see the French as a threat, they saw the advance of the
Ohio Land Company of Virginia into the region in 1750 as a direct challenge; an encroachment
that was unacceptable to the tribes. Celeron had reminded the Delawares at Kittanning that what
Pennsylvania had done to Delaware independence in the east would be repeated in the west
unless Delawares allied themselves with the French.36
Tensions increased as the French gained a foothold in the west. In June of 1752 a French-
organized coalition of 240 Chippewas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis, led by a Metis named Charles
Langlade from Michilimackinac, attacked and ravaged the Miami Indian town and English
trading center of Pickawillany (near current-day Piqua, Ohio). Women and children suffered the
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brunt of the casualties because most of the Miami warriors were on a hunting excursion. The war
party also killed a few British.37
In response to the massacre at Pickawillany and the construction of French forts in the
Ohio and Allegheny valleys, Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie dispatched a party under a
young provincial major named George Washington to warn the French from the Ohio.38
Washington, through Tanacharison as a mediator, also addressed a group of Delawares.
Washington promised them that he was there to “put you again in possession of your lands [and]
to dispossess the French” from the Ohio.39 The Delawares were skeptical of Washington’s
promises and were also offended that he did not address the Delawares directly, but instead used
Tanacharison as a middleman. They told Washington that they had their own leaders who would
be willing to hear his words. They also told him that they opted not to get involved in the conflict
between the French and English. 40
However, Delawares were also receiving invitations in the form of wampum belts from
the French to join the alliance of western Indian nations. Tanacharison acting on behalf of
Washington and the Six Nations, met with Shingas at Kittanning on October 31, 1753.
Tanacharison ordered that the Delawares bring to him all the wampum belts sent by the French.
Shingas claimed that the Wolf Delaware leader Custaloga (Pakanke) held the belts received by
the Delawares at Venango and that he refused to relinquish them.41  While the Wolf contingent
of Delawares was moving toward supporting the French, the Turtle-Turkey groups of Delawares
remained out of the conflict as the French and their Indian allies assaulted and gained control of
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Fort Necessity, Washington’s outpost at the Great Meadows in western Pennsylvania.
Washington surrendered to the French on July 4, 1754.42                                           
Despite their neutral status, there was tension between the Ohio Delawares and the
Pennsylvania government. This animosity increased on July 9, 1754, during the Albany
Conference between the Six Nations and representatives from various American colonies. Six
Nations leaders granted to the Pennsylvania proprietors Delaware lands and Iroquois claims “on
both sides [of] the River Susquehanna” as far east as the Delaware River and as far “Northward”
as the Appalachian Mountains “as they cross the Country of Pennsylvania.” 43 The Iroquois
claimed that because of their covenant with the English, they had “Rights to the said Lands and
Premises . . . solely in them and their Nations, and in no other Nation whatsoever. . . .” The Six
Nations delegation promised that the agreement would last and “mutually be preserved between
both the said Parties and their Children and Children’s Children” forever.44
A month after Albany, over two hundred Ohio Indians met at George Croghan’s home at
Aughwick, in present-day Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. The half kings Tanacharison and
Scarouady complained to Conrad Weiser, who was in the capacity of a representative of
Pennsylvania governor Robert Hunter Morris, that the Onondaga council had relinquished too
much western land to Pennsylvania.45 The Delawares voiced their concerns through Tamaqua,
who addressed both Weiser and the Six Nations. With shrewd oratorical maneuvering and a
respect for traditional protocol, he reminded them of their histories and obligations and that the
Delawares had lived under Iroquois protection during times of peace. He advised the Iroquois
that the tributary Delawares looked to the Confederacy for protection. He also noted that it was
the Six Nations who had forbidden them to “mettle with Warrs, but [as the men, forced the
women to] stay in the House and mind Counsel affairs.” Tamaqua pleaded that because of a
“high Wind” rising, (the French presence in the Ohio), “we desire you therefore Uncle to have
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your Eyes open, and be Watchful over us your Cousins, as you have always been heretofore.”46
Diplomatically and with deference to the Delaware status within the structure of the Covenant
Chain, he insisted that if the Iroquois could not protect the Delawares from the French, then they
should permit the Delawares to pick up a hatchet and defend themselves. As the majority of
western tribes came to support the French, Tamaqua worked hard not to sever Delawares from
the British orbit.
Tamaqua then turned to Weiser and reminded him of Pennsylvania’s fair treatment of his
people from the time “William Penn first appeared in his Ship on our Lands” and was accepted
by the Delawares and Five Nations into a union of “lasting Friendship.” He asked Weiser to tell
the governor of Pennsylvania that “we desire that you will look upon us in the same Light, and
let that Treaty of Friendship made by our Forefathers on both sides subsist. . . .”47 Tamaqua
knew that western Delawares would not tolerate the territorial encroachments of Pennsylvania
into the Ohio. He hoped to avert conflict by appealing to Pennsylvania to remember its traditions
and history of fair treatment towards the Delawares. To avoid war with Pennsylvania, he was
willing to acknowledge a degree of over lordship of the Six Nations in hope that they would
intervene with Pennsylvania on behalf of the Delawares.
Weiser was not as optimistic regarding a soothing of strained relations between the
Iroquois and Ohio Indians. He rejected the half-kings’ objections regarding the Albany Treaty
and remarked that the “Ohio Indians had no business at the Treaty, and the Six Nations always
declared them Hunters, and no owners of Land. . . .” He emphasized that the Ohio was strictly a
hunting domain of the Indians, not a homeland. In fact, Weiser admonished the Delawares and
Shawnees who “ignored the advice of the Six Nations” and moved to the Ohio and refused to
return to the east despite the “repeated Request of the Six Nations.” 48
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The Albany land exchange, lamented politician and schoolmaster for the Quakers Charles
Thomson, aggravated a dangerous situation, for it forever altered the relationship between
Pennsylvania and its Indians. The Delawares were “violently driven from their Lands” and
“reduced to leave their Country.” No doubt because of this loss of land, many Delawares
eventually gave “Ear to the French, who declared that they did not come to deprive the Indians of
their Land . . . but to hinder the English from settling westward” of the Allegheny Mountains.49
At Albany, the Delawares were essentially thrown “entirely into the Hands of the French.”50
Thomson may have overestimated Delaware attention to French overtures. Western
Delawares were cautious not to burn bridges behind them. Despite Washington’s demoralizing
defeat and surrender at Fort Necessity in July of 1754, events that weakened English influence in
the Ohio, many western Delawares still respected British power and sought to remain in the
British sphere.51 On the eve of Major General Edward Braddock’s march to the three rivers of
the Allegheny, Monongahela, and Ohio, Weiser urged the proprietor Thomas Penn to persuade
the Iroquois to release the Delawares from their tributary obligations, remove their status as
cousins, and “give them a Breech Cloath to wear.”52  Shingas and a small party of Ohio warriors
met with Braddock and his command along the road as he marched to assault the French
stronghold at Fort Duquesne in the late spring of 1755. Shingas claimed that the Delawares of
the Ohio desired to “Live and Trade Among the English and Have Hunting Ground sufficient to
support themselves and [their] Familys.” They offered their services to Braddock if the English
general could assure the Delawares that their land would not be disturbed. Braddock coldly
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refused their help and asserted that only the “English Should Inhabit & Inherit the Land.”53 He
refused to acknowledge the territorial rights and sovereignty of a people he referred to as
“Savages.”54 These rejected Indians--a “smattering of Delawares,” Mingos, and Shawnees,
joined the western tribes of Wyandots, Ottawas, Chippewas and Pottawatomies to ally with the
French. A combined force of 850 Indians and French waited for Braddock eight miles outside of
Fort Duquesne (current day Turtle Creek). There they met and destroyed Braddock’s British
regulars and colonial militia of 1,300 men.55
Despite Braddock’s defeat, described by Indians as that “what passed on Monongahela,”
the continuous overtures of the French, and the lack of a British military presence in the Ohio,
western Delawares were willing to remain loyal to the Crown. Scarouady, the Iroquois vice-
regent, made an appeal before the Pennsylvania governor, council, and assembly to support the
majority of western Delawares, who he believed were not willing to join the French. He hoped
that Pennsylvania would sanction the Delawares as warriors and remove the petticoat, by
providing them with guns and powder. Scarouady told Pennsylvania governor Robert Hunter
Morris, that the Ohio groups of Delawares were prepared to unite and “one word of yours will
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bring the Delawares to join you.”56 The word did not come. The French, on the other hand,
offered Delawares military support and needed trade goods, such as powder and muskets, to
stave off starvation. In consideration of the British failure to militarily assert themselves in the
Ohio and the silence from Philadelphia, many Delawares became impatient and joined the
French.
With Scarouady ‘s pleas ignored, Ohio Delawares became fully alienated from the
Pennsylvania government. As Pennsylvania settlement included the far regions of the western
Susquehanna to the Juniata Rivers, more Delaware bands trickled over the Alleghenies into the
Ohio country towns to show their solidarity and independence as Delawares. Throughout the
eighteenth century, Delawares “had to submit to such gross insults” such as their emasculation at
the hands of the Pennsylvania-Iroquois alliance. However, as John Heckewelder observed, “they
were not ignorant of the manner in which they might take revenge” on their transgressors.57
Because of this treatment at the hands of the Six Nations and Pennsylvania, [Delawares] “took a
severe Revenge on the Province, by laying Waste their Frontiers” and paid little attention to
Iroquois commands from Onondaga.58
The peace that had existed between the Delawares and Pennsylvanians since 1682 when
William Penn negotiated a treaty at Shackamaxon, ended on October 16, 1755. Delaware war
parties from the Turtle-Turkey stronghold at Kittanning led by Shingas, Pisquetomen, and the
war captain known as Captain Jacobs moved east into the Susquehanna River region and entered
the settlement of Penn’s Creek in current-day Snyder County. Delaware warriors rushed into the
home of Barbara Leininger and announced, “we are Alleghany Indians, and your enemies. You
must die.” They shot her father, clubbed her brother to death, and took Barbara and her sister
captive. Within three days, the Delawares destroyed most of Penn’s Creek, taking prisoners,
burning farmhouses, and stealing horses.59
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Delaware war parties then fell upon the “Inhabitants on Mahanahy Creek,” a tributary of
the Susquehanna River, took captives and torched the community. One month later Delawares
and Shawnees “crossed the Sasquehanna and fell upon the County of Berks.”60 Settlers were
“greatly alarmed and terrified” that the Delawares, with a handful of Shawnee allies, and
(possibly) a few French Mohawks could inflict so much suffering and damage, particularly since
the proprietors had purchased much of this land from the Six Nations.61
Delawares at Kittanning, “encouraged by the Retreat of the [British] Forces,” gravitated
to the French, whom they saw as more powerful and a safer bet as an ally than the English.62 The
constant rumors of a large force of French and allied western Indian nations sweeping through
the Ohio did much to push Delawares into action. 63  Shingas and Pisquetomen made a
preemptive strike and hoped by doing so, to discourage future Anglo-American settlement
beyond the Alleghenies. They also believed that the French could assure them security of their
homeland--a factor vital in the nurturing of Delaware unity and independence. Bands of eastern
Delawares also perceived British military ineptness in the west and joined their western kin in
the 1755 attacks on the Pennsylvania frontier.
As a result of these ferocious Indian raids, the frontiers of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia were cleared of Anglo settlers. By the spring of 1756, over 700 settlers had been killed
or taken captive, pacifist Quaker assemblymen were purged from Pennsylvania government for
not funding frontier defense; by 1758 Virginia was forced to construct twenty-seven forts from
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the Blue Ridge to the Allegheny Mountains.64 These raids forced Pennsylvania to rethink its
Indian policy regarding the western Delawares and Shawnees.
The violent outbreaks on the Pennsylvania frontier demonstrated both the Delawares’
anger against the provincial government of Pennsylvania and a disappointment on the failure of
the British to offer them territorial security. Two Ohio Delawares, serving as messengers for the
victorious warriors of Kittanning, visited the Susquehanna River town of Scarouady and
proclaimed: “We, the Delawares of Ohio, do proclaim War against the English. We have been
their Friends many years, but now have taken up the Hatchet against them, & we will never
make it up with them whilst there is an English man alive.”65  They danced a war dance and then
stated “When Washington [at Fort Necessity] was defeated We, the Delawares were blamed as
the Cause of it. We will now kill. We will not be blamed without a Cause.”66
Three factors enabled the bands of Shingas and Pisquetomen to assert their independence
in the west and to enjoy a resurrected military reputation. First, because of the lack of a strong
British military presence in the Ohio, they could retaliate at will against Pennsylvania. Second,
the French were more than willing to support these potentially powerful allies. Finally, the Six
Nations did not have the presence of authority in the Ohio, other than a symbolic relationship
with the western Delawares.
Major General William Shirley, commander-in-chief of his majesty’s forces in North
America during the war’s early years, was shocked at the behavior of the Ohio Indians, tribes who
“for a long time past lived in Friendship with the People” of Pennsylvania and bordering
colonies.67 Shirley tried desperately to rejuvenate the former subservient role of Delawares to
Iroquois dominance. He complained to Six Nations leaders that the Delawares had “always lived
under your Direction. They looked upon you as their masters, and you looked upon them as
Women who wore Petticoats. They never dared to do anything of Importance without your
leave.” He then cautioned the Iroquois that they needed to punish those Delawares who raided on
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the Pennsylvania frontiers. If the Iroquois refused to assert their dominant status within the
Covenant Chain, Shirley warned, the Delawares would “think themselves as good Men as you,
and you will lose the name of being their Masters.”68
Many western Delawares, however, reveled in their military successes and were adamant
in their “Hostilities against the English.” They would not cease even if “ordered to by the greatest
Sachem in the Country of the [Iroquois] Confederates.”69  The Reverend Gideon Hawley told
Governor Morris that despite the pleas of the influential Scarouady, the Ohio Delawares “were
obstinately bent on the Destruction of the English.” They would “pay no Regard to the
Interposition of the Six Nations.”70
The Iroquois sought to find the causes for Delaware discontent. In February 1756, the
Onondaga speaker known as Red Head (Kaghswughtioni), visited Fort Johnson and conferred
with Sir William Johnson about Delaware actions on the Pennsylvania frontier. He believed that
they were “deluded by the craft” of the French and he promised to intervene and use “all means”
at his disposal to pacify the hostility of the Delawares. 71
The Iroquois were willing to concede that Delaware militancy against Pennsylvania was a
result of the diplomatic failings of the Penn government. Red Head addressed Sir William
Johnson and reminded him that the Six Nations “looked upon the Delawares as [in need of] the
more immediate care of Onas.” He believed that the “barbarous Behavior” in 1755 occurred
because of Pennsylvania’s lack of diplomacy. “Therefore our common Enemy [the French] hath
taken the advantage of their neglect.” Red Head reminded Johnson that proper attention paid to
the Delawares would keep them strong in the Covenant Chain.72
Sir William Johnson agreed with Red Head that French seduction of the Ohio tribes was
a contributing factor in the escalating violence against English settlers. He also believed that
these Indians were disturbed by the continuous settlements that started to press into Indian
hunting grounds. The Ohio Delawares spread their discontent “among their brethren who dwelt
on the Susquehanna.” The French then “propagated those prejudices against the good intentions
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of the English.” The French fed those Indians with promises and won over their support by
“magnifying their prowess, kindness, and generosity.”73 Both Red Head and Johnson failed to
acknowledge the attempted emasculation inflicted by the Six Nations upon Pennsylvania’s tribes
as a significant reason.
Despite the weak mediation of the Six Nations with regards to the rift between the
Delawares and Pennsylvania, the uprising continued. In April of 1756, Governor Morris
complained to Sir William Johnson, who was the Indian agent for the Six Nations and the soon
to be Superintendent of Northern Indian Affairs for the British, that Delawares living at
Kittanning and farther to the west on the Ohio River were “most mischievous” and continued to
“murder and destroy our Inhabitants, treating them with the most barbarous Inhumanity that can
be conceived.”74 In what could be conceived as an attempt to bring together eastern and western
Delawares, war parties converged on the frontiers of central Pennsylvania from two directions.
Over 700 Delaware warriors came from the Ohio, while a few hundred approached white
settlements from their villages on the Susquehanna.75 Before the Six Nations could fully hear
Delaware complaints, Governor Morris declared war against the Delawares on April 14, 1756
and placed scalp bounties on all Delawares, who had waged war or aided the warriors. Morris’s
actions ended any chance of peace on the Pennsylvania frontier.76
Morris urged Pennsylvania citizens to “embrace all Opportunities of Pursuing, taking,
killing and destroying the said Delaware Indians.” He offered a premium bounty of “150 Spanish
Dollars or Pieces of Eight” for any male Delaware over twelve taken captive, and “130 Pieces of
Eight” for their scalp. The scalp of a Delaware woman was valued at “Fifty Pieces of Eight.”77
He also offered 700 pieces of eight for the scalps of Shingas and Captain Jacobs, the prominent
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Delaware war leaders.78 Morris condemned the actions of the Ohio Delawares who were looked
upon by the Proprietors as “our own Children” and who in a “most cruel manner fallen upon &
murdered our Inhabitants, People whose Houses were always open to them. . . .” He added that
certain Delawares, unprovoked, had greatly damaged the “Chain of Friendship” that had
historically bound them with Pennsylvania and the Six Nations.79
Morris’s declaration of war in April of 1756 against the Delawares who raided on the
frontier naturally incited more western Delawares to shift to the French orbit. The Iroquois asked
the British to withdraw their military from the Ohio so that their half-kings could secure English
captives and chastise those guilty of “base and treacherous Behaviour.”80  This was an arduous
task. Many of the Turtle-Turkey Delawares at Kittanning, together with a few Susquehanna
Delawares, were already on a full-fledged war footing against Pennsylvania and had no intention
of apologizing for their actions or freeing captives. In the early spring of 1756, Shingas and
Captain Jacobs led a war party out of Kittanning. The party burned a private fort named Fort
McCord, killed twelve, and took many captives.81 In July, a combined party of French and
Delawares led by Captain Jacobs moved against Fort Granville in Mifflin County, Pennsylvania,
where they burned the fort and took more captives.82
Indian successes throughout the fall of 1755 and early 1756 shattered the Quaker policy
of Indian pacification and increased the aggressiveness of the Ohio Indians. The ashes of Forts
McCord and Granville “convinced the Pennsylvania back inhabitants that they needed to set
aside their defensive passivity” and take the fight to the western Delawares.83 On September 8,
1756, Lieutenant Colonel John Armstrong and a force of 300 Pennsylvania militiamen moved
into Indian country and attacked and burned Kittanning. Armstrong’s mostly Scots-Irish force
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freed ten captives and burned crops and a cache of weapons.84 The Reverend Thomas Barton
noted that Captain Jacobs “fought, & died, like a soldier. He refus’d to surrender when the House
was even on Fire over his Head.”85 An English deserter who resided with the French at Fort
Duquesne noted “That after the taking of Kittanning the Indians came to Fort Duquesne and told
that they had buried upwards of 50 of their people that were killed there,” including Captain
Jacobs’ wife and son. Shingas and his warriors fled north to Saukunk in the Beaver Valley.86
After Armstrong and his command left the smoldering Kittanning, the Delawares
eventually returned with many of their English captives.87 While frontier raids continued, the
boldness and aggressiveness of the Ohio Indians gradually diminished. They now dreaded the
prospect of going on the war trail and leaving their towns open to the attack of militias.
Kittanning, while not abandoned, would no longer be used as a center of military operations
during the French and Indian War.88
Throughout 1756, the alienation of western Delawares from the Covenant Chain was
complete. Many were now “under the protection of the French” and would no longer honor their
previous treaties with Pennsylvania or the British. Governor Morris lamented that Delawares
also refused to “submit to the Six Nations, to whom they owe obedience.” 89  The spirit of
autonomy also spread back across the Allegheny Mountains. Delaware chiefs, living near the
Iroquois in the Wyoming Valley, announced in the fall that “five hundred of their people would
move away from the English and settle ten leagues to the west,” near the Ohio River.90  Western
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Delawares, confident in their ability to throw the frontier into chaos, challenged the Iroquois to
take the hatchet against the English. In council with the Shawnees and Iroquois, the Delawares
“reproached the Iroquois bitterly for their failure” to declare war against the British for their
incursions into the Ohio. They told the Iroquois that they would no longer wear the petticoat. The
Delawares insisted that the Iroquois now wore the petticoat and became the woman. The Ohio
Delawares “wished to strike the English” and would call the “Abnakis their brothers, and that
perhaps they would become crazy . . . [and] even raise the hatchet against their uncles, the
Iroquois.”91 The Iroquois maintained that Delaware warriors who had attacked Pennsylvania
frontiers bragged “We are Men,” and warned that they would continue to fight as true warriors.
These Lenapes, aware of their resurrected political and military prominence, cautioned the
Iroquois to beware and not to interfere, “lest we cut off your private Parts and make Women of
you, as you have done of us.” They would “no longer . . . submit to the Six Nations.” 92
The Delaware raids of 1755 demonstrated the “vehement masculinity of men rearmed.”
Delawares led by Shingas and Pisquetomen “cast aside the metaphorical petticoats and
cornpounders” and set the American frontier on fire.93 Delawares were not weak and passive but
a potentially powerful people who were caught in the pincers of the Pennsylvania-Six Nations
alliance that threatened Delaware identity. The events during the fall of 1755 “had been in the
making, gradually acquiring force and implacability, for decades.”94 Spearheaded by Delaware
aggression out of Kittanning, the Ohio Indians emerged as a formidable power bloc in the west.
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Eventually the British, in their imperial struggle with the French, pressured the Six Nations to
remove the petticoat from the Delawares and to secure them as military allies.95   
George Croghan, newly appointed Deputy Indian Agent, confided to the Superintendent
Sir William Johnson that it was the “Conduct of the [Pennsylvania] Assembly” that drove the
Delawares “out of the British interest.” 96 This conduct had been inherited from James Logan
and his disastrous Indian policy. The “colonial officials would not have to look far” for the
reasons for brutal Indian attacks on the frontier after Logan “forcefully and rudely” cast the
Delawares aside.97  By pushing the Delawares and Shawnees from their traditional homes, Logan
“opened the gate to colonial settlement” in the Susquehanna. His misguided policy eventually
“guaranteed the deaths of hundreds of Pennsylvania’s back settlers at the hands” of Delaware
warriors seeking revenge for their mistreatment.98  The alliance between Pennsylvania and the
Six Nations, sealed in 1732, came at a price--the “alienation of the Delawares, the full payment
of which fell on the inhabitants” decades later. In choosing the Iroquois at the expense of
Delaware autonomy, Pennsylvania dealt the Delawares a “taunting insult.”99
As Pennsylvania bonded with the Six Nations, the Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf Delaware
tribes of the west became physically and politically alienated. To gain security in their Ohio
Valley homeland, Delawares defended their rights to choose their own leader and also displayed
their defiance through military aggression. The Delaware attacks on white settlers that followed
on the Pennsylvania frontier were a consequence of the “breakdown of the political institutions
binding them in peace to the colony.”100
Delawares moved west and remembered the lessons of their past. While a minority of
eastern Delawares remained locked into and subdued by a tenuous Iroquois/Pennsylvania
relationship, the western Delaware tribes, led by the royal line of Shingas, Pisquetomen, and
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Tamaqua broke free and enjoyed a new status as prominent warriors and diplomats of great
consequence in the Anglo-Indian world. They did so without adhering to the attempted overlord
dominance of the council fire at Onondaga. Though Tamaqua favored more mediation and
diplomacy with the British, Pennsylvania, and Six Nations axis, he still looked to establish and
protect the Delaware people in their new home. Seeing that the Covenant Chain alliance “had
been organized for their destruction;” Delawares believed that their “very existence was at
stake.”101  Western Delawares slowly embraced autonomy, commonality, and unity-- contingents
of a process known as national growth. They abandoned their role as pacifists “into which they
had been insidiously drawn.”102  From the moment they picked up the hatchet and went to war
against Pennsylvania, the “Delawares were turned, and became another People. . . .”103 At the
onset of the Seven Years’ War, the Ohio Delawares “forced [the Covenant Chain of the Six
Nations and Pennsylvania] to acknowledge they were Men . . . a free independent Nation.” 104
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Chapter III
“on behalf of all our Nation”:
The Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes
During the Seven Years’ War and the Age of Pontiac
Charles Thomson’s observations of the frontier raids in 1755 as the definitive moment in
the shaping of a Delaware nation were a bit premature, but nevertheless on the right track. The
frontier uprisings were the ramification of the demographic pressures caused by Anglo
settlement and the political inequities placed upon Delaware Indians by the Covenant Chain.
The Delaware nation, however, emerged in the west, not solely upon the need to vent
frustrations and to avenge insults through bloody reprisals. A crucial factor in the rise of a
Delaware nation was the geographical and political separation of the western and eastern
Delawares. Despite the participation of bands of Susquehanna warriors in the raids of 1755, the
political, as well as geographic chasm between east and west was steadily increasing. This
became evident when various failed attempts were made to call back Delawares from the Ohio to
rejoin their eastern kin in the Susquehanna Valley. The disconnection of west from east became
permanent and increased the regional identity of the western bands, particularly with the sweep
of historical events that entered the Ohio Valley to redefine the structure of once-decentralized
Delaware Indians. Also throughout the Seven Years’ War and during the brief uprising of
Pontiac in 1763, powerful and influential leaders rose among the phratries of the western
Delawares. In this time of crisis, the three animal tribes, who were in specific locations in the
Ohio country, developed stronger political identities through the leadership of these influential
men. As the alliance between Onondaga and Philadelphia once served as the catalyst for
Delaware westward migration, the regional detachment of the western groups from those
Delawares to the east, increased phratry cohesion and identity among the western groups.
Isolation, as well as unity and a new sense of self (on a phratry level), served as powerful
mechanisms in the establishment of the Delaware nation.
By the 1750s, British and Pennsylvania officials took notice of this new identity among
the Ohio Indians, particularly the western Delawares. They quickly realized that they needed to
get the Delawares out of the Ohio and coax them to come back under Covenant Chain control.
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To do so, they naively hoped that eastern Delawares could retain enough influence to persuade
the westerners to return east, to move back across the Alleghenies to the Susquehanna.
Eastern Delawares shifted in and out of the Pennsylvania political spotlight. Earlier, when
hostilities spread to the Susquehanna in the fall of 1755, the Quaker-led Pennsylvania assembly
scurried to make a peaceful settlement with eastern Delawares, many of whom took an active
role in the raids. They empowered the New Jersey Delaware (now relocated on the Susquehanna)
known as Teedyuscung to unite the eastern tribes and proposed to meet with Pennsylvania
officials at Easton, Pennsylvania in the summer of 1756.1 All in hopes of bringing the western
Delawares back into the fold. Eventually, the western Delawares and their concerns became the
focus of attention at the Easton talks.
In this “new-model” government of a coalition of Indian nations and communities from
the Susquehanna and Wyoming regions, the Munsees and “two Tribes of the Delawares viz . . .
the Lenopi and Wanami,” joined together “in a League” with “some of the Mohiccons” of the
Hudson River and Susquehanna Shawnees. Teedyuscung selected a council of advisors and war
captains. Charles Thomson, impressed by Teedyuscung’s charisma, noted: “Soon afterwards a
Number of straggling Indians, who lived up and down without any Chief, joined in and
strengthened the Alliance.” 2 With Quaker support, “Teedyuscung soon saw himself at the Head
of a very considerable body.” 3
To counter this Quaker-approved union of eastern Delawares and to maintain his
authority, Sir William Johnson encouraged leaders of the Six Nations to send word to Delawares
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at Tioga, on the North Branch of the Susquehanna, that the Covenant Chain alliance was
displeased at the “unbrotherly Behaviour of their Nephews to the English. . . .” 4 They ordered
the Tioga Delawares to send a council to Onondaga so that they could “have their heads shaked
till they became sober,” and “bore a larger [hole] in their Ears, and make them hear. . . .” 5
Johnson met with these and other Susquehanna Indians at Onondaga.
Teedyuscung was deliberately excluded, as Johnson wanted to deal with a more pliable
chief to represent Delaware affairs. Johnson’s intent was to use eastern Delaware influence on
the rebellious westerners and at the same time, maintain the preeminence of the Six Nations
within the Covenant Chain. Johnson chose the ancient sachem Nutimus to act as chief for the
eastern Delawares.  Nutimus, the Munsee leader who had been chastised by Canasatego in 1742,
was humbled in his old age. He eagerly acknowledged that his Susquehanna Delawares had been
“deceived and deluded” by the French operating out of Fort Duquesne to take up arms against
Pennsylvania.6 Nutimus added that the migrating Delawares were responsible for the breakup of
eastern communities and the disregard for the authority at Onondaga. He contended that he could
only speak for the eastern groups of Delawares and could only try to persuade the Ohio
Delawares to reject an alliance with the French.7 Nutimus feebly promised Johnson that he
would “use his utmost Endeavours to withdraw those of his Nation [the western Delawares]
whom the French have seduced to go & live in the Neighbourhood of Fort Duquesne.” 8
In reality, there was a great political polarization between western and eastern Delawares.
Eastern Delawares were quick to realize that their military actions could bring harsh retaliation
as they were in close reach of Onondaga and Philadelphia. Western Delawares were willing to
diplomatically exploit their devastating frontier raids and use them as a bartering chip in the
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imperial struggle between the British and the French. They also enjoyed a geographical distance
that enhanced both a sense of regional identity and a spirit of defiance.
Johnson, much to the chagrin of the Six Nations, concluded the talks at Onondaga by
“taking off the Petticoat or that invidious name of woman from the Delaware Nation [which had]
been imposed on them by the 6 Nations from the time they conquered them. . . .”9 Deputies of
the Six Nations told Johnson that they were not “properly authorized” by the Six Nations’ Grand
Council to release the Delawares from their tributary status. They “would make their reports &
press it upon them” [the Grand Council].10
Johnson’s maneuver to control both the eastern Delawares and the Quaker Indian policy
through the puppet leader Nutimus did not sit well with eastern Delawares. By symbolically
removing the petticoat from the Susquehanna Delawares, Johnson gave them a degree of
independence. He hoped that this move would assuage them and that they would be less apt to
demand the reinstatement of Teedyuscung. However, Teedyuscung remained their choice over
the “doddering old Nutimus.”11 As the Ohio Delawares had once chosen Shingas as their King,
despite the attempts of Six Nations’ intervention, the easterners remained in support of
Teedyuscung.
Sir William Johnson and the Six Nations brought the eastern Delawares to peace talks at
Easton, Pennsylvania, in the summer of 1756 to officially gain their support and put an end to
Delaware militancy on the Susquehanna.12  They also hoped that the eastern Delawares, locked
in tight once again to the Covenant Chain, would have a beneficial influence on their western
kin. Johnson begrudgingly accepted Teedyuscung as leader of the Susquehanna Delawares at the
Easton conference.
Teedyuscung was unreliable in his diplomacy. At the Easton talks, the drunken leader
claimed he was the king of ten nations, including the Six Nations. He also insulted several
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Iroquois chiefs and head warriors and postured as an all-powerful leader. He continually changed
his accusations as to who was most responsible for alienating the Delawares. One time it was the
Pennsylvania proprietors who had swindled his people out of their lands, another time the
flattery of the “false hearted French King,” or the intrusions of Connecticut settlers into the
Wyoming Valley.13
At Easton, colonial observers criticized Teedyuscung and his band as “a belligerent
bunch.” Teedyuscung walked about in a French-style coat, while Delaware women wore shirts
made from the tablecloths of settlers killed on the Pennsylvania frontier.14 The Seneca councilor
Newcastle, on behalf of the Six Nations, threatened to chastise those Delawares who were
disobedient tributaries. He reminded the Delawares that they had betrayed the Six Nations and
had become the “common Bawd ” of the French, with whom they had considered a military
alliance. The Six Nations then gave Teedyuscung a large belt and allowed him to speak,
asserting that they had given him a “little Power” and that it would be “some Time” until he
would be considered a “complete Man.”15
A year later, at the Easton talks of 1757, Teedyuscung claimed that the Six Nations made
men of the Delawares once again, giving him the hatchet and authorizing him to make peace. He
reminded the Six Nations that he had been empowered to bring the Indian nations together in a
common bond of defense. He presented wampum belts to the Iroquois leader known as
Anaquateeka and promised him “that whoever Strikes any one of us, Strikes all.”16 He was not
speaking the sentiments of western Delawares.
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The Easton talks of 1756 and 1757 demonstrate a great deal about the growing clout of
the Ohio Delawares and the attempts made by the Six Nations Confederation to diminish this
power. Easton, as an eastern locale, symbolically represented Six Nations preeminence and
control in colonial Pennsylvania Indian affairs. At the Easton talks, western Delawares were
required to move “out of the weeds” from the region in which they enjoyed strength and
influence, to come east into the domain of Iroquois supremacy. This in itself was a great
diplomatic obstacle for Ohio Delawares to overcome.
At this time, eastern and western Delawares were moving in different political and
diplomatic directions, conditioned by their divergent circumstances. Despite being given a
degree of diplomatic freedom by Johnson, Delawares on the North Branch of the Susquehanna
had to consider their proximity to the council fires at Onondaga. Teedyuscung and other eastern
Delaware leaders were on a short diplomatic leash; independence was limited and constantly
under the scrutiny of the Six Nations Confederation. They did not have the diplomatic freedom
and geographical isolation of their western kin in Ohio country. To the west, in council with the
French, Delaware chiefs claimed that they numbered five thousand people and that “should even
twenty-thousand English come from Europe they [the Delawares] would exterminate them in the
forests.”17 It was clearly evident that the Iroquois no longer dictated to the western Delawares
and controlled the Susquehanna Delawares only by giving leaders such as Teedyuscung a little
authority at Onondaga.18
 Eastern and western Delawares acted independently of each other, linked only by a
common language, religion, and kinship ties. If an eastern leader such as Teedyuscung made a
promise to stop raiding, it meant nothing to those Delawares in the west. 19 Western Delawares
could adjust their attitude towards the Iroquois in concordance with the strength or weakness of
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British presence west of the Alleghenies.20 There became a distinction between Susquehanna and
Ohio Delawares.21 Without a French presence east of the Alleghenies, eastern Delawares did not
enjoy the luxury of such diplomatic adjustments.
A sober Teedyuscung knew his limitations regarding political influence. He cautioned the
Pennsylvania Commissioners at Easton, “I would not have you mistake me, as if I meant that I
could prevail on the Ohio Indians! I cannot tell them that they will leave off doing mischief.” He
pleaded that Pennsylvania make itself as “strong as possible” west of the Alleghenies. He also
insisted that any wrong done on the east side of the Susquehanna was not the doing of his people
but Ohio Delaware who passed over from the west to “do what Mischief they please.”22
Western Delawares refused to be bound by Teedyuscung’s negotiations at Easton.
Shingas and Pisquetomen, now living at the Kuskuskies, wanted to meet directly with the
Pennsylvania government. They “had nothing to say to any treaty” made at Easton or any
agreement negotiated by Teedyuscung. Western Delawares believed that Teedyuscung was too
closely aligned with the interests of the Iroquois. The western leaders had nothing to do with
him.23 Ohio Delawares rejected any colonial agreement made in the east that did not
acknowledge their autonomy and right to a western homeland.
To the Delawares at western locales such as the Kuskuskies and Venango, Teedyuscung
became emblematic of eastern Delawares who were shackled to a subservient position within the
confines of a suffocating Covenant Chain. French officials sent wampum belts to Susquehanna
Delawares and reminded them that in the east they wore petticoats and were tributaries of the Six
Nations. They encouraged eastern Delawares to move west: “If you want Powder and Lead I
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have enough at Ohio; it lies there in heaps, and you may have what Quantity you please.” 24 The
French promised Ohio Indians “rewards for Scalps and assurances of re-instating them in the
Possession of the Lands” they had ceded between the Ohio and Susquehanna to the English.25
After 1755, the Pennsylvania Indian world underwent drastic change, as the Ohio country
became the new center of Indian affairs in North America.
The Six Nations had unwittingly “put themselves out of business.” By helping
Pennsylvania exile Indians from the eastern part of the province and by turning over lands to the
proprietors that they had taken from the Delawares, the Iroquois had “very little else to offer”
Pennsylvania. They made themselves geopolitically obsolete, since they were originally assigned
by Pennsylvania to control and police the province’s Indians and the frontier. Anglo diplomats
now turned their undivided attention to sway those western Indian nations on the periphery of the
British west.26
This was also a period in which western Delaware leaders were most concerned with the
defense of their country, though they did not agree on how to attain any degree of security.
During the Seven Years’ War, and its aftermath with the rebellion of Pontiac, the Delaware
animal tribes in the west evolved from groups bonded by ethnic and kinship ties into political
divisions.27 The various bands within the animal divisions slowly gained a sense of common
goals. Delaware leaders, yet to be placed under a more-centralized national structure, were
strongly concerned with the security of their individual phratry. War created a distinct tripartite
division of Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf. Netawatwees (“Skilled Advisor”) assumed leadership of
the Turtle division, most of who resided at Saukunk in the Beaver Valley. Netawatwees became
a highly respected Ohio Delaware leader and leaned towards support of the British.28 To the
other extreme was Custaloga, principal leader of the Wolf tribe (Munsees) who lived in the
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Upper Allegheny Country at Venango, close to the western Senecas. Custaloga and the western
Senecas or Chenussio Senecas supported the French. The Seneca sachem Garistagee
 (“ Mud Eater”) served Custaloga as his chief adviser.29  The Turkey tribe, under the leadership
of Shingas and Tamaqua, was located mostly at the Kuskuskies and at the rebuilt Kittanning
town. Their council was sharply divided regarding the critical political concerns of alliances with
European powers.30 Tamaqua did not follow the coalition of Unamis who left out of Kittanning
in October of 1755, to raid on the Pennsylvania frontier. Tamaqua, along with another influential
Turkey headman, Delaware George (Nenacheehunt), fully supported the British.31 Both had “not
approved” the raids of Shingas and his followers from Kittanning, and were quite agitated at the
group. Tamaqua “believed some of those who had [raided] were sorry for what they had done.”
He was willing to make amends to the English.32 Delaware George swore that his people had
never waged war against Pennsylvanians.33
Shingas, once recognized as the leader of the western Delawares by the British and Six
Nations, offered a different political position. He embraced an ideology that could be construed
as “Delaware first.” In 1755, pressured by the French and angry against Pennsylvania authorities,
he launched vicious frontier raids on that province. Because of his defiant stance, he was
eventually removed by the British as the client chief and replaced by Tamaqua.34 Shingas did not
necessarily support the French, but his political views were structured upon his increasing vision
of a Delaware nation-- a nation free of Anglo or Six Nations’ political and territorial
encroachments.
He and other leaders were also entrenched in the reality that the three tribes of Delawares
needed to make the right decision regarding alliances in the evolving imperial struggle for the
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Ohio. Throughout the Seven Years’ War, the western Delawares remained uncommitted in
taking a side, whether on a phratry or national level. George Croghan, as a deputy to Lord
Loudon, the British commander-in-chief in America, correctly summed up the situation on the
Ohio. He believed that no more than three hundred French were garrisoned at Fort Duquesne and
that the Ohio Delawares and Shawnees along with the Mingos were “divided amongst
themselves, one Half of each Tribe going down [the] Ohio to where the Lower Shawanese are
settled, on the Scioto [River], and the other Half were determined to go off to the Six Nations,”
to remain in the British sphere.35
This non-committal status was a trait of the Delaware tribes during this conflict. The
British and French actively courted their leaders for support. It was rumored that the Turkey
council met at the mouth of Beaver Creek to discuss “demolishing” the French garrison of Fort
Duquesne. Shingas, to get back in the good graces of the British, was prepared to “destroy the
Inhabitants.” 36 Nothing came of this threat. The French had promised western Delawares “that
if they would assist them they would repossess them of their native Country and bring the
[Pennsylvania] people under their command.”37 The governor-general of New France, the
Marquis Pierre di Rigaud de Vaudreuil, believed that French military presence would overawe
those Ohio Delaware tribes, who still clung to supporting the British: “This sight of this army,
which consists of about 9000 men, will give these Loups (Delawares) nothing but an exalted idea
of the French power and strengthen the confidence they are beginning to have in us.”38
Western Delawares, for the most part, were not totally convinced of French power.
Shingas, Pisquetomen, and others involved in the frontier raids of 1755 and 1756, realistically
weighed this success as a short-term victory. On the periphery of Pennsylvania, the Turtle,
Turkey, and Wolf tribes of Delawares individually became established as formidable forces that
Pennsylvania and the Six Nations could not ignore. Collectively the Turtle-Turkey tribes,
however, were well aware that a war against the British was not in their best interests. Also,
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while Custaloga and the Wolf Delawares were physically separated from the Turtle and Turkey
Delawares on the Ohio, they remained cautious in establishing a military alliance with the
French. The Wolf –Munsee division relied upon the western Senecas to handle all their
discussions with the English. The Wolf phratry of the Upper Allegheny region, slowly
“established a symbiotic relationship with the French garrisons in the area, supplying food and
labor in exchange for trade goods and cash.”39
From 1756 to 1758 the core of Unami-speaking Delawares in the west sought a peaceful
solution rather than to plunge into a disastrous war with the British. Both Tamaqua and Shingas
were willing to support the British on the condition that the Turkey tribe would be given a
prominent status over the other Delaware divisions. Tamaqua agreed to accept a “token Iroquois
hegemony” in the Ohio and to keep his warriors from joining the French. He also hoped that by
doing so, he would elevate his status among all Delaware headmen.40 Tamaqua reminded the
British that the French had treated the Delaware people “kindly, in every respect” and hoped that
the British would “take the same method.” 41 He told Croghan that the “governor of Fort
Duquesne” had offered his Delawares the hatchet. Tamaqua refused until he gained advice from
the Six Nations. But he contended that a group of Senecas on their way south to raid the
Catawbas were also at Fort Duquesne. These warriors offered the “French hatchet to the
Delawares and Shawonese who received it from them and went directly against Virginia.”42
The Marquis de Vaudreuil noted that the Delawares were playing sides--perhaps as a
strategy rather than indecisiveness. A Delaware delegation told a French emissary that they were
“firmly resolved to abandon the English forever.” Later de Vaudreuil was informed that the same
delegation had “gone in truce [to the English] to seek peace,” or at least a better deal. 43
Eventually Ohio Delawares left their French allies when it became apparent that the
French could not supply the Delawares with the steady flow of the trade goods (firearms,
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powder, tools, clothing) that they had become dependent upon. And those French goods that
found their way into Indian towns did not have the quality of the English products.44
As French presence in the Ohio decreased, western Delawares who had accepted the
French hatchet, sought to alter allegiances. This shift began when a group of Delaware warriors
failed in their attack against the British at Fort Ligonier in western Pennsylvania in October of
1756. This failed siege became a turning point for the British war effort in the west and slowly
disillusioned the Ohio Delawares who supported the French. Also the British were regrouping to
prosecute the war at a more ferocious pace under the auspices of William Pitt, newly appointed
Secretary of State for the British Crown in December 1756. By the spring of 1758, Brigadier
General John Forbes initiated a military expedition with a goal to push from Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, and “cut a new wagon trail” westward. Forbes, along with Swiss-born Colonel
Henry Bouquet, planned to move one hundred miles across Pennsylvania and remove the French
from the Ohio by taking Fort Duquesne and maintaining an English military garrison at the
forks.45
Forbes chose to avoid the mistakes of Braddock in his 1755 march to the Ohio. Rather
than alienate the Ohio Indians, as did Braddock, Forbes used Teedyuscung and Quaker merchant
Israel Pemberton to help pave the way for peace negotiations with the Delawares. Forbes hoped
that the efforts of Teedyuscung and Pemberton would wear down the militancy of the French
Indians at the forks. This was a controversial plan, as Forbes was aware that Sir William Johnson
and the Iroquois did not favor an “independent standing” of the Delawares in the west. Forbes
went over Johnson’s head and with the assistance of Pennsylvania’s new governor, William
Denny, arranged for Tamaqua and Pisquetomen to come to Philadelphia to discuss peace.46
Both Delaware leaders sought to make peace with the English. Not to be outdone, Sir
William Johnson sent Croghan with wampum belts to the “scattered Delaware Indians on the
                                                 
44 Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 236-237.
45 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in
British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 257-258. Also see Sipe,
Indian Wars of Pennsylvania, 387-391; O’Meara, Guns At The Forks, 188-193; West, ed., War
For Empire, 47-57. For more on William Pitt and the British plans of war, see Jennings, Empire
of Fortune, 354-363.
46 Anderson, Crucible of War, 268-270; Theodore Thayer, Israel Pemberton, King of the
Quakers (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943); Jennings, Empire of Fortune,
393-394.
79
Ohio to invite them back to their former Settlements” and to meet with Governor Denny, the
Susquehanna Delawares, and “Deputies of the Six Nations.”47
Encouraged by the prospect of peace, Denny enlisted Christian Frederick Post, a
Prussian-born Moravian missionary; to accompany the Delaware leaders back to the Ohio and
continue negotiations. Post was an excellent choice. He was a skilled frontiersman and a trusted
friend of the Delawares. (He also had two Delaware wives.) Post was instructed by Governor
Denny to offer amnesty to all Delawares who had participated in frontier raids against
Pennsylvania if they would now support the British.48 Post and Pisquetomen reached Shingas
and Tamaqua at the Kuskuskies by the middle of August of 1758. Post assured Tamaqua and the
other leaders that the English wanted peace. At the Kuskuskies, Shingas shielded Post from a
French captain and fifteen of his men. Having eluded the French, Post continued down the Ohio
to address other Delawares and their Shawnee and Mingo allies. Though well received by the
Indians, Post had to be protected from the French by Pisquetomen and his warriors. On August
26, he spoke to a large group of Ohio and Great Lakes Indians outside of Fort Duquesne as
French officers watched.49
As Post moved about the region, Forbes received word from Netawatwees of the Turtles,
Custaloga of the Wolf clan, and Keekyuscung, a spokesman of the Turkey tribe, that they were
willing to “return to their old habitations,” and move away from the French at the forks of the
Ohio. They told Forbes that they were “heartely weary of the warr.”50 This message from the
principal spokesmen of all three phratries demonstrates that a consensus was slowly taking form
among the western Delawares. These leaders realized that the British were about to take control
of the Ohio Valley.
By 1758 loyalties wavered as the war turned in favor of the British. From July to
December, Post met with Delaware chiefs from all three tribes to “prevail on them to withdraw
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from French interest.”51  At the Kuskukies, Post met with the civil chiefs and war captains of the
Turkey tribe. Shingas and Tamaqua assured Post of their friendship for the English. However,
they reminded him that they did not have the authority to speak for all other western Indians who
had “united in a body” against the British.52 Post then met with Koquethagechton (White Eyes)
and Gelelemend (Killbuck), the principal war captains of the Turtle tribe at Saukunk. He noted
that these two warriors, once very hostile to Post’s overtures of peace, now “received [him] very
kindly” and “apologized for their former rude behaviour.” White Eyes and Killbuck then
escorted Post back to the Kuskuskies for a great council meeting.53  Delaware George reiterated
the sentiments of the western Delawares, and at the same time, demonstrated his inability to
speak for the other Ohio nations  (Shawnees and Mingos) when he addressed Turtle and Turkey
leaders and Post's party on September 4, 1758:
Look, Brothers, we are here [on the Ohio] of three different nations. I am of the
Unamawa [Unami] Nation . . . I am sorry that I should make friendship with the
French against the English. I now assure you my heart sticks close to the English
interest. . . . 54
It appears that Tamaqua had persuaded Shingas and his followers to move into a pro-
British footing. Shingas said that the Delawares joined the French reluctantly despite the fact that
traders had told them that both the English and French “intended to join and cut all the Indians
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off” from the trade goods that his people needed to survive.55 He asked the British if they would
remove back east across the Appalachians and wait until the Delaware tribes could meet in
council with the other Indian nations to negotiate for a peace throughout the Ohio. The
Delawares would then invite the British back to “ build a trading house.” 56 This trading house
could only be realized after the French were driven from point of the three rivers. Pennsylvania,
through the mediation of Post, agreed to relinquish its claims to lands west of the Appalachians.
The Delawares were also assured that General Forbes would not molest their villages when his
British and American forces assaulted Fort Duquesne.57 The diplomacy of Post and, particularly
Pisquetomen, helped to weaken the French influence in the Ohio and bring all Unami Delawares
back into the British orbit.58
As the combined colonial and British army under Forbes pushed and hacked its way to
the forks of the Ohio, an Indian congress met once again with colonial officials at Easton. In
attendance on October 8, 1758 were representatives from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New
York along with Teedyscung and the eastern Delawares, the Six Nations, Nanticokes, Mahicans,
and Wappingers. A small western Delaware delegation headed by Pisquetomen and his council
arrived a few days later.59 Before this western delegation arrived, the Seneca chief Tagashata,
out of the affinity his people had with Wolf Delawares, assumed to speak for the western
Delawares. He told New Jersey governor Francis Bernard that the Munsees and “three other
different Tribes of that Nation, [he possibly included Mahicans as part of the Delawares] have, at
last, listened to us, and taken our Advise, and laid down the Hatchet” they had used against the
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English.60 Tagashata also apologized for a band of eastern Delawares, who under Captain Bull
(Teddyuscung’s son) were goaded by the French to commit violent raids on the Susquehanna.61
Teedyuscung marred the talks at Easton when he came to a session drunk and belligerent.
He, like Tagashata, attempted to speak for all Delawares, even though Pisquetomen had yet to
arrive. Teedyuscung also chastised the Iroquois for their attempts to dominate his people. He
claimed he and not the Iroquois had the power to make the Delawares accept the peace belts. At
Easton, Teedyuscung was caught in the middle of colonial rivalries. While the proprietors
condemned the actions of the eastern Delawares, the Quakers championed Teedyuscung and
rationalized Delaware raids as retaliation for such land frauds as the Walking Purchase in 1737.62
After Teedyuscung’s drunken tirade, he had “his wings clipped.”63 The Six Nations
denounced the authority of Teedyuscung and questioned who had given him that power. Nichas
of the Mohawks was the most vehement. He wondered if Governor Denny, “or perhaps the
French” had elevated the status of Teedyuscung.64 Denny came to Teedyuscung’s and his own
defense, when he maintained that the Delaware leader “never assumed authority” over ten
nations and that he had spoke of the Iroquois with deference “as his uncles and superiors.”65
Denny also asserted that Teedyuscung claimed to be a “Chief man for the Delawares, but only as
a Messenger for the United Nations,” or the ten eastern tribes.66
The Easton Conference once again changed the political environment of Pennsylvania
and its Indians. The proprietors gave back to the Iroquois all land “Westward of the Allegheny or
Appalaccin Hills” purchased at Albany in 1754.67 Governor Denny promised to restrain English
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settlements west of the Alleghenies, an action later made official policy by the Royal
Proclamation Line of 1763. Peace was made between eastern Delawares and Pennsylvania, and
western Delawares agreed to withdraw from French influence and not to assist in the defense of
Fort Duquesne.68 By this time the majority of Susquehanna Delawares were attached to the
British, except for bands of Munsees living on the west branch of the Susquehanna, who had
never been controlled by Teedyuscung.69
In a sense, with land being returned to the Iroquois, the Covenant Chain was extended,
but not necessarily strengthened, west of the Alleghenies. Once again, the Iroquois faced the
difficulty of asserting their rights as owners of the land and overlords of their tributaries. After
Easton, the temporary independence enjoyed by eastern Delawares had ended. Teedyuscung, no
longer needed as a mediator between Pennsylvania and the Ohio tribes, became expendable.70
The Iroquois once again claimed superiority over the eastern Delawares. They were, however,
not willing to push their luck and attempt dominance over the Ohio tribes. The Iroquois lost the
right to speak for the western Delawares. As the army of John Forbes approached Fort
Duquesne, the British treated directly with the Delawares, ignoring Iroquois pretensions as
territorial overlords.71
The Easton conference of 1758 symbolized a new prestige for western Delaware leaders
in the geopolitical environment of British America. Pisquetomen and his council brought a
message from Ohio Delawares that demonstrated solidarity and a need for Delawares to
reestablish a positive relationship with the English and Pennsylvania. Pisquetomen and Post
delivered a statement of consensus in wampum belts from “Captains and Councellers”--all
                                                 
68 Fenton, Great Law and Longhouse, 509; Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 402.
69 Croghan to Sir William Johnson, March 29, 1757, in Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties by
Benjamin Franklin, 169.
70 Without a following, Teedyuscung in an emotional moment as a forgotten man,
lamented to the Six Nations delegation: “I sit here as a Bird on a Bow [Bough]: I look about and
do not know where to go. . . .” See Teedyuscung to Six Nations delegation at Easton, Oct. 20,
1758, in MPCP 8: 201, 203; Wallace, Teedyuscung, 192-207.
71 Anderson, Crucible of War, 277-278; Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 402; Jennings,
Fenton, eds.,  History of Iroquois Diplomacy, 191. Jennings contends that the Iroquois would not
claim land rights in the Ohio until Easton solidified their territorial rights and until Forbes and
his army were at the gates of Fort Duquesne. In other words the Six Nations needed to be
reassured of British commitment in the Ohio before they would “push pretensions of superiority”
over Ohio Indians. See Jennings, Fenton, eds., History of Iroquois Diplomacy, 400-402.
84
principal civil and war leaders of the western Delawares. The list of marks included Tamaqua,
Shingas, and Delaware George of the Turkey tribe, Captain Kill Buck (Bemineo), a Wolf war
captain and the father of young Killbuck, and White Eyes, the prominent Turtle war captain,
among other leaders. Captain Kill Buck appeared regularly at various diplomatic talks with the
British during the fall of 1758. With the presence of this prestigious war captain, it became
apparent that the long-isolated Wolf tribe was slowly becoming part of the coalition that had
been established among the Turtle and Turkey tribes. All western Delawares sought to renew the
“Peace and Friendship” that had existed in the past with Anglo-America. The Delawares asked
the British to make a peace that would be acceptable to the Delawares beyond the Alleghenies
and that if they did so, their leaders would relay the word to all Indian nations of the Ohio and
Great Lakes.72
Clearly the western Delawares were seeking peace and were not dependent upon the
Iroquois to broker a deal for them. Governor Denny saw a great opportunity to achieve a peace
on the Ohio that would benefit both Pennsylvania and the British. The governor differentiated
between Teedyuscung’s Delawares, referred to as the “United Nations” of Indians, and Ohio
Delawares, who he called “our Brethren.” Denny responded to Pisquetomen’s message by
inviting an Ohio Delaware delegation to “come to Philadelphia . . . to [the] Old Council Fire,
which was kindled when we first saw one another. . . . ” By referring back to the days of William
Penn, Denny hoped to reestablish the positive relationship of the past.73  He also promised the
Delawares that if they restrained their warriors on the frontier not to attack settlements, not to
molest Forbes’ army, and to remain clear of Fort Duquesne, they would be safe from the British
military. Denny assured them that the army was sent not to punish these Indians who had
opposed the King of England (called “lost children”) but to “Chastise the French.”74
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Though the Ohio Delawares sought peace, this was not docility. Delawares were adamant
in defending their independence and their new homeland beyond the Alleghenies. As western
Delawares refused to give ground at Easton in 1758, they defied any attempt of the Six Nations
to reassert overlord dominance in the Ohio. A delegation visited a Chenussio Seneca town and
openly told them “We have been once Women, and ashamed to look down at our Petticoats, but
as you have taken off our Petticoats, and encouraged us to quarrel with the English, we are
determined to never submit to that ignominious State while there is one of us alive.”75 Hugh
Mercer, the Scottish physician who was a lieutenant colonel under Forbes, informed the General
that a combined force of Shawnees and Delawares had the capability to destroy the Six Nations.
He believed that only the “very powerful aid of the British could prevent this annihilation.” 76
Keekyuscung, a companion of Pisquetomen, warned Post that “all the [Ohio Indian]
nations had jointly agreed to defend their hunting place at Alleghenny.” He wanted the English
not to settle there but to “draw back over the mountains.” He was opposed to any form of
English settlement and told Post that a banning of settlements would be the only way to win over
the loyalty of the Ohio Delaware tribes. Post was to express these hopes to Forbes.77
As Forbes’s army approached the forks of the Ohio, the Indian allies were deserting the
French. At the Kuskuskies, the Delawares received a war belt from Captain Francois-Maria
Lignery, the French commander at Duquesne. They refused the belt, threw it to the ground, and
kicked it “as it were a snake.” They informed the messenger “We have often ventured our lives
for him [the French]; and had hardly a loaf of bread” to show for their loyalty.78
 On November 26, de Vaudreuil reported that the British met with Pisquetomen and
Keekyuscung at the Kuskuskies and asked them to “forget the past, to renew their ancestors’
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alliance with them, to let their entanglement with the French become void. . . .” 79 The Turkey
leaders told the British negotiators that to “hear their speeches, they must withdraw to the other
side of the mountains, and leave their lands free.” Without this understanding, the Delaware
tribes would never strike an alliance with Anglo governments. De Vaudreuil reported to the
French minister that the Kuskusky Delawares told the English that they and other tribes would
not be driven from the Ohio, for it “belonged to them from its source to its mouth.” 80
At this time the Delawares had emerged as the influential spearhead within the bloc of
western Indian nations. In 1759, Colonel Henry Bouquet described the Delawares as a “Warlike
Nation, living on the Ohio, Beaver Creek, and several other Branches of the Ohio, and high up
the Susquehanna” river region. He noted that in their current state, western Delawares comprised
of about 300-400 warriors. These numbers were changing as they “were collecting their People
together” on the Ohio to be a force with which to be reckoned.81
Delawares also hoped to regain the prominence they once enjoyed in Pennsylvania as
peacemakers. The British looked upon Shingas and Tamaqua as influential men who could sway
western Indians from the French fold. An intelligence report from Hugh Mercer in March 1759,
noted that western and Great Lakes Indian delegations were visiting the Kuskuskies to hear the
words of Delaware leaders. Mercer was optimistic that these Indians would “follow the Example
of their Grandfathers the Delawares.” 82  Delaware leaders were prepared to make peace with the
British and to enforce that peace as their national policy. Their decision was also hurried by the
dramatic events that transformed the Ohio region and forever altered Delaware history.
The fall of Fort Duquesne was a turning point of the Seven Years’ War in the Ohio
country. The English quickly accelerated their goals at gaining a total peace in the Ohio, free of
the instigations of the French. In July and August of 1759 George Croghan, as Sir William
Johnson’s “Deputy Agent” in the Ohio, and Colonel Hugh Mercer, the commandant in charge of
the construction of Fort Pitt (to be built at the point on the three rivers where Fort Duquesne once
stood), met with the Delawares and other western Indian nations to secure a lasting peace.
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Croghan in particular, hoped to re-establish himself with the Ohio Delawares because he wanted
to protect his “land-speculating-interests.” 83 Western Delawares assembled a strong delegation
of civil and war leaders. The Turkey tribe had a major presence at these Fort Pitt talks.
Representing the western Delawares were Tamaqua, Shingas, Delaware George, Keekyuscung,
and Captain Johnny (Welepachtschiechen), all of the Turkey phratry. Also in attendance at the
newly constructed fort, was the Turtle war captain White Eyes, and a group of Wolf war captains
including Captain Kill Buck and Captain Pipe (the nephew of Custaloga). These leaders were
committed in seeking the establishment of trading posts in the Ohio, but all were opposed to
Anglo settlements and permanent British garrisons in what they perceived to be Indian country.
Also present at the talks was a small group of Iroquois and Shawnees.84 However, Delaware
interests and concerns were the focus point of these peace talks.
An official peace was concluded on September 13, 1759 when Captain Pipe met with
Croghan. Pipe told him that he was carrying a message from Tamaqua and other principal
Delaware leaders that they, as holders of the wampum belts of all Ohio Indians, had “forwarded
all the Speeches entrusted to his [Croghan’s] Care by the western Indians to the Six Nations &
Susquehanna Indians.” He then requested that Croghan give him wampum belts to enable him
to convert more Indians “for the good of the English interests.” Captain Pipe also “delivered up”
two white boys who had been taken captive in Lancaster County.85
By October 1759, French strength in the west dwindled to 500 starving men at Fort
Detroit together with a small group of diehard Great Lakes Indians who prepared themselves to
“fall with their [French] Father.” 86 Peace came to the Indian west when Canada fell to the
British in September 1760. Britain now would not just have to pacify and govern the Great Lakes
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and Ohio Indians. They now also wielded authority over a vast number of Canadian tribes. The
Ohio country, in particular, became redefined as an extended part of Britain’s “greatly enlarged
empire.”87
Delawares reluctantly supported the restoration of the British in the Ohio. In reaction to
the presence of the British military, Delawares, at the invitation of the Wyandots, started to leave
the Allegheny River town of Kittanning and the Beaver Valley communities of Saukunk and the
Kuskuskies to move west to the Muskingum / Tuscarawas country. The Wyandot council
promised the Delawares that they would “never sell the ground under their feet to the White
People” as the Six Nations had done in Pennsylvania.88
Despite this “westward relocation” of what could be considered the core of the Delaware
nation, the majority of Munsee-Wolf people remained in the Upper Allegheny at Venango. The
Wolf tribe, yet to join the main body of Delawares, still remained close to their western Seneca
allies. The Unami-speaking Turtle and Turkey Delawares moved across the Ohio to establish
new towns and a central council fire in the Muskingum River valley of the Upper Ohio.89 The
leaders of these Unami groups extended invitations to the Susquehanna Delaware and Munsee
                                                 
87 McConnell, A Country Between, 146; Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness:
The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1961), 46.
88 John Heckewelder, A Narrative of the Mission of the United Brethren among the
Delaware and Mohegan Indians, from its Commencement, in the Year 1740, to the Close of the
Year 1808 Edited by William Elsey Connelley, (1820; reprint, Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers
Company, 1907), 230; Paul A.W. Wallace, ed., The Travels of John Heckewelder in Frontier
America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 95-98. Originally published as Thirty
Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958). The
Iroquois previously had given the Wyandots the country near the west end of Lake Erie and the
Ohio Valley between the Ohio River and the Miami River. The Wyandots became proprietors of
this region and granted the Delawares and Shawnees the right to settle in that region. The
Wyandots had become overlords of Ohio tribes--similar to the relationship between the
Delawares and the Iroquois in the east. Ironically in 1843, the Wyandots were resettled in Kansas
Territory on a tract of land (at the mouth of the Kansas River) purchased from the Delawares for
an exuberant price of 48,000 dollars. The Wyandots complained that at one time, the Delawares
had nowhere to go and they were given land in the Ohio. The Delawares now had an opportunity
to repay the kindness of the Wyandots and instead gouged them. See the notes by William
Connelley in Heckewelder, Narrative of the Mission, ed. Connelley, 273.
89 McConnell, A Country Between, 208-209; Goddard, “Delaware” in Trigger, ed.,
Handbook of North American Indians, 222. As part of this migration, the majority of northern
Unamis remained behind on the north branch of the Susquehanna, to eventually be subsumed as
89
speakers of the Wolf tribe to join them on the Muskingum. Most importantly, the “nucleus of the
emergent Delaware tribe” had been planted on the Muskingum.90
By the 1760s, the Ohio country had been transformed. The Allegheny and Monongahela
Valleys, once the heart of Indian country in the Ohio for immigrant Delaware, Shawnee, and
Mingo people, became crowded with British outposts and colonial settlements. The new heart of
the Ohio Indian country became the Muskingum and Scioto River valleys.91
The Turtle and Turkey leaders on the Muskingum demanded that the British and the
American colonists respect their independence and their rights to the Ohio Valley. This
insistence was also a double-edged sword. Shingas wanted both a “liberating distance” from
colonial settlements and at the same time, to enjoy the opportunities of commercial trade with
British traders.92 Christian Post noted that Delaware leaders sought to secure a distance between
the races so that the Delawares “may live by [themselves] a due distance from us . . . [as a way]
to secure theire hunting. . . . ” Post also believed that the Delaware men would not give up their
hunting territory to become farmers. He warned that they “will therefore rather die than submit to
work.”93
The Delawares’ expectations regarding their autonomy and rights to a new homeland
were dashed by the reality of a clash of cultures on the frontier. As quickly as the French
departed the Ohio by 1760, new difficulties arose on the British frontier. Trade between Indians
and whites flourished. But as Indians made their ways near British troops, a “volatile
atmosphere” of fear, mistrust, and hatred erupted. There were drunken brawls between Indians
and British soldiers and this carried past the military outpost as Indians and whites exchanged
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insults and violence. Indians stole horses from white settlements and American squatters took
control of tribal hunting grounds.94
The British attempted to remedy the problems on the frontier by enacting a disastrous
policy--a legislation that increased British authority and at the same time alienated the Ohio
tribes. The British government authorized Commander-in-Chief Sir Jeffrey Amherst and his
subordinates to enact an Indian policy that empowered the British and their “rights of conquest”
attitude in the west.95  Amherst structured his new Indian policy on fiscal conservatism. He told
his Indian agents that with regard to giving gifts to Indians: “I can see very little reason for
bribing the Indians or buying their good behavior, since they have no enemy to molest them.”96
In his policy he restricted such trade goods as muskets, powder, knives, tomahawks, razors--
anything that could be used as weapons against British troops on the frontier.97 Amherst also
banned the sale and trading of alcohol to Indians. With the English in sole possession of the
Ohio, Amherst and Sir William Johnson adhered to “authoritive regulation.” Under this policy,
trade between Anglo-Americans and Indians would be restricted to British outposts on the
frontier and regulated by British officers.98
John Heckewelder noted that Delawares cherished the “axes, guns, knives, hoes, shovels,
pots, and kettles . . . to which they have now become accustomed, and which they can no longer
do without.” 99 By refusing them these trade items or making them harder to acquire, Amherst
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dealt the Ohio Delawares and other Indian nations a severe blow. The British instigated an Indian
rebellion in the west, which had a deep imprint on the development of the Delaware nation.
In opposition to the new British trade policy, western Delawares gathered together “under
the guidance of charismatic prophets or respected headmen.”100 Delawares in the Ohio
welcomed the revitalization ideologies of Wolf spiritual leaders Neolin and Wangomen (“well-
beloved”), and the political radicalism of the Turtle chief Netawatwees. These nativist
movements focused on a return to traditional values, an anti-British rhetoric, and an opposition to
being dependent on the trade goods of the whites. Delaware leaders embraced the doctrine of the
prophet Neolin as a way to mobilize “sufficient social and political integration” and to use native
spirituality as a rallying point for unification.101 Neolin advocated that Delawares, who had
already physically isolated themselves from the Anglo world, “learn to live without Trade or
Connections with the White people” and support “themselves as their forefathers did.”102
The period of the 1760s was the “Indian Great Awakening;” 103 a time in which Neolin
and Wangomen opposed the secular influences that whites had brought to their people. During
this period, western Indians of all nations were awakened to the fact that they “shared a conflict
with Anglo-America” and needed to unify as a race. The Delawares in particular, realized that
they needed to “take hold of their destiny by regaining sacred power.”104
Duane Champagne maintains that the revitalization movement of Neolin “consolidated
the three major Delaware political groupings into a religiously and politically unified national
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government.” He believes that the creation of a national religion structured around the traditional
Big House Ceremony brought these tribes together.105
While Champagne’s point is well made, he has overestimated the role of cultural
revitalization in the national development of the Delawares. Revival, on a spiritual basis, was a
short-lived phenomenon. Delawares by this period were dependent upon commercial trade goods
for survival. Also nativist and revivalist movements, that emphasized shunning British trade
goods, could not reconcile itself with the pan-Indian rebellion of 1763, lead by the Ottawa leader
Pontiac and Kiashuta of the Senecas, which was in response to Amherst’s trade restrictions. This
uprising, in essence, was a militant protest against being cut off from those trade commodities.
 Pontiac and other influential leaders unified the western Indian nations into action.
Delaware warriors, together with other western tribes such as the Shawnees, Ottawas,
Chippewas, Wyandots, and western Senecas, joined Pontiac and Kiashuta and took control of ten
out of the thirteen British forts they attacked.106
During Pontiac’s war, the Delaware war captains came to the forefront in implementing
policy among the phratries. While Tamaqua, Shingas, and William Anderson of the Turkey
phratry opposed the attacks against British forts and settlements in the Ohio, they could not
prevail upon Delaware war captains and their warriors to stay clear of the war trail.107 As during
                                                 
105 Champagne, “Delaware Revitalization Movement,” 115. For more on revivalist
movements as a tool of moral reform see White, The Middle Ground, 279-283; Merritt,
“Dreaming of the Savior’s Blood,” 723-746; Anthony F.C. Wallace, “New Religions Among the
Delaware Indians, 1600-1900,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology  12 (Spring 1956): 1-17.
106 Much has been written about Pontiac’s Rebellion, Uprising, or Conspiracy. William
Nester considers this uprising to be a “war of self-determination” of western Indians in a British-
dominated North America. See Nester, Haughty Conquerors, X. Some of the best works
regarding Pontiac’s War includes Nester’s, Naughty Conquerors; Dowd, A Spirited Resistance;
Dowd, War Under Heaven, Howard Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (New York:
Russell and Russell, 1947); and of course Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac. The
British outposts at Niagara, Pitt, Ligonier, and Detroit withstood the sieges of the western
Indians. Fort Bedford, ninety miles east of Pitt, also held out against the attacks.
107 A. T. Volwiler, ed., “William Trent’s Journal at Fort Pitt, 1763,” The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review 11 (March-June 1924): 399. In June of 1763 four Shawnees met with
Alexander McKee (in charge of Indians affairs at Fort Pitt) and informed him that the “Capts and
Warriors of the Delaware pay no regard to their Chiefs who advised them not to accept the
Hatchet. . . . ” Tamaqua, Shingas, and William Anderson sent messages of intelligence to Fort
Pitt on the progress of Pontiac’s war along the Great Lakes. They also requested that the white
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the French and Indian War, the “prowess of the Delaware warrior became known from the
Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi.”108 Delaware war parties acted more “For the welfare of
[their] nation,” raided throughout the region, bringing “home the trophies of war,” including
white captives, and leaving behind the destruction of American settlements.109 The Delawares
were particularly active in sieges against Fort Ligonier and Fort Pitt.110
Despite the initial success of Pontiac and his followers, the uprising fell apart when
fortunes turned in favor of the British. On August 5th and 6th, 1763, Colonel Henry Bouquet
decisively defeated the western tribes at the abandoned outpost of Bushy Run at Edge Hill
(approximately twenty-six miles southeast of Fort Pitt). The siege of Fort Pitt was lifted on
August 10. 111  Not wanting another costly Indian war, the British ministry issued a Royal
                                                                                                                                                              
inhabitants leave Fort Pitt while they had the chance. See “Intelligence brought to Fort Pitt by
Mr. Colhoon,” June 1, 1763, in Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles, 245-246.
108 Newcomb, Culture and Acculturation, 87.
109 Excerpt from “ The Song of the Lenape Warriors Going Against the Enemy” in
Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 210-211.
  110 John W. Jordan, ed., “Journal of James Kenny, 1761-1763,” The Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography 37 (1913): 183. In Kenny’s journal entry on Jan. 13, 1763,
he noted that, in the “attacks upon [Fort] Leigonier . . . there were many Delawares.”
111 Sipe, Indian Wars of Pennsylvania, 420; O’Meara, Guns at the Forks, 226. Captain
Bull, the son of Teedyuscung, was a fierce opponent of settlers who entered Delaware land in the
Wyoming Valley. On April 19, 1763 Teedyuscung’s cabin at Wyoming was burnt to the ground,
as he lay asleep, in a “drunken stupor.” Connecticut settlers may have been involved in the
burning of Teedyuscung’s cabin. Taking advantage of the turmoil in the west and in retaliation
for his father’s death, Captain Bull and other Delawares of the Susquehanna, raided in the
Wyoming Valley (near current-day Wilkes-Barre), in the fall of 1763. In October of 1763, Bull
moved south and raided in Northampton and Cumberland counties in Pennsylvania. Bull boasted
that during these raids, he alone had killed twenty-six settlers. During the spring of 1764,
Andrew Montour and a large party of Iroquois (Oneidas and Tuscaroras) were sent to punish the
Susquehanna Delawares for these frontier raids, and captured Bull and twenty-nine of his
warriors.  Montour presented Bull to Sir William Johnson, who placed him in a New York City
jail. See Johnson Papers 7: 350-351; 14: 160; Wallace, Teedyuscung, 207, 210, 214, 217, 260-
265; Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 246-247. Keekyuscung, the prominent Turkey war
captain, was killed at Bushy Run. See footnote 12 in Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness
Chronicles, 134.
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Proclamation in October that limited white settlement west at the crest of the Appalachian
Mountains until a formal western expansion policy could be established.112
Future events, however, had deeper relevance in the process of Delaware nationhood than
did short-lived revival movements. In October of 1764 Colonel Bouquet, with 1500 Royal
American troops and auxiliary forces of Virginia militia and the Black Watch, moved into the
Muskingum to chastise the Delawares for their part in Pontiac’s Rebellion and to procure the
release of English captives. Bouquet met with Indian leaders at Fort Pitt. An Onondaga and an
Oneida told him that the Delawares and Shawnees were in a “state of confusion.” They asked
Bouquet to approach the Muskingum with caution and civility and they informed Bouquet that
the Delawares, in particular, were very remorseful “for what they have done, and are collecting
all their prisoners from the lower Shawanese town in order to deliver them up at Sandusky.”113
Bouquet was unimpressed and told the Iroquois that the Delawares and Shawnees were a “false
people” who deceived them.114 He did agree to meet with Delaware leaders at Tuscarawas. To
insure that Delawares would not violate the truce, Bouquet detained the war captains Captain
Pipe and Captain Johnny. Bouquet threatened to put them to death if the Delawares renewed
hostilities against his troops.115 He remarked that Pipe and Johnny were to remain at Fort Pitt “as
a security, that you shall commit no further hostilities.”116
For the first time in documented history, there is reference to the three animal tribes
acting together with shared aims as representatives of the Delaware nation. Tamaqua, the leader
of all western Delawares, greeted Bouquet on “behalf of the Chiefs, Warriors, Women, and
Children of our three Tribes. . . .” 117 In Bouquet’s journal he acknowledged each animal
                                                 
112 McConnell, A Country Between, 234, 248; Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 461-463.
The Royal Proclamation line as a demarcation between whites and Indians was first discussed at
Easton in 1758. The British could not stop settlement west of this imaginary line.
113 Iroquois Indians to Bouquet at Fort Pitt, Oct. 2, 1764, in Rupp, ed., Early History of
Western Pennsylvania, 146.
114 Bouquet to Iroquois at Fort Pitt, Oct. 3, 1764, in ibid., 147.
115 Ibid., 148.
116 (Author unknown) Referred to as a “Lover of his Country” in “An Historical Account
of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764, under the Command of Henry
Bouquet, Esq” (Dublin: John Milliken, 1769) 27. Bouquet detained the two Delaware war
captains after a British soldier was murdered on the Muskingum.
117 Tamaqua to Bouquet, Nov. 10, 1764, in Johnson Papers 2: 457.
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division and their principal leaders, not to divide them, but to acknowledge them as vital parts of
the nation. Both Bouquet and the Delaware leaders understood that peace could not be reached
unless all three tribes acted in concert as a nation. Bouquet first met with Custaloga of the Wolf
tribe and Kiashuta of the Chenussio Senecas, and secured the release of eighteen prisoners. He
then met with Tamaqua who agreed to release over eighty captives held by the Turkey tribe.118
Netawatwees feared to meet with Bouquet. His tribe of Delawares was responsible for the
murder of schoolmaster Enoch Brown, other teachers, and eleven school children at a
schoolhouse in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.119 Bouquet became “dissatisfied with the
conduct” of Netawatwees when he failed to show at the talks and “deposed him.” Bouquet met
with a council member named Tapiscawen and appointed him chief leader of the Turtles.120
Throughout most of the talks, Bouquet directly addressed the chiefs and councilors of all three
groups as one nation. 121
Tamaqua confided to Bouquet his hopes that the “three Tribes” of Delawares would be
able to “embrace Peace once more with their Brethren” and to “now think of nothing but
hunting, to exchange their Skins and Furs with their brethren for Cloathing.”122 Bouquet had the
                                                 
118 William Smith, Nov. 11, 1764, on the Muskingum in Booth, ed., Tuscarawas Valley
in Indian Days, 69-77; “An Historical Account of the Expedition,” 16-17.
119 Ibid., 212. Bouquet was furious with Netawatwees and his band. The chief had no
hand in the slaughter, but could not control his warriors. The war party that massacred Brown
and his students, took a boy captive. They killed the boy on the trail near Little Beaver Creek.
Bouquet condemned them for they had the “impudence to fix his head upon a pole in the middle
of the path as a taunt to those who pursued.”  See Rupp, ed.,  Early History of Western
Pennsylvania, 151.
120 Ibid., 73; MPCP 9: 226-229. The meetings on Nov. 1, 9, involved the Wolf Delawares
and western Senecas, exclusively. Bouquet understood the close geographical and historical
relationship between the two. Also see Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 248-249. At this time,
Bouquet refused to acknowledge the authority of Netawatwees, who retained his position later
that year and remained leader of the Turtle tribe and chief councilor of all Delawares until his
death in 1776.
121 Bouquet in Johnson Papers 2: 458-461
122 Tamaqua to Bouquet, Nov. 10, 1764, in Johnson Papers  2: 456-457; MPCP 9: 226.
Shingas, recognized as the head leader, died during the winter of 1763. Keekyuscung told the
Quaker trader James Kenny in 1763 that Tamaqua was not king of the Ohio Delawares. He told
Kenny that it was the “people of Virginia,” and not the Delawares who made Tamaqua a king.
Keekyuscung contended that Netawatwees of the Turtle tribe was the Delaware king. See Jordan,
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Ohio Indians cease hostilities in all of Indian country and forced them to give up over 200
English captives. The Indians also agreed to send deputies to Johnson Hall in New York to meet
with William Johnson and to officially “conclude with him a final and lasting Peace.”123
Delawares exchanged prisoners for trade goods, desperately needed by a people approaching
starvation.124
The following May, both Ohio and Susquehanna Delawares mutually agreed to meet with
Sir William Johnson, who also met with Shawnee and Mingo leaders at Johnson Hall during
these talks. Principal leaders among the Susquehannas were Long Coat (Anindamooky) and The
Squashcutter (Yaghkapose). Captain Kill Buck of the Wolf tribe attended the talks as a
representive of the Ohio Delawares, as a “Deputy from our Chiefs . . . on behalf of all our
Nation.” Killbuck, accompanied by Turtles Heart, carried the words of the phratry heads,
Tamaqua and Custaloga, and the Turtle councilor named Teatapercaum. At the talks,
Susquehanna and Ohio Delawares separately agreed to twelve specific articles of peace. The first
of this agreement was that both eastern and western Delawares would release all English
captives, “Deserters, Frenchmen & Negroes.” He demanded that they “promise and engage never
to take revenge for any act committed by Individuals of the British Nation” but to take their
grievances to the commander of the military post. Johnson also asked the Delawares to use their
influence on Shawnees, who were still fighting against the British.125
Johnson promised that settlement would be limited and only achieved through the
consensus of the Iroquois. (The Delawares had to abide by the decisions of the Six Nations
regarding white settlement in the Ohio). He also guaranteed the Delawares a restoration of
English trade in the Ohio, and that they would “be once more received into the Covenant Chain
                                                                                                                                                              
ed., “Journal of James Kenny,” 157. Keekyuscung also told Kenny that the principal Wolf leader
Custaloga was one half Seneca.
123 A proclamation by Pennsylvania Governor John Penn, Dec. 5, 1764, in MPCP 9: 234.
124 Regarding the conditions of some of the Delaware bands, Sarah Carter  a white
captive mentioned that the Chenussio Seneca had “Corn Enough,” but the Delawares [Munsees]
were “starving, having Dug up sev.[eral] English dead bodys & Eat them” in Johnson Papers  4:
497.
125 “Treaty of Peace concluded with the Delawares” at Johnson Hall, May 8, 1765, in
NYCD 7:738;  MPCP 9: 277-280. The British knew Teatapercaum as Samuel.
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of Friendship with the English.”126 The Delaware leaders signed a treaty with the British
admitting responsibility for their role in Pontiac’s uprising. Johnson remarked that the three
Delaware divisions, locked in consensus, agreed to the peace proposal. Delawares consented that
they would no longer molest the King’s subjects and would turn over all disputes with whites to
royal authority.127 Johnson acknowledged the influence and authority of the Delaware deputies
such as Captain Kill Buck in confirming a treaty for the “rest of their whole Nation.”128 Most
importantly, these talks clearly show that the British had finally realized that western groups of
Delawares had no intention of ever returning to the Susquehanna. They refused to be shackled to
past reciprocities of subservience and had forged a new individuality as an emerging nation in
the Ohio.
Michael McConnell contends that these Delaware groups “reconstituted in the west” and
through a “process of social and political coalescence,” they allied themselves in an ethnic sense.
While McConnell is correct in his overall assessment, he fails to address the complexities of this
procedure. A key factor in the independence and unification of the western Delaware tribes was
their complete separation from the eastern Delawares. With this parting, western Delawares were
free to organize the type of strong national political structure that had never existed among the
dispersed bands in the east. The “coalescence” that McConnell mentions was not a distinct
moment to be pinpointed by future historians. In fact, the initial “coalescence” centered first on
the strong interaction between the Turtle and Turkey phratries. The Unami-speaking Turtle and
Turkey tribes, united by ethnicity and language, banded together first in the Allegheny and
                                                 
126 “Treaty of Peace concluded with the Delawares” at Johnson Hall, May 8, 1765, in
NYCD 7:738; MPCP 9: 277-280.
127 Sir William Johnson to Cadwallader Colden in Johnson Papers 3: 746; MPCP 9: 280.
George Croghan’s observations differ from Johnson regarding Delaware political solidarity.
Croghan contended that the Turtle and Turkey leaders “were very averse to making peace with
the English” until Captain Kill Buck returned from Johnson Hall. In fact, they expressed
contempt for Custaloga of the Wolf tribe. They considered him to be “an old Woman” for
quickly agreeing to peace with Bouquet. See “Croghan’s Report,” 1765 in Clarence Walworth
Alvord and Clarence Edwin, eds., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, vol. 11, The
New Regime, 1765-1767 (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1916), 5-7. Despite the
differences between Johnson and Croghan regarding Delaware consensus, the ethno-historian
Melburn D. Thurman contends that by 1765, there was a clear indication that “war and peace
making powers [for the nation] resided with each of the three Delaware tribes.” See Thurman,
“ Delaware Indians in Ethnohistory,” 113-114.
128 Sir William Johnson at Johnson Hall, July 13, 1765, in NYCD 7: 754.
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Beaver valleys of western Pennsylvania, then in new towns across the Ohio River along the
Muskingum.129 With regard to the Wolf phratry, the Delawares told John Heckewelder that the
more militant “Monseys, had [traditionally] chosen to live back of the other two tribes,” as a
“bulwark for their protection.”130 Geographically distanced, the Wolf tribe had to be slowly
integrated into the Delaware nation. Their participation in the Bouquet peace talks was but a
start.
Even more so than the social and ethnic commonalities, it was the strong presence of the
phratry leaders that affected the once-autonomous animal tribes to move toward a needed
centralized structure. Shingas, Pisquetomen,Tamaqua, Netawatwees, and Custaloga, among other
headmen, established a solid base for their respective tribes while at the same time planting the
seeds of political nationalization. Beneath the veneer, in the aftermath of the Muskingum talks
with Colonel Bouquet, the Delawares were taking the national form of a “three divisional
confederacy.” 131
The experiences of the Seven Years’ War and Pontiac’s Rebellion had established the
Ohio Delawares as a separate entity from the Susquehanna Delawares. By severing themselves
from their ties in the east, Ohio Delawares were in place to be more receptive to radical changes
in organization. This period galvanized once autonomous bands of Delawares into a more
cohesive polity. In the aftermath of 1765, Delawares had a greater conception of a common
cause--the survival and security of their homelands on the Muskingum. The political unity of the
Delaware tribes was not complete and would go through more transformations as the turbulence
of the American Revolution approached the Ohio.
                                                 
129 Ibid., 225.
130 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 52-53. Lenape oral traditions have
established much of this relationship among the three Delaware phratries. According to
Heckewelder, the Turkey tribe was more stationary than the “rambler” Wolf tribe and always
clung close to the Turtles. This attachment may have much to do with a common Unami dialect
between the two Delaware tribes. Thurman has mentioned that there has always been a
misconception that the Wolf tribe, because of geographical isolation, was never a full-fledged
member of the Delaware nation. Thurman maintains that “spatial segregation” was not indicative
of “political segregation.” See Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 253-254;
Thurman, “ Delaware Indians in Ethnohistory,” 107-108.
131 Champagne, “Delaware Revitalization Movement,” 115.
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Chapter IV
White Eyes, The Great Council, and the United Brethren:
Peacemakers on the Muskingum, 1770-1776
In Lenape folk tradition there was the tale of Nanapush who was the spirit helper of the
Creator, known as Kishelamakank. Nanapush gave the Lenape a new Earth in which to reside,
created their culture, and gave birth to the animals that offered sustenance. Lenape oral history
also maintains that Nanapush fought his father, known as Wunch`enekis, to avenge the death of
his mother who was killed by the father. The father denied that he had murdered his mother, but
seeing his son's determination for vengeance, agreed to fight him. Locked in a ferocious fight with
bow and arrows, knives, and bare hands, the father told his son to cease the battle. “Enough my
son, enough . . . to go on is senseless. Let us have peace between us.”1 The father taught his son
the art of diplomacy. With the use of the pipe of peace, the father and son smoked together and
“brought their hearts and minds together as one, resolving the differences between them.”2 The
Delawares were instructed that an integral part of national greatness was to be militarily strong,
but without striving for “power and control over others.” Through the art of diplomacy, Lenapes
hoped to gain the ideals of “peace and order” in their world.3
To insure the success of Lenape diplomacy with other nations and among themselves,
Nanapush also brought four sacred gifts: The Fire of Peace, the Pipe, the Sacred Tobacco, and
Sweetgrass, to enhance the strength and wisdom of the Lenapes when they were in council.
Nanapush told Lenapes: “As the smoke from the pipe rises to the sky, your thoughts and
prayers will be heard by the Creator. Peace and order, and good thinking will be restored among
the people.” 4     
                                                
            1 Hi`takonanulaxk (Tree Beard), Grandfathers Speak, 55. According to Lenape and most
northeastern woodland Indian oral traditions, the Earth was formed on the back of The Great






In the aftermath of Pontiac’s uprising, Ohio Delaware tribes tired of war, sought peace
and pressed for unity in the tradition of Nanapush, and moved deeper into the Ohio country.
Throughout the decade before the American Revolution, the three phratries of Delawares secured
a short-lived and very fragile national solidarity. Other key catalysts in this solidarity were the
presence of a more definitive national council and the appearance of Moravian mission towns
along the Muskingum River. Together with the council and Christian missionaries, a persuasive
leader known as White Eyes rose as a singular voice to influence the shape of the Delaware
political nation.
It was during this time that the “Lupwaaeenoawuk” (the Great Council or “Wise Men”)
entered the historical record.5 While each phratry had a council headed by a principal civil chief
and a war captain, during the 1760s the Great Council of the three tribes became the definitive
expression of a political nation.6 Previously there was little mention or understanding of a
functioning Delaware national council until their move into the Muskingum River valley. The
organization of a national council fulfilled the “shared needs” of the three phratries to strike a
meaningful union in a new western homeland. The Great Council served as a testament that
Delawares were willing to enter into a structured union for the first time in their history.
By the 1760s, the three phratries became highly recognizable and visible in the “process
of treaty making” for the Delaware nation.7 Teedyuscung made reference in 1760 to the
Lupwaaeenoawuk as “the great Council over the River Ohio”--the high authority for western
Delawares.8 By 1761, there was a growing awareness of a national council among the three tribes
when Delaware George told James Kenny that “their Nation [was] subject to three heads . . .
which all had to be consulted” before any action be taken.9 In July of 1762, Netawatwees,
                                                
5 The term Lupwaaeenoawuk, can be found in Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 194, 288-
290. The men who held council were referred to as Wemiehatschimolsitschik (“All those who
continually hold council”). Correspondance with Raymond Whritenour, August 18, 2002.
6 Thurman, “Delaware Indians in Ethnohistory,” 120-121.
7 Hunter, “Sub Divisions of the Delawares,” 35.
8 Teedyuscung to Pennsylvania officials in Philadelphia, March 29, 1760, in Grumet, ed.,
Journey on the Forbidden Path, 20-22.
9 Delaware George to James Kenny, August 14, 1761, in Jordan, ed., “Journal of James
Kenny,” 18.
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Tamaqua, and Custaloga, held “Several Councils amongst” themselves regarding the release of
white settlers, who were captured during the Seven Years’ War.10
This council, which housed the civil chiefs and war captains of the Turtle, Turkey, and
Wolf tribes, became more recognizable after the peace talks with Colonel Bouquet on the
Muskingum in November of 1764. During the various meetings with Bouquet, Tamaqua and
Custaloga had central roles in mediating a peace for all Western Delawares. Despite the
temporarily weakened diplomatic status of the Turtle group, a national Delaware council was
slowly establishing a presence on the Muskingum. After Bouquet’s military left the region, a
western Delaware council led by the phratry leaders Netawatwees (restored as chief), Tamaqua,
and Custaloga, met as a national council, to discuss tribal concerns regarding a settlement with the
British.11 A better understanding of the structure and mechanism of the council was furthered
through the careful observations of the Moravians, Zeisberger and Heckewelder. They became
critical witnesses to the development, unification, and eventual fragmentation of the Delaware
nation.
The Lupwaaeenoawuk contributed as an integral part of Delaware political organization in
this post-Seven Years’ War period. At that time, George Croghan noted that many of the
Delaware towns were in “great Confusion amongst themselves and without any order in their
Council.” 12 Croghan based this assessment of chaos among the Delawares as a result of the news
that two unnamed Delaware war captains, “differed in Council & stabbed each other . . .” 13
This, however, was an isolated incident and not indicative of council behavior at that time. Many
witnesses to the procedures of the council were impressed with the order and respect for
protocol demonstrated in the Great Council House of the Delaware nation. Nicholas Cresswell, a
young English adventurer, maintained that the Great Council House had been constructed at
Gekelemukpechunk, later known as Newcomerstown (“the water that is always still”), the
capital Delaware town on the Muskingum, solely for the discussion of national affairs. There the
Delawares kept the central council fire. During the council meeting, every item was discussed
                                                
10 James Kenny, July 8, 1762, in ibid., 161.
11 Champagne, “Delaware Revitalization Movement,” 114-115.
12 George Croghan, March 1765, “Journal of transactions with the Indians at Fort Pitt,”
in MPCP  9: 254-256.
13 Croghan, March 1765, in ibid., 9: 255.
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with the “greatest regularity and decorum, silence and deliberation.” 14 John Heckewelder
observed that Delawares, like most American Indian nations, had a great respect for council
etiquette. Only one person spoke at a time and the others listened attentively until the speaker
had concluded. The tone of the speaker’s voice might become more intense if he was directing his
agenda towards a group of warriors.15
Phratry leaders, meeting under the structure of the Great Council, pursued both unity and
peace as a national agenda. This national goal became manifested through the influences of the
United Brethren on Delaware leaders and through the peacemaking efforts of the prominent
Turtle leader, White Eyes. The Lupwaaeenoawuk and the presence of Moravian missionaries
served the higher visions of White Eyes in his quest for a united and stable Delaware Indian
nation.
To survive as a people, the Delawares had to augment the ideals of peacemaking with the
reality that an Indian nation with a strong warrior presence could deter the unwanted territorial
expansion of British America. They could seek peace with the Anglo-Americans, because the
historical examples of their raids into central Pennsylvania in 1755 would always serve as a
reminder that the Delawares, even at band level, were not “weakling women” and could exact
great damage on any people who might do them injustice.
However, this was a time in which peace, through diplomacy, was preferred by the
leaders, who became tired of the ravages of war. West of the Ohio River in the Muskingum River
valley, the Delawares established a series of small villages and “satellites of larger towns.”
Diplomatic centers such as Gekelemukpechunk and Goschachgunk, also known as Coschocton,
became the chief residencies for powerful and influential civil and war leaders, all seeking
consensus in determining what was best for the Delaware people.16
                                                
14 Nicholas Cresswell, The Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777 (New York: The
Dial Press, 1924), 113. Newcomerstown was named in honor of the residing Turtle chief
Netawatwees (Newcomer).
15 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 107-112, 189-190. For details on
Delaware council meetings, see Zeisberger in Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,”
94-99.
16 McConnell, A Country Between, 229. Gekelemukpechunk (Newcomerstown) was the
first Delaware capital in the west. In 1776, the Delawares moved their capital to Coschocton,
known by the Delawares as Goschachgunk, located at the forks of the Tuscarawas and
Walhonding. Goschachgunk, a settlement composed of log houses and a large council house was a
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Phratry consensus became increasingly important to the stability of the Delawares after
the 1760s. The three phratries worked together in the context of the Great Council. Leaders were
closely scrutinized and chosen by “consent of the tribe and whole nation.” A chief, even though
recognized as a figure of authority, was dependent on the advice of his counselors.17 This careful
procedure of selection, and the vital role of the counselors, insured the Delaware nation that men
of good character would lead the people through consensus-- not in an autocratic fashion. The
layers of consensus needed for governmental decisions, interlocked phratry and national
concerns. David McClure, a visiting Presbyterian missionary, witnessed firsthand a Delaware
Great Council meeting and the concern shown for consensus. Netawatwees and the council
in number about 12, sat on Buffalo skins. Civil chiefs sat on one side of the
entrance of the council house, chief warriors sat on the other side-- Young men &
women & children occupied the rest of the house. Warriors were painted, & their
heads & necks ornamented with feathers & strings of wampum.18
McClure noted that the speaker worked the council house to gain a consensus. He contended:
listeners gave “shouts of applause to what they dislike, as uttered by the speaker, as freely as
they do what they approve.”19 Thus council members strove for agreement in national affairs.
This became the political ideal among the leaders of this fledgling Indian nation.
Political consensus removed the stigma of inaction and decentralization that had
previously encumbered national development. Agendas could now be pursued on a national level.
In April of 1770, the Delaware Great Council met at Gekelemukpechunk. They invited the
United Brethren or Moravian missionaries to move their missions of Delaware Christians from
the Susquehanna to minister to those Delawares who remained at the Kuskuskies and in the
                                                                                                                                                            
chief Unami town. For an extensive list of Delaware towns in the west see Swanton, Indian
Tribes of North America, 48-55.
17 Zeisberger in Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., Zeisberger’s History,” 112-113. On the
dependency of the chiefs on the council see Wainwright, George Croghan, 17, 40-46.
18 Entry of David McClure, Sept. 22, 1772 in David McClure, with notes by Franklin B.




Muskingum towns farther west. “Epidemical disease” had raged through the Delaware towns in
Ohio country and carried “off great numbers” of the population. Custaloga, the Wolf leader,
became convinced that witchcraft had caused the epidemic, and that “by embracing Christianity
the contagion would cease.” He also feared that this catastrophe could destroy national unity.20
Delawares were not rejecting their own religion but rather adding Moravian religious doctrine to
their beliefs. They believed Christianity might serve as a spiritual weapon to combat the
biological epidemics that swept through the Delaware communities by “augmenting their own
collective powers against dangerous forces.”21 Christianity served as a “remedy” to the
problem.22
Leaders such as Custaloga and White Eyes saw the influence of the Moravians as a
stabilizer rather than a threat to the Delaware nation. Whether it was the nativist proselytizing of
Neolin or the Christian doctrine of the Moravians, Delaware leaders assessed the value of cultural
and spiritual rejuvenation through moral reform as a mechanism to insure a cohesive political
nation. Throughout the eighteenth century, Moravian missionaries and nativist leaders contended
with each other for the collective soul of the Delaware people. In 1740, after failing to establish a
successful Christian mission in Georgia among the Cherokees, David Zeisberger, his wife, son,
and fifteen of his Moravian helpers moved to Pennsylvania and founded Bethlehem, in the
Nazareth Valley at the forks of the Delaware River. Among Zeisberger’s neighbors were
immigrant New Jersey Delawares. This praying town eventually became the center of the
Moravian Church in America.23 
In Pennsylvania, the Moravians quickly established themselves among the eastern
Delawares. By the late 1740s there were mission towns in Gnadenhutten (twenty-five miles
                                                
20 John Heckewelder in Wallace, ed., Travels of Heckewelder, 95; Heckewelder, Narrative
of the Mission, ed., Connelley, 226-228.
21 McConnell, A Country Between, 229.
22 Heckewelder,  Narrative of the Mission, ed., Connelley, 113. For a more extensive
view of the dynamics between missionaries and American Indians during the colonial era see
Axtell, The Invasion Within.
23 Elma E. Gray and Leslie Robb Gray, Wilderness Christians: The Moravian Mission to
the Delaware Indians (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), 24-25; Earl P.
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north of Bethlehem) and Shamokin, on the Susquehanna.24 In 1765 Zeisberger founded
Friedenshutten on the Susquehanna near the Indian town of Wyalusing in current-day Bradford
County and in 1768, Zeisberger and his followers crossed the Alleghenies to the headwaters of
the Allegheny River to establish Goschgoschunk among the Munsees, near Tionesta in
northwestern Pennsylvania.25 At that time, Moravian Delawares had remained with the majority
of Munsees in Allegheny country. There, Zeisberger and Christian Delawares lived at the mission
towns of the Allegheny Valley. Later he founded Friedenstadt, south of present-day New Castle,
Pennsylvania.26 These missions were situated in the shadow of the trading towns of the
Kuskuskies, whose primary commodity was liquor.27 The sale of alcohol alarmed Zeisberger
because his missions were constantly harassed and vandalized by those he considered bellicose
“drink-crazed heathens” of the Munsee-Wolf and Seneca tribes.28 John Heckewelder, assistant to
Zeisberger, condemned the actions of those he called the “drunken Munsee chauvinists” who
resided in these “degenerate, rum-soaked” trading towns.29
                                                
24 Gray, Wilderness Christians, 24-26; Olmstead, Blackcoats Among the Delaware,  3-6;
Wallace, ed., Travels of Heckewelder, 1-5. The Unity of the Brethren (Unitas Fratrum) was the
oldest international Protestant church in the world. The Moravian religion originated in 1457 in
the German provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. John Huss, its originator, led a Protestant
Reformation a century before Martin Luther. Moravian missionaries entered North America in
1735, as missionaries to the Creek and Cherokee Indians in Georgia. When their efforts failed
among these people, the missionaries relocated into the Nazareth and Lehigh valleys of eastern
Pennsylvania to minister to the Delawares. Zeisberger and his fellow missionaries branched out
into New York to minister to Hendrick and his Mohawks. Among the Mohawks as missionaries
in 1745, Zeisberger (1721-1808) and Christian Frederick Post were accused of being French spies
and jailed by New York authorities for fifty-one days.
25 Gray, Wilderness Christians, 408-409; Olmstead, Blackcoats Among the Delaware, 6-
7. Goschgoschunk was also referred to as Goschgoschink.
26 Olmstead, Blackcoats Among the Delaware, 6-7.
27 McConnell, “Kuskusky Towns,” 36-37.
28 Zeisberger in Gray, Wilderness Christians, 47.
29 Heckewelder, March 1773, in Wallace, ed., Travels of Heckewelder, 104. The
Reverend John Gottlieb Heckewelder (1743-1823) was born in Bedford, England. He immigrated
to America in 1754 and settled in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania to study at the Moravian children’s
seminary. During the Seven Years’ War, Heckewelder accompanied the Moravian missionary and
frontiersman Christian Frederick Post (1710-1785) on a diplomatic mission to meet with the
Ohio Indians and persuade them to terminate their alliance with the French. Heckewelder spoke
fluent German and the Unami dialect of the Delaware language. In 1762, he moved to the
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At the invitation of Delaware chiefs, Moravians entered the Ohio Valley to establish a
community of Delaware Indian praying towns. These mission towns served dual purposes. The
intent of the Moravians was to use these missions to assimilate Christian Delawares into white
society. Delaware leaders used the Moravians not only to help ward off disease by rejecting
witchcraft but also to unify their people as they moved beyond the Alleghenies into the Ohio. A
symbiotic relationship evolved between Delaware civil leaders and Moravian missionaries, which
reflected their mutual goals of maintaining order, stability, and peace within Delaware society.
Many Delaware civil leaders supported the efforts of the missionaries to solidify the
Delaware social environment in the Ohio Valley. These same headmen, seeing that their people
were outnumbered by the whites and were dependent upon trade goods, embraced certain
Moravian doctrines of order, progress, and neutrality. This would guarantee the flow of goods
and thus secure the economic and, in the long run, the political survival of the developing
Delaware nation. To exist in this new region, the Delawares had to accept the realities of a
changing world and to blend Anglo conceptions of progress with traditional values. The
Moravians offered a structural base for a new Delaware society in the Ohio Valley. The Delaware
leaders hoped that this base could be more receptive to the preservation of peace. They pursued
peace as a national policy.
Throughout the eighteenth century, American society was undergoing “cumulative and
irreversible” transformations. European immigrants from the Continent, indentured servants, and
African slaves entered an Anglo-dominated America and “undermined the stability of their
institutional order.”30 This also held true for Delaware society, as it was undergoing social
change. Delaware leaders saw the strain placed upon their people by territorial relocation, trade
dependency, and hatred of Indians that existed on the American frontier. Delaware chiefs believed
that Moravian mission towns could serve as models for their people to emulate. Delaware chiefs
openly declared that the missionaries “should not only be tolerated” by non-Christians, but
                                                                                                                                                            
Muskingum to reside with the Delawares and start his mission work. For a brief history of the
Moravian Church in Europe and America see Wallace, ed., Travels of Heckewelder, 1-31.
30 James A. Henretta and Gregory H. Nobles, Evolution and Revolution: American
Society, 1600-1820 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 2.
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should be given the “liberty to preach the gospel wherever they pleased.”31 Custaloga also
declared that the Moravian preachers be adopted as full-fledged Delawares.32     
For the most part, the Moravians were better received than other denominations. The
Presbyterian missionaries David McClure and David Jones had failed in their attempts to preach
to the Delawares in this region. Delawares associated Presbyterians with the border violence and
“territorial ambitions” of the Scots-Irish. They could differentiate between the “doctrine and
sectarian politics” of Moravians, Quakers, Jesuits, and Presbyterians.33
Zeisberger also had his ordeals ministering to native peoples. In 1768, while in the
Allegheny country, he locked horns with the Munsee revivalist preacher Wangomen over their
differing perceptions of spirituality. The Munsee-Wolf traditionalists did not take well to his
religious teachings, which directly challenged elements of their social structures, namely warfare
and purging ceremonies. Zeisberger criticized what he believed were Munsee ritual excesses and
“superstitions.”34 In the midst of the consolidation of the three Delaware tribes into a nation,
there was a showdown between traditionalists and Moravian supporters. Both sought to
stabilize the nation as it rooted itself in a new homeland. Both had their own visions on how to
                                                
31 Heckewelder in Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,” 113.
32 Heckewelder’s observations of Custaloga in Heckewelder,  Narrative of the Mission,
ed., Connelley, 113.
33 McConnell, A Country Between, 231.
34 Zeisberger in Gray, Wilderness Christians, 44-45; Earl P.  Olmstead, David Zeisberger:
A Life Among the Indians, (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University, 1997), 150-151. Zeisberger
and his fellow missionaries were repelled by the traditional ceremonies of the Munsees,
particularly the purging ceremony. After a successful fall hunt, the Munsees held four feasts as a
way to give thanks for their good fortunes and to secure favorable vicissitudes in the future.
There were banquets, feasts, dancing and singing. Men entered sweat baths and used them as a
method to induce visions and hallucinations. Participants wore deerskins and wore the head of a
deer as a headdress. After the sweat baths, these men then gorged themselves on bear meat, and
drank hot bear grease until they vomited. This ceremony was then corrupted by syncretic
influences of the trading towns. There was a week of rum drinking, brawling, and occasional
murders. Heckewelder condemned purging ceremonies. To him, these rituals represented a
heathen, not Christian, atonement for sins. During the revivalist period, Delaware preachers
encouraged young men to purge themselves and advocated their training as warriors. Among the
Shawnees, the town of Wakatomika on the west side of the Muskingum, near present-day
Dresden, Ohio, became a place of martial training and purging. British traders referred to
Wakatomika as “Vomit Town.” Moravians also opposed purging, for they believed that Indians
were ruining their health. Heckewelder, Narrative of the Mission, ed., Connelley, 104-105. See
Zeisberger’s comment in Booth, ed., Tuscarawas Valley in Indian Days, 98-99.
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bring stability and unity. The Moravians, supported by the Delaware peace chiefs, won the
contest for the soul of the Delaware nation--for the time being. Zeisberger increased his following
when he converted the feared Wolf war captain Glikhikan (“foremost sight on a gun barrel”) to
Christianity. Glikhikan, who was also the brother of Wangomen, believed that the “brethren have
the right doctrine and preach the right way to happiness.” 35 Glikhikan’s conversion made
Wangomen less suspicious of Zeisberger and the Moravians. 
The “Three Chiefs in the west,” Netawatwees, Tamaqua, and Custaloga, for the most
part, tolerated the Moravians and allowed for the missionaries’ attempts to bring peace and unity
to the Delawares.36 On May 3, 1772, Zeisberger arrived on the Muskingum with eleven
Moravian Delawares, several Indian helpers, and a small group of native children.37 As the group
traveled the Muskingum, Heckewelder noted that the Delawares “showed themselves friendly
towards us.” At Newcomerstown “they greeted us with their usual shouts of joy.” Even at the
Shawnee town of Wakatomika in near present-day Dresden, Ohio, the war-like Shawnees
“moved about among [the converts] and showed friendly feelings” for the Christians.38
At the Delaware capital of Newcomerstown, Zeisberger met with the Turtle leader,
Netawatwees and the Great Council. The council members now recognized Netawatwees, once
“deposed” by Colonel Bouquet, as the head chief of the western Delawares. The
Lupwaaeenoawuk “allotted [Zeisberger] . . . the Land on both Sides [of the] Muskingum River
from Tuskerawy till within 3 miles of Newcomers Town.”39 With his grant of land, Zeisberger
eventually established the mission towns of Schoenbrunn and Gnadenhutten in 1772, Lichtenau
                                                
35 Entry of Zeisberger, June 7, 1769, in Tilde Marx, trans., “Diaries of the Moravian
Missions in Western Pennsylvania, 1769-1772,” transcripts in Merle Deardorff Papers, Warren
Historical Society, Warren, Pennsylvania, 35; Olmstead, David Zeisberger, 160-161.
36 Entry of Zeisberger, June 14, 1769, in Marx, trans., “Diaries of the Moravian
Missions in Western Pennsylvania,” 35.
37 Olmstead, Blackcoats Among the Delaware, 7.
38 Heckewelder in August C. Mahr ed., and trans., “A Canoe Journey from the Big
Beaver to the Tuscarawas in 1771: A Travel Diary of John Heckewelder,” Ohio State
Archaeological and Historical Quarterly 61 (1952): 297. Also see Weslager, The Delaware
Indians, 288.
39 Heckewelder in Wallace, ed., Travels of Heckewelder, 98. Also see C. A. Weslager,
The Delaware Indian Westward Migration (Wallingford, Pennsylvania: The Middle Atlantic
Press, 1978), 27. Bouquet removed Netawatwees as principal leader of the Turtle phratry in
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in 1776, New Schoenbrunn in 1779, and Salem in 1780.40 When Zeisberger’s people settled on
the Muskingum, the non-Christian Delawares were both astonished and alarmed to see the
differences in “manners and customs” of the converted Delawares from that of their own
traditional culture. Some of the Delaware Christian men wore the same black suits and shoes that
were required dress for the missionaries. Many western Delawares, long removed from Moravian
influence in eastern Pennsylvania, were also exposed to a “doctrine preached, of which they
never before” had heard.41 The Moravian missions were the first Protestant missions west of the
Ohio River.42
Delaware civil leaders accepted the Moravians into their community as a way to bolster
both their own local authority and prestige within the council. They were also willing to
experiment with the adoption of certain Moravian values.43 White Eyes saw the peaceful
Christian Delawares as an influential factor in solidifying the coming together of the three
Delaware phratries.44 Delaware leaders hoped to interweave Christian order throughout the
Delaware nation on the Muskingum. Netawatwees, at the urging of White Eyes, recognized the
                                                                                                                                                            
1765. The Delaware council quickly reinstated him once Bouquet and his military left the Ohio.
With Tamaqua's death in 1769, Netawatwees became “King” of the western Delawares.
40 Olmstead, Blackcoats Among the Delaware, 241-242. Mahican converts also
accompanied the Lenape and Moravian missionaries. These Mahicans did not get along with the
Delawares. There was constant tension and divisiveness between the Unami-Munsee speakers
and the Mahicans at Wyalusing and other Indian communities. To mediate this animosity
between these two peoples, Zeisberger settled the Mahicans mostly at Gnadenhutten and the
Delawares at the other Muskingum towns. See Mahr, ed., “Canoe Journey,” 290. After the
American Revolution, western Mahicans became absorbed into the Delaware nation, while
eastern Mahicans remained in the Connecticut region. See Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution
on Ohio, 62.
41 Heckewelder in George Henry Loskiel, trans., Christian Ignatius La Trobe, History of
the Mission of the United Brethren Among the Indians of North America in three parts (London:
The Brethren’s Society, 1794), 3: 57.
42 Gray, Wilderness Christians, 47. Amy C. Schutt contends that from 1767-1781 there
were from 350-400 baptized/Christianized/missionized Delawares on the Ohio. Though these
numbers are small, the Delaware Christians comprised 12-14% of the Delaware nation in the
west. See Schutt, “Forging Identities,” 9.
43 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 182-183.
44 Schutt, “Forging Identities,” 200-201.
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small number of Christian Delawares as members of his community.45 Despite his reluctance to
openly accept the Christian faith, Netawatwees (who would later become a convert) was inspired
by the Christian theology of peace and good will, at a time when he wanted his people to reject
the influences of the warriors from the surrounding Shawnee, Wyandot, and Seneca towns.46 
While Netawatwees took a moderate approach and preferred blending aspects of
Christianity with traditional spirituality, White Eyes was much more radical. He advocated that
Delawares embrace Anglo concepts of progress by breaking away from many of their traditions
and customs.47 Despite his radical affinity for the white mans’ progress, White Eyes gained
prominence in the Lupwaaeenoawuk as the leading Delaware proponent of peace and supporter
of the Moravian mission towns in the Ohio. The political influence of White Eyes rose in the
early 1770s. A once-powerful war captain, he became the chief lieutenant of Netawatwees at
Gekelemukpechunk. There, he replaced the Wolf councilor known as Echpalawehund (“He that
missed the objects he shot at”) as chief speaker of the nation in the Great Council.48
The peace-making skill of White Eyes became evident in 1774 when he took a prominent
role during the frontier conflict involving the Shawnees and Mingos against Virginia known as
Dunmore’s War.49 Lord John Dunmore of Virginia, with the help of White Eyes, met with
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Shawnee and Mingo chiefs at Fort Dunmore (Fort Pitt) in August 1774. Shawnees asked the
Delawares to mediate with the British on their behalf. The Shawnees desired an armistice and
“open peace negotiations.” They “yielded themselves to their grandfather” (White Eyes) and
accepted “whatever he would agree upon with the Virginians” as a way to “secure peace.”50
Dunmore noted that despite the resistance of the Shawnees, the Delawares “remained Steady in
their attachment” to the British. White Eyes offered the Virginia governor Dunmore the
“assistance of himself and [the] whole tribe.” The governor enlisted White Eyes and three of his
warriors.51
At the time of Dunmore’s War, the Delawares were in a precarious position. If they sided
with the Shawnees, they would be the targets of Virginia militia, if they supported the Virginians,
the Delawares would violate the “sacred bonds” they had established with their Shawnee allies. If
Delawares broke this bond, they would be branded “schwannaks” (“bitter beings”) or the Indian
equivalent of traitors. White Eyes opted for neutrality as the Delaware position in this frontier
conflict. Though he could not stop Virginia’s invasion and destruction of the Shawnee upper and
lower towns on the Scioto River, he fulfilled his role as “Peacemaker” when he helped to broker
the peace settlement between the Shawnees and Virginians at Camp Charlotte in October 1774.52
                                                
50 From a journal entry of Abraham Thomas, Aug. 6, 1774, in Booth, ed., Tuscarawas
Valley in Indian Days, 161. Lord Dunmore’s War was also the result of the collapse of “imperial
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forces took control of Fort Pitt. See Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 67-69; Abernathy, Western
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War, 384.
52 Wellenreuther, “White Eyes and the Delawares’ Vision,” 145-146. At the Camp
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claim to Kentucky. Also see Abernathy, Western Lands and American Revolution, 112. The
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Olmstead, David Zeisberger, 228.
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Dunmore befriended White Eyes and praised his “faithfulness, and firmness and
remarkable good understanding.”53 He asked White Eyes to come to Williamsburg where
Dunmore would “draw up a Deed for the Land of the Delaware that they would then take to
England for confirmation by the King.”54 Dunmore saw a no-lose opportunity. He hoped that by
supporting the Delawares’ claim to the Ohio, they would be free of the Six Nations Iroquois and
Wyandots as landlords. At the same time, Virginia could be proprietors north of the Ohio and
control the region south of the Ohio. Delaware land would then be within the boundaries of an
extended Virginia.55 White Eyes sent a peace belt to Dunmore, who in turn assured him “that our
foolish men shall never be permitted to have your Lands [the Muskingum] but on the contrary
the Great King will protect you and preserve you in the possession of them.” 56 The
“revolutionary stirrings” in Virginia however, put the Dunmore proposal of a Delaware petition
to the King permanently on hold.57
White Eyes pushed his agenda for peace and unity as a national policy, through his
recognition and support of the Moravian missionaries. However, he suffered many rebukes in his
attempt to unify the Delawares around the Moravian Christians. By November 1774, he was
placed at odds with Netawatwees and the Great Council, who modified their original tolerance of
the Moravian missionaries and their Indian converts. Perhaps trying to save his own
chieftainship, Netawatwees secretly considered White Eyes to be one of the “foolish and
unreasoning people” who allowed for the contamination of Delaware native beliefs through the
intrusions of Christianity.58 White Eyes broke council protocol when he tried to initiate his
policy concerning full acceptance of the Moravians without council consensus. In a moment of
intense passion, White Eyes threw a wampum belt at the feet of the old chief and resigned from
the Delaware council. Netawatwees panicked and asked the Moravians to mediate this dispute
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and to coax White Eyes back into his position as spokesman. White Eyes was the right hand man
of Netawatwees, regarding council affairs, and this resignation had great bearing on swaying the
old chief's position on the Moravians. According to Zeisberger, “White Eyes’s opinion counts
the most in the Council. The chief does nothing without him.” 59 At that time, he had the
“greatest influence among the Delaware.”60 Those who opposed the decision were eventually
overridden in the Lupwaaeenoawuk.61
Through the pressure of White Eyes, Netawatwees welcomed Moravians to the
Muskingum and promised Zeisberger the “protection of the Unami Delawares,” as these praying
towns mostly comprised Turtle and Turkey Delawares and were located near militant Shawnee
and Mingo communities.62 The Council also acknowledged the rights of the converts as
Delawares.63 On February 28, 1775, White Eyes “professed, in the name of the entire nation,”
an acceptance of the Christian faith among all Delawares.64 He warned his fellow Delawares “if
they were to harm Christians, so would they be harming God.”65 Sensing a council consensus in
this matter, Netawatwees told a fellow chief:
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62 Zeisberger quoted in Gray, Wilderness Christians, 47.
63 Mahr, trans., “Schoenbrunn Diary,” 101b.
64 White Eyes and the Delaware Great Council, Feb. 28, 1775, in August C. Mahr, trans.,
Schoenbrunn Story: Excerpts from the Diary of The Reverend David Zeisberger, 1772-1777 at
Schoenbrunn in the Ohio Country (Columbus: The Ohio Historical Society, 1972), 15.
65 White Eyes in Schutt, “Forging Identities,” 199. Schutt in pages 197-201 of her
dissertation emphasizes that White Eyes did not advocate Moravianism solely for spiritual
motives. He believed that Christianity could make the Delawares more powerful. White Eyes
was not a convert and at one time considered bringing Anglican missionaries into the Ohio if the
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You and I are both old. Let us do a good work, before we depart, and leave a
testimony to our children and posterity, that we have received the word of God.
Let this be our last will and testament.66
David Zeisberger was less optimistic regarding the co-existence of Christian and
traditionalist Delawares on the Muskingum. He reminded the Delaware Council that:
If you agree to having the Gospel preached here, those who want to hear it, must
live by themselves. Here in this town [the traditionalist town of Coschocton]
there is nothing but gambling, dancing and drinking and constant noise, therefore it
is imperative for us to have a place to ourselves where we are isolated away from
the noise, and unmolested, so that those who want to hear the word of God can
come and those who prefer their heathendom, can stay away.67
The Moravian missionaries preferred this separation as a means to assimilate Christian
Delawares into white society, and as a way to resist what they considered to be the destructive
influence of non-Christian Indians.68 Zeisberger disapproved of the non-Christian Delawares
who lived in proximity to the Moravian towns. He saw them as being "lazy as far as work [was]
concerned." He observed that if men were not hunting they would “lie all day on their britche[s]
and sleep; when night [came] they [would] dance or wander about in disorderly fashion.” 69 He
opposed the social mores of many unconverted Delawares, for “so long as [they] lived on the
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Muskingum, they used all sorts of devices” to lure his converts away from the mission
settlements and back into the traditionalist Delaware towns. 70
Throughout the mid 1770s, there was increasing social breakdown in many non-Christian
Delaware towns. On his visits to these villages, Zeisberger witnessed an “impurity and
immorality, even gross sensuality” after traders entered the towns with rum.71 Zeisberger, in
turn, could not always prohibit visitors to his towns. With the corrupting influences of alcohol
and the oncoming American Revolution bringing warriors into the Delaware and Moravian towns,
isolation of these communities became increasingly difficult. Peaceful seclusion was needed to
establish both the utopian Christian Indian communities on the Muskingum and to strengthen the
unity of the fledgling Delaware nation.
Certain civil leaders within the Great Council saw the negative influences as a disruption
to social and political cohesion. One prominent chief threatened to live with the Moravians, if the
council would not purge all communities of drinking and gambling. Missionary John Ettwein
explained that the headman's departure would have “made a great Stirr” in the town “for he was
highly loved & honoured by the Chiefs and all the Delawares.” The Delaware council decided to
reform the community by banishing “all games and the Traders who taught them to play at Cards
& Dice.” The Delaware Lupwaaeenoawuk also banned the sale of alcohol in their towns and
appointed six men to destroy the ten kegs of rum, which traders had recently brought to
Newcomerstown.72
The Delaware Great Council, spearheaded by the visions of White Eyes and
Netawatwees, gravitated towards Moravianism and social reform as an implement to build a
strong Indian nation. White Eyes saw Christianity as an anchor for Delaware society. In the Ohio
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Valley, Delawares sought to create a new utopian world; a Delaware version of what Puritans
called, the “Citty upon a Hill.” 73
Delawares also believed that by remaining neutral during the Revolution, they could
secure the goods they needed from Americans at Fort Pitt and spare their people the violence
that had taken place against the Shawnees during Dunmore's War. White Eyes and other civil
chiefs were “yet determined to stand fast and not to meddle with the War . . . [and] to live in
friendship” with their American neighbors.74 The Delaware Great Council embraced
Moravianism as a way to mobilize political and economic integration with their American
neighbors in the Fort Pitt region. In doing so, they would enhance this new social environment
and gain control of national destiny.75 These Christian communities offered “new sources of
spiritual strength and community resilience” as Delawares faced the reality that their environment
was slowly “becoming a white man’s world.” 76
Despite the ideals of peace and neutrality as the base for the stability of the Delaware
nation, the American War for Independence indeed slowly seeped into the Ohio. With the start of
the conflict between Great Britain and the American colonies, Delaware chiefs confronted two
choices. They could choose sides (many of the neighboring western tribes such as the Wyandots,
Ottawas, Shawnees, and Mingos became military allies of the British who were headquartered at
Detroit) or remain neutral. Delaware council leadership, guided by White Eyes and the United
Brethren, decided on neutrality in this turbulent and dangerous region.77
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In October 1775, White Eyes severed his diplomatic ties with Governor Dunmore and
situated the Delawares as noncombatants in the escalating tensions between the British
government and American colonists. Diplomatically he realized it was in the best interest of his
people to have friendly relations with the Americans and distance themselves from the British-
appointed governor of Virginia.78
White Eyes and a delegation from the Lupwaaeenoawuk met with Continental Congress
officials of Indian affairs and several other Indian nations at Fort Pitt in October of 1775. This
conference was a pinnacle event in Delaware Indian history. It was there that White Eyes
asserted both Delaware consensus as neutrals and total independence, as a sovereign nation, from
the Council Fire at Onondaga. On October 9, White Eyes declared to the American
commissioners “that they [the Delawares] would remain neutral, during the contest between
Parent and the Son--and not lift up the Hatchet against either side.”79 He demanded that the
homeland of his nation include the Muskingum to the “Mouth where it Empties into the Ohio
and up the said River to the Place of Beginning.” 80 To keep in the good graces of the Americans,
he promised the commissioners that he would keep his young men from hunting in Virginia and
would keep them “planting Corn in their Own fields” on the Muskingum.81 White Eyes, with
astute diplomacy, also masked the discontent of a pro-Seneca Wolf faction of Delawares who
were shouted down at the great Council fire. Leaders of the Wolf tribe, because of a historical and
geographical attachment to the Senecas, were quick to dissent against any oratory that might
estrange them from the Six Nations. To minimize the relevance of the anti-American faction,
White Eyes referred to them metaphorically as our “foolish young men.”82
The Six Nations Iroquois made a last attempt to rekindle dominance over their former
tributaries. Kiashuta of the Senecas addressed the Delawares “in a haughty tone” and reminded
them that the Delawares “had no will of their own, but were subordinate to the 6 Nations.”
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White Eyes, “long since tired of this language,” rose and in a forceful bit of Lenape oratory,
challenged Kiashuta’s desperate pretensions:
You say that You had conquered me [the Delawares]-that You had cut off my
Leg’s-had put a Petticoat on me, giving me a Hoe and Corn pounder in my hands,
saying: now Woman! Your business hence forward shall be to plant-hoe Corn, and
pound the same for Bread for us Men and Warriors!
Look! at my Legs! if as you say You had cut them off, they have grown again to
their proper size! the Petticoat, I have thrown away, and have put on my proper
dress! The Corn hoe and pounder I have exchanged for these fire Arms, and I
declare, that I am a Man! and all the Country on the other side of that River
[Ohio] is mine.83 
White Eyes, correctly, believed that the Senecas would support Great Britain and fight
against the Americans. In the interim, he believed that if the Six Nations attacked the Delawares,
they would receive help from the Americans. He also hoped that the Iroquois would “therefore
lose the Land they had so artfully wrested from the Delawares.” 84
At the peace talks at Fort Pitt, White Eyes proclaimed a Delaware political nation when
he told the commissioners: “we now inform you that there are three tribes of us Kalalamint
[Gelelemend or John Killbuck of the Turtles] Walapachakin [Captain Johnny of the Turkey
tribe] and Ohokon [Captain Pipe of the Wolf phratry].” Together with White Eyes as chief
spokesman, they were the chiefs “Appointed for the Delaware Nation.” 85
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Unlike the Bouquet talks in 1765 when the phratry heads had to humble themselves in
order to receive a favorable peace, the Fort Pitt talks of 1775 demonstrated a Delaware nation of
diplomatic confidence--with political strength and influence. Beneath the veneer of regional
prominence, however, was a fragile state of union among the three tribes. White Eyes had much
to do with building consensus and strengthening the nation. Yet as a leader with a vision for the
Delawares, he would have to deal with the dissent of those in the Great Council who did not
share in this dream.
White Eyes as the chief councilor of Netawatwees, who was still recognized as head of
the nation, became highly regarded for his oratorical and diplomatic skills. Once a decentralized
people of autonomous bands, the Delawares at this time appeared to have accepted not only
political solidarity but also established a certain hierarchy among the three phratries. The Turtles
gained a new preeminence over the Wolf and Turkey tribes. Zeisberger implied this when he
observed that among the Delawares, a “message sent or a speech in council goes or is delivered in
the name of the three tribes, signifying the three chiefs. The Turtle is named first, next the Wolf
Tribe and the Turkey Tribe last.” 86 Zeisberger contended that only a Turtle could be the
principal leader of the nation. Yet during the Seven Years’ War, Tamaqua and Shingas had
previously held this position, despite their Turkey lineage.87 Here Zeisberger erred in his
observations. The three tribes had never acted together as a national entity. Those Delawares
who addressed colonial officials, were always Unami speakers. The Wolf and Turkey division
may have ceded the dominant position to the Turtles with the selection of Netawatwees as the
principal sachem. This may have been a temporary arrangement to accommodate the Delaware
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capital being moved in 1776 to Goschachgunk, a Turtle stronghold. Certainly the rising status and
influence of White Eyes also contributed to the high ranking of the Turtle group. 
White Eyes’ rhetoric of independence from the Six Nations, however, disturbed Captain
Pipe and the Wolf tribe who had a closer relationship with the Iroquois (western Senecas) than
did the Unami-speaking Turtles and Turkeys. They in fact were concerned that the Six Nations
would try to assert their authority over the Delawares on the Muskingum. Shortly after the talks
at Fort Pitt and with much consternation, Pipe withdrew from the council and removed his
people from the forks of the Muskingum and moved west to the Walhonding, located fifteen
miles from Goschachgunk. Newalike and the Munsee Christians who resided at the Moravian
mission town of Schoenbrunn followed Pipe’s secession from the centralized cluster of Delaware
towns. Newalike took his followers north to the Lake Erie region. John Heckewelder maintained
that Pipe “was glad to see a breach made, of which White Eyes was to bear the blame.” He
believed that Captain Pipe made a push for power using White Eyes’ support of the Americans
as a pretense to remove his Wolf Delawares “from the Councils of the Turtle tribes.”88
Netawatwees used the influence of Munsee-Wolf converts Glikhikan and
Echpalawehund, both highly-regarded as war captains and councilors, to mediate the schism
between White Eyes and Captain Pipe. Temporarily, a delicate reconciliation of emerging
political factions was reached between the two.89 Pipe, from his new location, “pretty regularly
attended the Councils,” though he was increasingly moving away from the consensus of the civil
leaders and their push for peace. 90  Pipe’s temporary resignation from the Lupwaaeenoawuk
may have been symbolic--a form of protest against White Eyes’ cavalier and potentially
dangerous treatment of the Six Nations Iroquois at Fort Pitt. Despite the withdrawal of the Wolf
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group from Goschachgunk, the Delaware peace chiefs among the Turtles and Turkeys “pursued
their usual course, their sole Object being the welfare of the Nation.” 91
 White Eyes appeared before the Continental Congress in December of 1775 to ask them
to provide the Ohio Delawares with a teacher and a blacksmith and to gain assurances that
Americans would not settle in Delaware country. If the American Congress could guarantee these
requests (and they could not), White Eyes assured them that he would keep his men peaceful.92
Anti-Americanism among the western Indian nations, however, intensified. The Delaware
policy of peace and neutrality became harder to maintain as outside agitations brought great
pressure to the Great Council at Goschachgunk. As early as the fall of 1775, it was rumored that
over 1,500 Chippewas and Ottawas had converged on the Tuscarawas “with the probable
purpose of an attack on Fort Pitt.” 93 In August of 1776, County Lieutenants at Fort Pitt were
warned of a great western confederation of Indian nations prepared to swarm out of the Detroit
region to ravage the Delaware towns on the Muskingum and the Americans at Fort Pitt.94
Killbuck, the civil chief of the Turtle tribe, warned Major John Anderson of Fort Pitt that
bands of Cherokees, Wyandots, Ottawas, Chippewas, Potawatomies, and Mingos were “united
as one nation” and were prepared to “strike the Big Knife.” 95 A Wyandot delegation came to
Goschachgunk to press the Delawares to abandon their neutrality and to strike the Americans on
behalf of the British and western confederation of Indians. Killbuck reminded the Wyandots that
“When you gave us this Land, & [when] the Council fire was kindled here you told us to hold
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fast to the Chain of Peace & Friendship” and not to be swayed to “anything but Peace.” He told
them that the Delawares would follow the advice of the “Virginians” and “sit still & be
quiet. . . .”  96
In the fall of 1776, the Lupwaaeenoawuk underwent a transformation. The ancient
Netawatwees died on October 31. John Killbuck, as the matrilineal hereditary successor to his
grandfather’s position, became head chief of the Turtle tribe but refused to become the principal
leader of all Delawares. White Eyes, because of his senior status and influence, became the
primary ranking civil chief of the Delaware nation.97 The Great Council, with White Eyes “ruling
it,” also agreed to the ascension of Captain Johnny as head chief of the Turkey tribe, to replace
the deceased Tamaqua. Pipe remained the head chief of the Wolf phratry.98   
It was of the utmost importance that the Great Council remain on its trajectory of guiding
the nation to peace, unity, and strength despite the increasing animosities between White Eyes
and Pipe and the violent atmosphere of the Ohio Valley. In the early part of 1777, the western
frontier became a volatile region for those Americans fighting for independence. Because of the
violence of Indian raids and American retaliation, Delaware neutrality became greatly challenged.
In January, George Morgan reported to Congress that the Senecas, goaded by the British, alleged
that they had warned off American frontiersmen at Venango, near the forks of the Allegheny
River. The Senecas delivered a message along with a war hatchet and the dead body of a
frontiersman. The note read: “the lands are ours and we insist on your quitting them
immediately.” 99 In February of that year, the Mingo war leader named Pluggy, together with a
small group of renegade Delawares led by Catfish, and Shawnees and Wyandots raided
settlements in Kentucky.100 Delawares felt the stress of the escalating hostilities on the
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periphery of the Muskingum. White Eyes informed the commissioners at Fort Pitt that the
enemies of Americans were the “Banditti” of the Mingoes, & the Wiandots of Sandusky &
Detroit.” He also showed concern for the few Delawares who had “been deluded by them” to
take up the hatchet against Americans.101
Amidst the growing tensions in the west, White Eyes and the Great Council held together
the consensus of neutrality for the Delawares. The Wolf tribe, true to its nature of a “rambler,”
remained outside of the Turtle-Turkey tribes at Goschachgunk. The Wolf council, nevertheless,
had enough influence and a strong martial presence to pull the nation from its neutral stance into
the sphere of the anti-American Senecas. Pipe, for the time being, allowed for the peace-making
efforts of White Eyes and the Moravians to materialize as a way to stabilize a peaceful
environment for the Delaware nation. At that time the nation was best served by the vitality of
the Great Council and the symbiotic relationship established between the visionary White Eyes,
the Delaware peace chiefs, and the Moravian faith. Eventually the American Revolution entered
the Ohio and greatly challenged and strained this arrangement of accommodation and cooperation
between Delaware civil leadership in the Great Council and Americans at Fort Pitt.
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Chapter V
The Delawares and the American Revolution
Throughout 1777, the British and their Indian allies misread Delaware neutrality as
support for the United States. This stance put them in a precarious state, for pro-British tribes
of the west had taken the hatchet against Americans who bordered the Delaware homeland.
Virginia Governor Patrick Henry acknowledged the dangerous position in which the Delawares
had found themselves. He was concerned that the Delawares were in great danger “on account of
their Fidelity” to the Americans. Henry ordered the county lieutenant of Ohio to “use every
means in your power to protect them.” Henry added that if the Delawares wanted forts
constructed, this was to be done. The lieutenant was to use the Virginia militia to “defend [these]
faithfull allys to the last Extremity. Any Injury done them, is done to us. In one Word, support
protect & cherish them in every Respect to the utmost.”1
As the conflict of the American Revolution reached the west, Delaware nationhood was
put to the test. It was expedient for the Great Council to agree upon a policy that would serve to
protect and preserve the Delaware nation. However, any consensus within the Lupwaaeenoawuk
was greatly strained by the increasing animosity between White Eyes and Captain Pipe. Both
recognized that neutrality was the best course for a fledgling nation--the means to attain this was
the point of contention between the two councilors. Eventually the changing political
environment in the west, altered by many factors, ended the influence and preeminence of the
Turtle and Turkey phratries as the navigators of policy. This period also challenged the Great
Council’s decision to emulate Moravian values of pacifism as the politico-social order of the
Delawares. Captain Pipe and the Wolf tribe steadily increased the opposition to the Turtle-
Turkey pro-American and Moravian position. He and his supporters eventually took advantage
of a political shift on the Muskingum and high jacked the political direction of the Delaware
nation, bringing them into a union with the western Indian nations and their British allies.
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The Ohio Delawares were strategically located in a region that made them geo-politically
important to many parties. Their towns on the Muskingum were enclosed between the western
Indian nations and their British allies at Detroit and the Americans at Fort Pitt. George Morgan,
the Indian agent at Fort Pitt, was a steadfast friend of the Delawares, and saw that the pressure
was great on the Lupwaaeenoawuk of the Delawares to join the cause of the anti-American
western tribes. Morgan noted that during a council with the British at Detroit in November of
1777, Captain Pipe and the Wolf council refused the overtures of Detroit Governor Henry
Hamilton to join the British cause. Hamilton offered bounties of “very high prices” for the scalps
of whites taken on the American frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania. He also encouraged
Indian allies of the British to attack Delawares who were friendly towards the Americans at Fort
Pitt.2 Pipe told the British that the “Big Knife [Americans] are our Neighbours and we live in
friendship with them. They & we have lately renewed our friendship & we wish it to last for
ever.” Regarding the Revolution, Pipe assured the British of Delaware neutrality: “We are a free
& independent Nation, we are in friendship with all Nations & we desire to remain so & we
particularly wish to live in friendship with you.”3 While Captain Pipe and the Wolf Delawares
favored the British (as the Turtle-Turkey group of White Eyes, Killbuck, and Captain Johnny
favored the Americans), he was committed to keeping the Delawares neutral as he maintained
that his people would not gain from taking sides. Pipe mentioned to Hamilton “They
[Americans] have explained to us the Nature of their Quarrel one Way. You explain it another but
we have Nothing to do with it.”4
The Delawares also alienated themselves from other tribes. They refused the war belt
offered to them by the Wyandots in July of 1777. The Delawares contended that they “would
never fight no more against the white people as long as the Sun shineth & the River run.”5 The
Delaware council advised the Wyandots to remember the past and to “reflect on the misery they
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had brought upon themselves" when they took an “active part” in the Seven Years’ War.6 When
over two hundred Wyandots and Mingos struck settlements on the Virginia frontier in August of
1777, they returned home by crossing through a Delaware town on the Muskingum, and taunted
the Delawares, deriding them by calling them Virginians. They said “with great Joy, it would not
be long that this Town [the Delaware village] would be no more.” 7 Captain Pipe told Morgan
that the Wolf- Munsees were constantly pressured by the Genessee or Chenussio Senecas to join
them in striking the American frontiers. Pipe maintained that the Wolf Munsees would be
“directed by the Delaware Council” to “preserve Peace and Friendship with the United States.” 8
David Zeisberger reported to General Edward Hand (then commander at Fort Pitt) in November
1777, that a party of Canadian traders came into Captain Pipe’s town at Cuyahoga in northern
Ohio. They coerced forty Wolf Delawares to take up the hatchet and go with them to attack
settlements in Ligonier, Pennsylvania. Captain Pipe “met them on the road” and chastised the
traders by telling them “they were only servants, & had no power to hand the tomahawk to
them” [his warriors]. The war party turned back with Pipe.9
Because of this instigation directed at the Delawares to join the western confederacy,
Zeisberger informed General Hand that they needed the intervention of the American army to
secure Delaware country from the western Indian nations. Zeisberger considered this to be the
Delawares’ only hope, for without American presence, he believed they could not exist as a
nation of peace.10 Despite the need for these outposts, the Delawares were also quite uneasy
about soldiers in their country. As far back as 1776, White Eyes had “asked the Americans to aid
his tribe . . . to build a strong fort to protect them from the western tribes, whom they fear will
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attack them because of their friendship for the colonists.”11 But White Eyes also asked Congress
that if an “Army should march” and strike Detroit, “it should take its march above & below our
Towns that our Women & Children might remain quiet & not be too much frightened.”12 There
were constant rumors that the American army, on its expedition to Detroit, would also strike the
Delaware towns. This rumor “set all the Indians in consternation & fear, expecting everyday that
they will be upon them.”13 Hand reassured the Delawares that his soldiers would not harm their
people and that his troops would remain on roads outside of the town.14
Uneasiness among the Delawares was justified. In an ironic incident, it was Hand and his
command that attacked a Munsee-Wolf encampment, forty miles north of Fort Pitt in January
1778, only to find a few men, four women, and a boy making salt. Referred to as the “Squaw
Campaign,” most of the noncombatants were killed in this tragic military action, including the
brother of Captain Pipe.15 George Morgan accused Hand’s militia of striking this group when
they could “find no hostiles” and that they took the two surviving women for a “reward of 100
Dollars for every Prisoner who should be brought in.”16 The outrageous attack led Delawares to
question the neutral stance of the Great Council.
By the spring of 1778, the Delaware neutrality policy became further challenged by the
propaganda of three American Loyalist deserters from Fort Pitt who took residence at Detroit.
Alexander McKee, an ex-British Indian agent, the trader Matthew Elliot, and Simon Girty, an
Indian interpreter, continually visited the Delaware council to convince the leaders that the
United States was preparing for a preemptive strike of the Delaware towns.17 McKee told the
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Delawares that the British destroyed American armies in the east, that General Washington was
killed, all members of Congress were hanged as traitors, and that the British controlled all
territory east of the Alleghenies. He also informed them that those Americans who escaped the
British were now preparing to invade the Ohio and kill all the Delawares, including women and
children.18 Many of the Wolf Delawares of Captain Pipe, perhaps sensitized by the Squaw
Campaign, were swayed by this propaganda. The Wolf warriors prepared for war.19
Heckewelder informed White Eyes that all of McKee’s assertions were lies. In April of
1778, the Great Council met in Goschachgunk. Captain Pipe, who had moved his people from
the Goschachgunk region to live further west on the Walhonding, came to the talks to address the
Delawares. He validated the anti-American claims of the three loyalists. White Eyes then
addressed the Lupwaaeenoawuk and, with an eye on Captain Pipe, reminded them that:
He [White Eyes] had taken peace measures, in order to save the nation
from utter destruction. But if they believed that he was in the wrong, and
gave more credit to vagabond fugitives [McKee, Girty, and Elliot], whom
he knew to be such, than to himself, who was best acquainted with the real
state of things, -- if they had determined to follow their advice, and go out
against the Americans, he would go out with them . . . he would himself
lead them on, place himself in the front, and be the first who should fall.20
White Eyes then displayed a copy of a newspaper that Heckewelder had read to him,
with the details of the American victory at Saratoga in October of 1777. He announced to the
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daubed with tallow. Their scalp locks were also adorned in the traditional warrior style with the
plume of an eagle. Most warriors carried a “rifle, a powder horn, a shot pouch, a tomahawk, and
a scalping knife hanging [from] their neck.”
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Delaware chiefs and war captains, “See my friends and relatives: this document containeth great
events; not the song of a Bird, but the truth.” 21 White Eyes’ diplomacy and rhetoric had the
“desired effect.” The Great Council ruled that they would remain at peace with the Americans
and would not rush into war against them without White Eyes as “their leader.” 22
The Continental Congress assessed the situation in the west by acknowledging that the
Delawares, Oneidas, Tuscaroras, and other “friendly nations,” were “collecting themselves in
bodies, in order to guard against the impending storm”--they were “call[ing] loudly for
assistance.”23 This assessment was accurate. The British had already struck a treaty with the
western confederacy of Indian nations at Detroit. All of the confederated nations agreed to move
against the Americans and, if needed, “fall upon the Delawares.” The Detroit Indians gave the
war hatchet to a group of young Wolf Delawares who were visiting the Great Lakes region. They
were ordered by the council of western Indian nations to bring the hatchet to Goschachgunk and
if they failed to do so they would be whipped.24
At this crucial juncture, the fate of the Delaware nation hinged upon what the Great
Council decided regarding the support or rejection of the war proposal of the western Indian
coalition. To complicate matters, by 1778, American settlers on the periphery of Fort Pitt
became tired of continued efforts to secure peace with the western nations of Indians. They
blamed the policies of Morgan and wanted him removed as Indian agent of the Middle
Department. Many favored an American military strike against the Indians of the west,
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Morgan, Goschachgunk, July 19, 1778, in Morgan Letters, 3: 70, 88-89.
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assembled at Detroit.25 The Delaware nation, entrenched on the Muskingum and Tuscarawas
rivers, was in danger of being caught in the crossfire in a bloody frontier war.
On the surface the three phratries were functioning as a council. Yet Captain Pipe, who
mistrusted the American military after the Squaw Campaign, questioned the affinity White Eyes
had with the Americans. Clearly the relationship between White Eyes and Pipe was tense and
demonstrated the fragile state of Delaware unity. White Eyes gravitated to support for
Americans, whom he believed recognized the neutral status of the Delawares. Pipe, on the other
hand, rationalized that the Delawares could avoid destruction by not siding against the western
confederation and the Six Nations.26 While Pipe and his council no longer resided near the capital
seat of government at Goschachgunk, the Wolf tribe was still recognized as a vital political
component of the Delaware nation.
These situations illustrated the need for a formal treaty between the Delawares and
Americans. In this volatile Ohio Valley region, the Delawares feared that the western tribes
would attack them when these tribes moved through the Muskingum to attack Fort Pitt. They
needed a treaty that would acknowledge Delaware neutrality and at the same time, provide the
Delawares with protection from both the western Indians and American frontiersmen.
Realistically White Eyes, Killbuck, and their followers favored a successful American Revolution.
They believed that a victorious United States could suppress the military power and harness the
aggressive stance of the Six Nations in their claims to the Ohio. Americans, on the other hand,
needed the Delawares’ assistance to gain access to the western stronghold of the British and their
Indian allies in the Detroit region.
White Eyes, seeking a secure homeland for his people under the banner of a unified
nation, believed that the time was right for the Delawares to modify their national goal of
neutrality and seal an alliance with the United States. In June of 1778, he and John Killbuck
informed Morgan that they believed that the “Clouds [of doubt], which arose” over the heads of
the western Delawares would “soon be dispersed & seen no more.” The Great Council was
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prepared to reach an agreement with the Americans.27 This became more urgent for White Eyes,
who reported one month later that the western Indian nations, who had made the treaty at
Detroit, “agreed to fall on the Delawares.” The Wyandots prepared to lead war excursions into
Delaware country.28 American officials proposed treaty talks to commence with the Delawares
in the fall of 1778 at Fort Pitt.29 A turning point in Delaware-American relations was on the
horizon.
The Treaty of Fort Pitt in September of 1778 exemplified the sincerity of Delawares to
live in peace in the Ohio Valley. This was the first treaty negotiated by the United States with an
Indian nation. White Eyes and Killbuck of the Turtles, and Captain Pipe of the Wolf division,
came to the treaty talks as the principal leaders. Representing the United States were General
Lachlan McIntosh (then commandant of Fort Pitt), Colonel Daniel Brodhead, Colonel John
Gibson and the Virginia representatives, Andrew and Thomas Lewis.30 White Eyes told the
Americans that his people were “extremely anxious to have such an opportunity” in helping the
“present [American military] Expedition against [the] common Enemy” of the Delawares. He
informed the commissioners that the Delawares would “most heartily” assist them in removing
the threat of the western tribes at Detroit.31
The commissioners presented White Eyes and the Delawares with a copy of the Articles
of Confederation. White Eyes looked over the conditions proposed by the first government of
the United States and approved its principles. He embraced the Virginia commissioners and
exclaimed “brothers, we now are become one people, the Enemy Indians as soon as they hear it
will strike us, we desire that our brethren will build some place for our old men, Women &
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Children to remain in safety whilst our Warriors go with you” 32 He promised to send “as many
of our Warriors as can possibly be spared . . . to join the assault against Detroit.” 33  The
American army at Beaver Creek “was informed, that the Delaware Nation should be looked upon
as Allies. . . .” 34
White Eyes believed that the Delawares were united in their alliance with Americans. But
he also feared the ramifications of this alliance as it was being worked out. He believed that the
Delawares would be targets of the “Enemy Indians” as soon as the treaty was signed. He asked
the commissioners to build forts to protect the Delaware community in the absence of the
Delaware warriors as they accompanied the American military.35 White Eyes also desired that
the Delaware warriors be placed under the command of American officers.36 General McIntosh,
in gratitude of the support of White Eyes, gave him the title of “Lieut. Colonel of all the Indian
Nations between the rivers Ohio, Mississippi & the Lakes.” 37     
This treaty was a “formal alliance” which asserted peace and friendship between the
United States and the Delawares.38 Representatives of the two parties continuously exchanged
wampum belts--a “Belt of white Wampum with a Road & Thirteen United States & Delaware
Nation decyphered on each side with black Wampum.” 39 This alliance also brought mutual
responsibilities. Both parties agreed to a reciprocal support or assistance “in due proportion to
                                                
32 White Eyes at Fort Pitt, Sept. 13, 1778, in Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance on Ohio,
143.
33 White Eyes at Fort Pitt, Sept. 16, 1778, in Morgan Letter Books, 3: 96-97; Kellogg,
ed., Frontier Advance on Ohio, 144.
34 Entry in David Zeisberger’s diary, Sept. 26, 1778, in Wellenreuther, ed., Herrnhuter
Indianermission, 466.
35 White Eyes at Fort Pitt, Sept. 13, 1778, in Morgan Letter Books, 3:  96; Kellogg, ed.,
Frontier Advance on Ohio, 143.
36 White Eyes at Fort Pitt, Sept. 19, 1778, in Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance on Ohio,
144.
37 From the headquarters of General McIntosh at Fort Pitt, September 21, 1778, in ibid.,
433.
38 Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 32.
39 Proceedings of the Fort Pitt Treaty, September 12, 1778, in Morgan Letter Books, 3:
94, 96; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance on Ohio, 141.
133
their abilities, till their enemies [were] brought to reasonable terms of accommodation.”40 Treaty
provisions acknowledged the “territorial rights” of the Delawares and promised the distribution
of trade goods “from time to time, as far as the United States may have it in their power” to do
so.41 Most importantly, the treaty promised the eventual establishment of an Indian state in the
Ohio country. The Delawares would be the head of this Indian state and “have a representation
in Congress.” Indian nations hostile to the United States were excluded from this proposed
state.42 In return, Delawares would grant Americans passage through their country and guide
them to the “posts, forts or towns of the enemies of the United States.” They agreed to supply
the American military with “corn, meat, horse, or whatever may be in their power.” 43 Delawares
also agreed to supply the American army with warriors, when available.44
The treaty demonstrated the confidence White Eyes and his followers had in maintaining
a peaceful and harmonious existence with their American neighbors and, at the same time, gain
                                                
40  Fort Pitt Treaty, Article II, Sept. 17, 1778, in Calloway, ed., Revolution and
Confederation, vol. 18 of Early American Indian Documents, 167.
41 Fort Pitt Treaty, Article V, Sept. 17, 1778, in ibid., 168.
42 Fort Pitt Treaty, Article VI, Sept. 17, 1778, in ibid., 169. The provisions of this article
(Indian statehood) had to meet “with the approbation of Congress.” Historians have been
skeptical regarding the sincerity of this article. In July 1779 another Treaty of Fort Pitt was
negotiated. This time, Americans made an agreement with The Raven (Coronah Savanooka), Pee
Weet Bird (Shaweeskaw) and Red Parrot (Ochwalatoch)--headmen of the Cherokee nation. Much
of the treaty language was similar to the Delaware Treaty. The Cherokees would join a proposed
federation of tribes to form a state, “where the Delaware Nation [would] be the Head and have a
representative in Congress,” upon the approval of the Continental Congress. John Killbuck
represented the Delawares at this treaty of alliance with the Cherokees. In September, American
officials met with a Wyandot delegation and made the same proposal. The Wyandots flatly
refused any cooperation or alliance with the United States. See correspondence of Colonel Daniel
Brodhead to the Cherokees, the speech of The Raven, and Treaty with the Cherokees, July 22,
1779, in Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance on Ohio, 395-400; Fort Pitt Treaty with Cherokees,
Article VI, July 22, 1778, in Calloway, ed., Revolution and Confederation, vol. 18 of Early
American Indian Documents, 188; Prucha, American Indian Treaties, 33.
43 Edward G. Williams, Fort Pitt and the Revolution on the Western Frontier (Pittsburgh:
Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, 1978), 105-106; Fort Pitt Treaty with the
Delawares, Article III, Sept. 17, 1778, in Calloway, ed., Revolution and Confederation, vol. 18 of
Early American Indian Documents, 167. The full text of the treaty can also be found in Charles J.
Kappler, ed., Indian Treaties, 1778-1883 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904),
8.
44 Fort Pitt Treaty with the Delawares, Article III, Sept. 17, 1778, in Calloway, ed.,
Revolution and Confederation, vol. 18 of Early American Indian Documents, 167-168.
134
security. David Zeisberger feared that Delaware neutrality would be jeopardized if western
Indian nations continued to badger the Muskingum towns. Zeisberger noted that “the Delawares
flatter themselves that an [American] Army will soon come out which is their only Hope yet” to
survive as a nation in the Ohio.45
The Delawares became vulnerable to the threats of western tribes. To insure this treaty
there needed to be “special offers of inducements.” 46 Part of these incentives was the
construction of forts along the Muskingum in which Delaware women and children would be
protected. Article III of the treaty guaranteed “that a fort of sufficient strength and capacity be
built at the expense of the said States.” 47 This would be accomplished in the later part of 1778,
with the construction of Fort McIntosh at the mouth of the Beaver River, twenty-five miles
below Fort Pitt, and Fort Laurens (a supply stockade) at the mouth of the Tuscarawas. When
this task was initiated on the Tuscarawas, General McIntosh and his men were heartily received
by the Delawares who threw his soldiers a feast and presented McIntosh with a “Quantity of
Venison And Skins.” 48
Despite the treaty and its potential to solidify positive relations between Americans and
the Delawares, many factors led to disintegration in relationships. Pushed by the political visions
of White Eyes for a unified Delaware nation, this treaty also illustrated the futility of maintaining
an agreement with the United States, a nation concerned more with securing its independence
than with matters of Indian diplomacy. While White Eyes was determined to preserve peaceful
relations with the United States, the treaty was doomed to fail. Racial animosities on the frontier
toward Indians, misunderstandings in treaty language, and the inability of Congress to uphold
treaty stipulations rendered the treaty worthless and fractured the peace between Delawares and
the United States. The failure of this treaty also revealed the chinks in Delaware consensus as
pro-American and pro-British factions squared off and created a schism within the Great Council
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and the nation itself. The unity of the phratries, delicate to begin with, became especially
strained. Gradually the pro-American faction within the Lupwaaeenoawuk lost favor as the
consensus tilted to the pro-British faction led by Captain Pipe.
White Eyes advocated the alliance between the Delawares and Americans on the grounds
that peace could both bridge the cultural gaps between the two races and help usher the
Delawares into a new era of stability and prosperity. The treaty did not change this. Delawares
and Americans shared a dangerous environment in the Ohio Country, which like any frontier,
bred fear and hatred between Indians and frontiersmen. In many instances these frontier
animosities turned into vendettas. White settlers intruded upon Indian hunting grounds and in
retribution, Indian war parties struck out at back settlements. Violence escalated when Indians
whether warlike or not, wherever found, were targeted by whites in retaliatory revenge raids.49
With friendly Indians also killed indiscriminately by whites, treaties of peace could not
last. The Delawares, being closest to the Fort Pitt area, always experienced much of this
senseless frontier violence. In 1777, Delawares, while clinging to neutral status, complained that
militia officers of Ohio and Monongahela counties were sending scouting parties into the
“hunting Country” of the Delawares. George Morgan received reports that these scouting groups
fired on Delaware hunters and robbed them of their pelts.50
Much of the violence stemmed from fear on both sides. David Zeisberger commented that
the Delawares at Goschachgunk lived in “Consternation & fear, expecting every day that they
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[vigilante frontiersmen] will be upon them.” 51 Rumors of Indian attacks were inflated and
“dilated beyond reasonable proportions.” Every white person around Fort Pitt could tell a story
of the relative of a friend who knew someone tortured or killed by marauding Indian war
parties.52 In many cases the Delawares were blamed for the actions of British-supported Mingos
and Wyandots. One year before the treaty was signed, Hand warned Delawares not to come to
Fort Pitt. He told them that it would be dangerous for them to “come near to this place, owing to
the foolish conduct of the Mingo’s & Wiandots” and for fear that a Delaware might be mistaken
for an enemy.53
Hand was sincere in his desire to protect the Delawares for their commitment to
Americans. If friendship was extended to the Delawares, it might persuade other tribes to desert
the British and ally with the Americans. Most importantly, western tribes were less of a threat
to settlements on the Virginia frontier if they had to pass through pro-American Delaware
country secured with American military garrisons.54
The stability of the treaty was most shaken by the death on November 10, 1778 of White
Eyes, who advocated support for the United States. Two months after the treaty signing, White
Eyes, who was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army, was on his way to
visit General Lachlan McIntosh during the construction of Fort Laurens, near current-day
Bolivar, Ohio, and supposedly was “ruthlessly murdered” by “border ruffians.” To prevent this
incident from destroying any chance of maintaining a Delaware alliance, American officers falsely
reported that the Delaware leader contracted small pox and died at Fort Pitt.55 George Morgan
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called White Eyes “the most trusting Indian friend the American people ever had.”56 Morgan
condemned the senseless murder of White Eyes, for he “was treacherously put to death, at the
moment of his greatest exertions to serve the United States.” 57 With the death of White Eyes,
the pro-American element within the Great Council was sapped of its strongest advocate.
The Fort Pitt agreement was also muddled in confusion and ambiguity. Two obstacles
hindered the treaty that sealed an alliance between the Delawares and the United States. First,
American officials and Delaware leaders interpreted the language of the treaty differently and
second, the Continental Congress was unable to honor the stipulations of the treaty.58
The foundation of the treaty was quickly pushed to the brink by the diplomatic
clumsiness of General McIntosh. Less than two weeks after the murder of White Eyes,
McIntosh and a poorly-equipped army met a Delaware delegation that included Killbuck,
Captain Pipe, and Captain Johnny (now a Moravian convert named Israel) at a camp on the
Tuscarawas River, near the construction site of Fort Laurens. McIntosh boasted that he was
prepared to assault and defeat the western Indian nations at Detroit. He demanded that the
Delawares provide food for his army and feed for his horses. He then reminded the Delawares
that they were under treaty obligations to supply his army with warriors.59 McIntosh, hoping to
impress the delegation with his power, then told them “that any nation or people who would not
afterwards Join us heartily by taking up the Hatchet with us . . . Should be looked upon as
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Enemys” of the United States. The Delawares looked over McIntosh’s rag tag, starving army,
and laughed.60    
McIntosh, despite his pomposity in dealing with the Delawares, may have been correct in
acknowledging their treaty obligations. However, from the very start of the treaty, the majority
of the leaders in the Great Council were uncertain as to what White Eyes, Killbuck, and Captain
Pipe had agreed to. Across the board, communication and clarity of the treaty was poor. George
Morgan and certain Delaware leaders eventually challenged the interpretation of the treaty as
fraudulent and deceptive. Morgan was absent during the treaty talks and when he returned to
Fort Pitt in January of 1779 he received the complaints of the Turtle leader Killbuck, who
lamented to Morgan:
Brother Taimenend . . . I have looked over the Articles of the Treaty again & find
that they are wrote down false, & as I did not understand the Interpreter what he
spoke I could not contradict his Interpretation.61
During the talks at Fort Pitt, the Virginians, perhaps out of ignorance rather than
deception, gave John Killbuck a hatchet. Killbuck, a civil chief, expressed his disillusion to
Morgan by mentioning that “I was looked upon as a Warrior, & which was the cause of so much
confusion among my People.” Killbuck claimed that the “Tomahawk was handed to me at Fort
Pitt but not in a Warlike manner, we all standing & at no Council Fire, neither did I understand
the meaning of it.” He contended that he was not there in the capacity of a war-captain.62
Killbuck, whom Morgan had hoped would replace White Eyes as chief spokesman of the
Delawares, also chimed in regarding the confusion of the treaty. He told Morgan that he was
under the impression that the Delawares were to guide the American army to Detroit, not to
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fight. Killbuck also believed that White Eyes was to have served as mediator between the United
States and the western Indian nations.63
Morgan was furious with the commissioners and railed that “never was a Conference with
the Indians so improperly or villainously conducted.” 64 Morgan added that Delaware chiefs
were induced to “sign certain Writings, which to them were perfectly unintelligible & which they
have since found were falsely interpreted to them.” In the translations, Delawares agreed to
“Declarations and Engagements they never intended to make or enter into.” 65 Delawares had no
idea that by signing the treaty, they were taking up the war-belt as military allies of the United
States in a war against the British and Western tribes. Article III specified that the United States
would build forts in Delaware country. These forts were to house the women and children of
Delaware warriors while they were “engaged against the common enemy” of the United States.66
This confusion certainly strengthened the argument of those Delawares who opposed an alliance
with the United States. They argued that interpreters who were inadequate to the task deceived
them.67 Delawares returned the war belt and hatchet to Morgan.68 
This misunderstanding may be true of Killbuck and Captain Pipe. White Eyes, however,
knew that this treaty sealed a military-political alliance between the Delawares and the United
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States. “Indefatigible in preserving the Nation at Peace,” 69 White Eyes became convinced that
outside agitation from the Detroit and Sandusky regions would destroy both the neutrality and
the fragile unity of the Delawares. Ever the visionary, he rationalized that Delaware independence
and unity would be best served by supporting the United States and their similar political
struggles. In his fervor for a strong Delaware nation residing within an Indian state, White Eyes
may have deluded Killbuck and Pipe on the meaning of the treaty. Americans at Fort Pitt no
doubt assisted White Eyes in this deception.
Congress recalled McIntosh from his commander’s position at Fort Pitt in April of 1779
for this diplomatic duplicity. Congress insisted that the United States, as the Delaware leaders
had argued, “never intended” to offer the Delawares the war hatchet. As a consequence, Delaware
leaders complained to Congress that this deceit caused “great confusion” among the Delawares
and “drove off two hundred” of their warriors “into the Neighbourhood of the English” at
Detroit.70
The Delawares were not ready to form a military alliance with the United States. At a
time when the three phratries were struggling to maintain a national solidarity, the stress of a
regional war slowly disrupted any form of cohesion within the Lupwaaeenoaw. Without the
vision and guidance of White Eyes to strengthen consensus in the Great Council, the Delawares
lacked the conviction to abide to a strict alliance with the United States.  
 General McIntosh had not been patient with Killbuck and those Delawares who did not
regard the treaty as a formal alliance. He reminded Killbuck that the western tribes threatened the
well being of both the Delaware nation and the United States and that it was time the Delawares
assumed their responsibilities and obligations. McIntosh told Killbuck, “we became one people,
it was time for all the friends of America and liberty to take up the hatchet for their own sakes
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with us. . . .” 71 Congress informed those Delawares who insisted upon neutrality that reports
confirmed that Wolf-Delawares, together with Senecas, were raiding the American frontier. Since
many Delaware young men abandoned neutrality, members of Congress rationalized that they
could not “expect the Assistance of such as profess to be our Friends.” 72 Killbuck and Captain
Johnny, on behalf of the peace faction among the Turtle and Turkey tribes, poignantly argued
that there were Tories in several of the states within the United States. They pointed out: “but as
that does not make those particular States your enemies . . . we hope you will make a proper
Distinction between our Nation and Individuals”--those individuals who were “outcasts” from
the Delaware peace contingent and its friendship with Americans.73
This friendship, however, was not feasible considering the racial climate of the region. In
1780, Colonel Daniel Brodhead, Commandant of the Western Department at Fort Pitt, recruited a
band of forty Delaware warriors to fight pro-British Indians. These warriors camped with their
families outside Fort Pitt. Brodhead had to assign a “guard of regulars” to protect these
Delawares when a group of whites from Hannastown “attempted to destroy them, women and
children as well as men.” 74  A private in the 13th Virginia Regiment savagely murdered one
young Delaware, “one of the best young men of the Delaware nation.” Brodhead complained to
General Washington that Delawares were targets and mentioned that a delegation of Delaware
chiefs, on their way to Philadelphia to address Congress, were in serious jeopardy, for “several
parties” had gathered to murder the delegation. Brodhead feared a general Indian war as the result
of the barbarity of these frontiersmen.75 Congress naively advised all Delawares who were
friendly to the United States to leave their towns on the Muskingum and to settle near Fort Pitt
for their own protection. Delawares were conditioned by history to reject this well-intentioned
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invitation. They remembered the massacre of Conestoga Indians at Lancaster in 1763 at the hands
of the Paxton boys and the “narrow escape of the Christian Indians in the City of Philadelphia”
from the same fate. In both instances, these Indians were supposedly under the protection of
whites.76   
The main contributor, however, in the destruction of Delaware and American relations
was the inability of a fiscally strapped Continental Congress to meet its treaty obligations. As
early as 1777, Delawares questioned the ability of the Americans to supply trade goods to the
Indian towns on the Muskingum. Captain Pipe had complained to Morgan that the Delawares
were being ridiculed by the western tribes for “being attached” to Americans “who cannot even
furnish us with a pair of Stockings or a Blanket. . . .” 77 Article V of the Fort Pitt Treaty
guaranteed “clothing, utensils and implements of war” to be distributed when possible by the
United States.78 The Delawares were deeply concerned when trade goods did not reach them.
Killbuck asked for “traders . . . with goods as our women & Children are poor & naked & in
danger of perishing.” Colonel Brodhead at Fort Pitt sympathized with Killbuck, but contended
that the deep snow had prevented “getting supplies over the mountains for the Delawares.” 79
Brodhead acknowledged that peace with the Delawares was predicated upon the ability of
Congress to supply them with trade goods. 80
A Delaware national delegation headed by Killbuck and Captain Johnny visited Morgan’s
home at Princeton, New Jersey, and with his help drafted a petition to be addressed to General
George Washington and the Continental Congress in May of 1779. The chiefs maintained that
their friendship with the United States depended on the reality that they could observe “strict
neutrality between the United States and Britain.” The chiefs reminded Congress that the treaty
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promised goods, in exchange for the fur pelts and deer hides of their hunters.81 The delegation
asserted that traders were not entering Delaware country--a provision “absolutely necessary for
the Subsistance of their Women and Children.” Through the three previous treaties made with
Anglo-Americans at Fort Pitt, provisions of goods had not been “complied with in any degree.”
These treaties were signed in good faith but left the “Delaware Nation . . . poor and naked” and
reduced them to send their leaders in person to “Congress & to his Excellency General
Washington” and plead their case.82 They asked Congress to live up to their treaty obligations;
otherwise, the Delawares would have to “look to the English alone for the supplies of all their
Wants.” 83
The pro-American delegation of Turtle and Turkey Delawares did not want to sever ties
with the United States. Killbuck and Captain Johnny promised that they would embrace the
white man’s civilization and “become one Peopl[e] with our Brethren of the United States,”
while nurturing a friendly relationship “to the end of time.” 84 Delaware leaders wanted Congress
to provide and pay for the schooling of their children. They also urged for congress to send a
“useful Tradesmen and Husbandmen” to live with the Delawares and “instruct the Youth” in the
professions. They agreed to increase the number of their men to be sent east and educated at
Princeton and to permit school teachers to enter Delaware country and to instruct their young
men in the vocation of a skilled trade or to demonstrate new agricultural methods.85 With
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85 Ibid., 319. White Eyes had sent his eight-year-old son and Killbuck sent two of his
sons to be schooled at Princeton. George White Eyes won academic awards as a boy, but when
he reached college, he quit school to return to his people. He became an alcoholic and was killed
by a white man when he was involved in a drunken brawl on Beaver Creek in Western
Pennsylvania in 1798. Thomas Killbuck, the half-brother of Killbuck’s other son John, studied
geography and Latin, but became homesick and returned home. John Killbuck, Jr. had an affair
with one of George Morgan’s maids. From this relationship they had a child and John left
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diplomatic dexterity, Killbuck used the example of Moravian Delaware converts to apply
leverage in their demands to Congress. The chiefs pointed out that the Moravians had
“established a Town where numbers of [their people] have embraced Christianity under the
Instruction of the Reverend and worthy David Zeisberger.” The Delaware peace faction believed
that the Moravian missions had exerted tremendous influence regarding the “love of Peace into
the Minds of the whole Nation.” 86
Washington was direct in his reply by telling the Delaware delegation, “I am a warrior”
and that it was his “business to destroy all the Enemies of these States and to protect their
friends.”87 Washington informed the Delawares of the great carnage exacted by his army on the
Onondaga, in retaliation for the wrongs committed by the Six Nations against the United States.
He sympathized with the plight of the Delaware people and condemned those who had “not
dealt justly” in regard to the treaty. He apologized by telling them “there are some matters about
which I do not open my lips, because they belong to Congress and not to us warriors. You are
going to them. They will tell you all you wish to know.” 88
Congress replied to the complaints of the Delaware leaders by reminding them that the
“Great Councel of the United States” had always strove for justice and “benevolent wishes”
towards their Delaware brethren, as exemplified by the previous treaty talks at Fort Pitt in 1775,
1776, and 1777. They did not consider the current treaty as finalized.89 Congress stated that it
“was out of [their] power to do all that [they] wished for [their] Indian Brethren.” Congress
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maintained that the British, through their plundering of American shipping, were to blame for the
shortage of trade goods.90
Congress criticized the Delaware chiefs for their insistence on remaining neutral rather
than allying with the United States. Congressional officials insisted, “you cannot be surprised
that our Warriors ask for, & expect the Assistance of such as profess to be our Friends.” They
also condemned the actions of the Munsee-Wolf Delawares who had “joined the Senecas and
taken up the hatchet” against Americans.91 David Zeisberger believed that these Munsee-
Delaware warriors tried to “get their friends away from the church, and to control them” when
they urged mission Delawares to join them in their raids against Pennsylvania and Virginia.92
Zeisberger previously had been most adamant in his condemnation of the Munsee-Wolf
warriors who continually breached the peace between Goschachgunk and Fort Pitt. He thought
that Captain Pipe and his militant supporters should be forever “cast out of the Council” and put
under the stringent control of the Turtle-Turkey civil leaders. He saw the Wolf tribe as being
drawn to the confederation of Indian nations at Detroit. Zeisberger concluded that to save the
nation, dissent of the Wolf war faction needed squelched.93
The Moravians were no doubt biased in their assessment of Captain Pipe and his
councilors. Pipe wanted to banish all missionaries from Delaware country. He saw the Moravians
as obstacles in his plan to bring the Delawares within the council fires of the western Indian
nations. He condemned Moravian-influenced pacifism as detrimental to the development of a
strong Delaware nation.94 Unlike White Eyes, who envisioned strength through diplomacy, Pipe
believed that only a militarily strong Delaware nation, linked in a confederation of Indian nations,
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could save them from the being dislocated once again by Anglo or American territorial
encroachments.
In the Great Council House, the three phratries “had frequent and violent disputes,
concerning the . . .  fate of the Indian congregation.” Unlike his uncle, the prominent Wolf leader
Custaloga who first invited the Moravians to Delaware country, Pipe and many of his followers
opposed the establishment of the Moravian mission towns.95 In the Delaware council, Pipe’s
overtures for a war against the Americans were continually blocked by White Eyes, Killbuck,
Captain Johnny and the Moravians, Zeisberger and Heckewelder, both of whom had great
influence “on matters necessary for the preservation of peace” among the Delaware civil chiefs.96
After the death of White Eyes, the peace faction lost footing and momentum in the Great
Council. Captain Pipe, a skeptical signer of the Fort Pitt Treaty, commenced negotiations with
the British. Pipe, “with an air of prophecy,” considered the death of White Eyes an act from the
Great Power to save the Delaware nation from an alliance with the United States.97 He had
condemned the pro-American bias of White Eyes and had always threatened to isolate him
politically from the mainstream. Pipe, described by Heckewelder as bold, frank, and sagacious,
once addressed the Great Council at Goschachgunk in the presence of White Eyes and told them
that he would “declare every man an enemy to the [Delaware] nation” who would not take arms
against the Americans.98 Pipe and bands of the Wolf tribe trickled out of the Upper Sandusky
region into Detroit to join the Ottawas, Chippewas, Shawnees, and Mingos. Pipe used
diplomatic skill and oratorical prowess to convince the Great Council to turn its back on the
pacifist United Brethren and the Americans at Fort Pitt and to join the western Indian alliance.
He gained influence with the “hungry and disillusioned” Delawares. The British, offering supplies
and arms, lured an increasing number of Delaware warriors into “their orbit.” 99
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In the fall of 1780, Heckewelder sent word to Brodhead at Fort Pitt that Delaware
councils, won over by Captain Pipe, had decided to launch attacks on the American frontier.100
The Delawares experienced a great “political division” between the supporters of Killbuck and
the supporters of Captain Pipe. The pro-American Delaware leaders at Goschachgunk lost
control of many of the young warriors who were exasperated at the influence held by the
Americans and Moravians over Killbuck and the others.101 The “political division” caused by
Pipe increased and made it difficult for the “Peace Chiefs” at Goschachgunk to “preserve the
Nation at peace. . . .” 102 The peacemakers among the Delawares, such as Killbuck and
Tetapachksit of the Turtles, and the Turkey leader known as The Big Cat (Machingwi Puschis),
were shouted down at the Delaware council fire. Pipe and his supporters opposed Turtle-Turkey
leaders who were “wishing to see the Nation become a civilized and agricultural people.” Pipe
believed that this harmful direction could best be countered by bringing the Delawares into the
coalition of western Indian nations. This would also remove the Delawares from the influences of
the Moravians and the Americans at Fort Pitt.103
Most importantly, the civil leaders of the Turtle and Turkey tribes could no longer
uphold the peace. Civil chiefs, in times of war, had little power and lacked “coercive
prerogatives” in the councils. With military tensions increasing in the Ohio and the demise of the
Turtle-Turkey peace factions at the Delaware council fire, militant headmen such as Captain
Pipe, the Wolf war captain known as Buckongahelas (“One Whose Movements Are Certain”),
and the prominent Turtle war captain Wingenund took advantage of this political capital and
pressed their agendas of war. These warriors and their followers gained preeminence and
dominated the Lupwaaeenoawuk.104 They won over the sentiment of the Great Council and
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hijacked the course of the Delaware nation. The Great Council became centralized as the political
engine of the Delaware nation, and at the same time the council, in its pursuit of a national
consensus, wracked the nation with factionalism. At the time it seemed that the Delaware
military leaders represented a strong alternative to the failed policies of the Turtle-Turkey peace
faction. The shift from the civil to a war standing had a great impact on the future development of
the Delaware nation.
In the long run, it was Moravianism that dealt the deathblow to the pro-American
contingent of Delaware chiefs. Killbuck increasingly lost influence in the Lupwaaeenoawuk after
the death of White Eyes.105 He complained that the Great Council kept him in the dark on most
affairs, “so that [he] knew nothing.” 106 Killbuck did not have the charisma and vision of White
Eyes, and despite his courage, lacked the stomach and fortitude for a power play within the
council. He also did not have the motivation to challenge Pipe for political supremacy.107
Killbuck and his pro-American supporters were reduced to the “lamentable Situation of
Refugees.” 108 He at that time was undergoing a spiritual transformation. Killbuck, greatly
influenced by Heckewelder and the Moravians, became a Christian and resigned from the
Delaware council in early 1781. He told Colonel Brodhead, who was adopted by Killbuck’s tribe,
“You are a Turtle Yourself, & there are many Men in our Tribe, Therefore You will not be at a
loss to find one good one, who will speak the truth.” 109
Two other peace chiefs who leaned to the Americans also converted to Moravianism.
Captain Johnny resigned from the council to live among the mission Indians at Lichtenau in 1777.
Another pro-American leader, the aged Echpalawehund, became a Christian and was baptized as
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Petrus. He was permitted to sit in the Great Council, and up until the political ascension of the
Wolf tribe, he still maintained a degree of political influence in the council.110
The conversion of these leaders presented Moravians with a dilemma. They needed these
men to remain as influential members of the council. This would permit the missionaries to
“recruit more converts and repress their critics.” 111 Without the support of the civil leaders, the
missionaries’ power waned, as did support for peace with the Americans. In an ironic sense, it
was against the interests of the Moravians to convert influential civil leaders, who in turn, might
decide to leave the Great Council to practice their Christian beliefs in the mission towns.
Conversion to Christianity also weakened the peace faction of Delawares at a time in which they
needed conviction and the strength of numbers to resist the calls for war.   
Unfortunately the Moravians built their missions in a region that “was fast becoming a
war zone.” 112 Indian war parties from the west entered the mission towns and coerced converts
into supplying them with food and a place to rest. The demands of the warriors “was a very
disagreeable business for the inhabitants of Lichtenau,” who were themselves hungry.113
Zeisberger lamented to a companion: “how could we live in the midst of warriors . . . We should
be swallowed and devoured.” 114 The steady appearance of western warriors in Delaware towns
along the Muskingum caused disruption and further weakened the peace.115
Moravians, despite their anti-military views, tended to favor the Americans and
clandestinely aided the American cause. Heckewelder relayed messages pertaining to the British
at Detroit and the movement of western warriors to military officials at Fort Pitt. Messages were
put in the “folds of the saddle blanket beneath the saddle” and delivered by Delaware messengers.
Moravians constantly sent runners to Fort Pitt with military information.116
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Realistically, it was not in the best interest of the Delawares to align with an American
nation that was financially unstable. Many Delawares slowly gravitated to the British,
particularly when the Americans failed to honor the Fort Pitt Treaty stipulations and were seen
as untrustworthy. Heckewelder notified Colonel Brodhead at Fort Pitt that the Delaware council
was leaning toward the British, and the war captains were attempting to “blacken the Character
of Killbuck” for his friendly leanings towards the Americans.117 In March of 1781 Brodhead
received word from a friendly Delaware that the Great Council “ha[d] declare’d in favor of the
British” and Delaware warriors had commenced in raids on American settlements.118   
To demonstrate his friendship, Killbuck threw in his full support for the United States.
Killbuck was not a pacifist, despite his newfound Christianity and his earlier stance, in which he
opposed a military alliance with the United States. Like Heckewelder, Killbuck desired to purge
the Delaware of the warriors who disrupted the Muskingum Christian towns. In the spring of
1781, commissioned as Colonel William Henry Killbuck, he led eighty Delaware auxiliaries
against the Indian alliance at Detroit. Killbuck was also prepared to fight Captain Pipe, his Wolf
followers, and the Unami Delawares who had taken control of the capital at Goschachgunk.
Heckewelder offered Brodhead’s command a safe haven if they should march through the
Moravian Delaware towns to “punish [those] wicked people” at Goschachgunk.119 Brodhead,
with over three hundred Continental Army troops, militia, and his Delaware allies, led a
preemptive strike against the Delawares at Goschachgunk on April 19, 1781. There they found
fifteen Delawares who were hostile to the United States. They were tried by a military tribunal,
sentenced to death, tomahawked, and scalped. Killbuck and his warriors discovered a party of
over forty Delawares on the banks of the Muskingum who were performing a victory dance--in
honor of their great success against American settlements. He and his warriors attacked the
Delawares. Killbuck chased the war captain, killed, and then scalped him.120 Brodhead leveled
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Goschachgunk and moved northward to torch the Moravian mission town of Lichtenau. The
victorious Americans captured prisoners and took cattle and furs, which were sold at Wheeling.
The Moravian missionaries and Delaware Christians were not harmed.121 Brodhead’s
preemptive strike into Delaware country broke the reluctance of the Great Council to become
active allies of the British. His destruction of the Delaware capital, Goschhachgunk, now a
stronghold for warriors hostile to the United States, was the final straw.122
Brodhead correctly assessed the situation by telling Washington that if supplies were not
sent, the pro-American Delawares would be “compelled to make terms with the British or
perish.” 123 The Delawares became allies of the British not out of sentiment or sense of
attachment, but because of the “default of the Americans,” and their failure to provide the trade
goods which would have been seen as a token of support.124 As the Revolutionary War slowly
shifted in favor of the Americans, it turned into a disaster for the Delawares. The Wolf division,
as the most militant and pro-British element, became the dominant division.
While Pipe opposed American intrusions in Delaware country, he was not a client chief
of the British. He would not support the British if it meant the destruction of the Delaware
nation. In November of 1781, one month after Lord Cornwallis’s surrender to American and
French forces at Yorktown, Virginia, Pipe attempted to mediate the Delaware stance. In council
at Detroit, Pipe lashed out at the British Colonel Arent Schuyler De Peyster for pressuring
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Delawares to fight in a war that did not concern his people, and thus disrupting the peace he had
hoped to attain for his nation. Brandishing a stick with a scalp attached, Pipe scolded the
commander by reminding him:
You may perhaps think me a fool, in risking my life at your call: and in a
cause too, by which I have no prospect of gaining anything; for it is your
cause, and not mine to fight the Long Knives. You both have raised the
quarrel within yourselves; and by right, you ought to fight it out
yourselves and not compel Your Children [the Delawares] to expose
themselves to Danger for Your sake . . .  Father! Many lives have already
been lost on your account! Nations have suffered and been weakened!
Children have lost Parents, brothers, and relatives! Wifes have lost
Husbands! . . . The Warrior [Delaware nation] is poor and his cabin is
always empty; but your house, father! is always full. 125
Captain Pipe told De Peyster that his people were reluctant to go to war “against a
People who had done [them] no injury.” He defended his decision to raid the American frontiers
with the Senecas--for if he failed to support the British he believed that they would withhold
trade goods from the Delawares. Pipe also knew that the two sides were preparing to initiate
peace talks. He feared that the Delawares had “expose[d] themselves to Danger” for the sake of
the British, who were “shaking hands with the Long Knives.” 126
The decision of the Lupwaaeenoawuk for the Delawares to ally themselves with the
British in 1781 had isolated the Moravian Delawares and sandwiched them between the hostile
western tribes and the white frontiersmen around Fort Pitt. On the Muskingum, warriors made
raids and brought their captives to the missionary town of Gnadenhutten. When this region
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“became a theatre of war,” De Peyster and the British at Detroit provoked Indian war-captains to
remove the Christian Indians from the Muskingum.127 Captain Pipe, who “had sworn
destruction to the Brethren,” instigated Wolf warriors and their Wyandot allies to attack the
Moravian towns. In return, he promised that the warriors could possess the “whole booty gained
on the Muskingum.” 128
The British feared that the Moravian missionaries retained an incredible influence and
could sway the Great Council back into supporting the United States. To sever the ties, the
British ordered that the Moravian missionaries be seized and brought to Detroit to be tried by a
military tribunal on the charges of aiding the American rebels.129 In the spring of 1781, the Wolf
war captain Buckongahelas and his warriors entered the mission town at Gnadenhutten to
capture the newly-converted Killbuck and to persuade the Christian Delawares there that the
American Revolution was a family war in which the “Father was in the right; and that his
Children deserved to be punished a little!” 130 Buckongahelas warned the Delawares at
Gnadenhutten that they lived in a dangerous region and should be wary of the “footsteps of the
Long Knives [Virginia militia], almost within sight” of the Muskingum. He pleaded with them to
remove to a safer place, out of the path of the “contending parties” of British and Americans.131
The Christians thanked him for his concern but declined to move, as they “found no cause to
mistrust the sincerity of their American Brethren!” 132
On August 10, 1781, a large group of Wyandots, loyalists, British soldiers, together with
Captain Pipe, Wingenund, and a group of Delaware warriors from the Upper Sandusky and
Detroit regions entered Salem and then Gnadenhutten in a “Warlike Manner on Horseback, one
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Man bearing an English flag. . . .” to coerce the converts to move from the Muskingum.133 As
they moved north through the Muskingum, the warriors became belligerent toward the
missionaries. They plundered Heckewelder’s home and stripped Zeisberger and other
missionaries of their clothing and gave them old rags and linen to wear.134 At Schoenbrunn, the
war party took Zeisberger’s wife as a prisoner.135
Moravians, both white and Indian, watched the Wyandots plunder Schoenbrunn. The
Wyandots ransacked the church and took “communion utensils.” 136 But bonds were strong
among the Delawares. When the party reached the Sandusky location called Captives Town,
some of the Munsees became displeased at the bad treatment of both Delaware and white
Christians. Zeisberger, who had been adopted by the Wolf tribe, noted that these Munsees had
“shown themselves good to us, and had done us no harm; they often showed their discontent
with the conduct of the Wyandots towards us.” 137
Zeisberger and his brethren spent over fifteen months at Captives Town. On October 31,
1781, De Peyster summoned Zeisberger, Heckewelder, and other Moravian missionaries to
Detroit to face charges of treason against the Crown for supplying information to Americans at
Fort Pitt. De Peyster eventually relented, through the intervention of Captain Pipe, and released
the missionaries, who returned to Captives Town.138
The Sandusky Indians at Captives Town underwent drought and shortage of game.139
One Delaware war captain who was bitter towards the converts sarcastically observed: “These
are the People who lived so well a while ago . . . Now they have nothing, & creep about looking
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for Food, as we are used to do.” 140 A large group of starving Moravian Delawares returned to
their Muskingum homes in the late winter of 1782 to gather corn in the fields they had left
behind.141 The converts returned to Salem and Gnadenhutton “without any Manner of Fear &
Uneasiness” of impending danger as war waged on the Ohio frontier.142
In March of 1782, Colonel David Williamson and 160 Pennsylvania militiamen from
Washington County, in search of a Wyandot war party, entered Gnadenhutten. Williamson
falsely accused the Christian Delawares of the raids along the Ohio River that had been
perpetrated by the Wyandots. The peaceful Delawares were disarmed and massacred by the
militia for crimes they did not commit.143 Only four of ninety-four Delawares escaped the
slaughter.144 Three prominent Delaware leaders who had converted to Christianity--Glikhikan,
the once-feared Wolf war captain, now known as Isaac, Echpalawehund, who became Petrus, and
Captain Johnny, who was Christianized as Israel, were among the victims.145
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Gnadenhutten symbolized the death knell of Moravianism and the peace faction within
the council as influences during national development.146 Delawares never forgot Gnadenhutten
and blamed Moravian missionaries for weakening Delawares so the Pennsylvania militia could
easily slaughter them.147 Christian Delawares left Captives Town on the Sandusky and gained
refuge with The Big Cat and the Turkey Delawares on the Miami River, west of the
Muskingum.148
 The death of White Eyes, the failure of the Fort Pitt Treaty, and the frontier environment
of violence, dismembered any chance of a stable Delaware political nation taking root in the
Muskingum country. Most importantly, the American Revolution intensified political rivalry
within the Great Council at a crucial time in the development of the Delaware nation. Without the
guidance of a strong peace leader such as White Eyes, the consensus and fragile unity of the
Lupwaaeenoawuk was tested and put through great stress. The council did not have the maturity
and experience as a body to withstand conflict within. When tensions increased in the council, the
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Wolf tribe took control of the nation, both politically and physically (with the removal of
Christian Delawares). For the survival of the Delawares, the factionalism would have to be dealt
with and the wounds healed among the Turtle and Turkey peace chiefs and war leaders of the
Wolf tribe. The Delawares had to prepare themselves to face an aggressive and restless American
nation that had won its independence, and with it, the belief that western expansion into the Ohio
country was a right of conquest.
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Chapter VI
“a nation . . . shattered, wrecked, and severed”:
The Decline of the Delaware Nation, 1783-1795
The post-Revolution Delaware nation no longer had the political maneuverability of
choosing sides, a position enjoyed during the Seven Years’ War and American Revolution. After
1783, driven from the Muskingum River valley, Delawares were at the mercy of the United States
government. The Delaware council was forced to rebuild a consensus, not an easy task in the
aftermath of the national schism caused by the American Revolution. It was vital for Delawares to
preserve their political nation and at the same time protect themselves from American
encroachment. To do so, the Delawares joined the federation of Northwest Indian tribes.
Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, Wyandots, Ottawas, among others, bonded together in common
cause of resistance to the territorial advances of the United States. In the Great Council of the
Lupwaaeenoawuk, Delaware chiefs and war captains focused on both unity as a nation and
solidarity with the Indian nations of the Northwest. This was difficult to achieve. Confederation
prerogatives greatly challenged the cohesiveness and identity of the Delaware nation. The split in
the Delaware council also required a period of reconciliation and healing. The process of
rapprochement between factions was not given time to work itself out. The political realities of an
expanding American nation made confederation issues more vital to the Delawares than bringing
together the factions that severed the nation.
As peace talks between the Americans and British commenced in Paris, the Governor of
Canada, General Sir Frederick Haldimand, asked the Delawares and other Indian allies of the
British “not to push the War into the Enemies Country but [to] defend your own” lands. He
reminded the Indians that they would receive assistance from the British.1 This, however, was an
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idle promise. The Indians who sided with the British during the American Revolution did not
receive “lasting gratitude and protection.” The interests of the western Indian nations were
ignored during the peace talks in Paris that ended the American Revolution.2
By the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the British recognized the Mississippi River
as the western boundary of the United States. They would retain a presence in frontier posts on
the Great Lakes at Niagara, Detroit, and Michilimackinac for three years to give British traders
time to withdraw. After that time, the United States gained jurisdiction over the Indian nations of
the Northwest Territory.3 When the pro-British Indians complained that they had been
“abandoned to their enemies,” the Earl of Shelburne, who was the head of the British ministry,
assured them that “they were remitted to the care of neighbours, whose interest it was as much
as ours to cultivate friendship with them. . . .” 4   
Shelburne’s optimism was not shared by the Delawares. After the rumored murder of
White Eyes and the massacre of Christian Indians at Gnadenhutten, many Delawares came to
hate Americans. In his rhetoric, the Wolf war leader Buckongahelas denounced the United States.
Buckongahelas maintained that there were more bad whites in proportion to the good. He
condemned American slaveholders who “enslave those who are not of their colour, although
created by the same Great Spirit.” He told John Heckewelder that these same Americans would
enslave the Indians “if they could, but they cannot do it, they kill us. I know the Long Knives;
they are not to be trusted.” 5
This lack of trust only compounded the confusion within the political environment of the
post war Ohio country. The Delaware nation faced new problems after the peace at Paris had
been concluded in 1783. The British, Americans, and northwestern Indian nations had different
geopolitical agendas. The British in Canada encouraged the Indians to remain peaceful, but to be
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vigilant and to defend their country from the encroachment of the United States. The British
ministry hoped to preserve the valuable western fur trade and retain Canada as a royal
possession. Most importantly, the British had no intention of confronting the United States over
this Indian territory from the Ohio to the Mississippi.6
American Indian policy in the west vacillated during this period. During the later years of
the Articles of Confederation government, the United States approached diplomacy with Indian
nations through the pretensions of “rights of conquest” ideology. In 1784, at Fort Stanwix, the
United States commissioners diplomatically mauled the Six Nations of Iroquois delegation. The
American commissioners would not deal with the Iroquois as a federation of nations but, to sap
them of unity and strength, dealt with them as individual tribes. The leaders of the Iroquois were
reduced psychologically when the American official, James Duane, dismantled their air of
“perfect equality” and reminded them that they were not a “free and independent nation” but a
“subdued people” who were defeated in battle and thus part of the peace settlement between
Great Britain and the United States.7
At Stanwix, Aaron Hill, a prominent Mohawk leader, attempted to speak for the
Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, and Shawnees, as well as the Choctaws and Creeks of the
southern nations. Hill demanded that the Ohio River boundary, as agreed upon earlier in 1768 at
the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, remain as the dividing point between the western Indian nations and
Anglo-America. American commissioners and the Seneca leader, Captain John O’Bail (known as
Cornplanter) quickly silenced him. Cornplanter reminded Hill that the western tribes “must
consult [amongst themselves] of what part they must cede to the United States.” 8 The Iroquois
interests in Ohio and Pennsylvania were terminated at Stanwix in 1784.9
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The United States then turned its diplomatic attentions to the Indian nations of the
Northwestern Confederation. In 1783 a Congressional Committee reported that the Indians west
of the Ohio River were “not in a temper to relinquish their territorial claims, without further
struggles.” 10 The Ohio and Great Lakes nations had bounded together in opposition to the 1768
Stanwix Treaty. The Indian Confederation reached fruition under the encouragement of Sir John
Johnson, the British superintendent and the son of the late William Johnson, and Thayendanega
(Joseph Brant) of the Mohawk nation. Both saw an opportunity to block the expansionist goals
of the United States by supporting the federation and their demands for an Ohio River
boundary.11
The Delawares had always resisted inclusion into a confederation. Despite their military
alliances with the Shawnees and Wyandots during the Seven Years’ War and American
Revolution, they strove to maintain the autonomy and unity of the three animal tribes within the
nation. They were not dependent upon the council fires of confederations, whether it was the
Iroquois at Onondaga or western Algonquians at Detroit. This self-sufficient position changed
with the conclusion of the American Revolution.
After the Revolutionary War, Delawares who were driven from the central towns on the
Muskingum and Tuscarawas were scattered to the Lower Sandusky region along Lake Erie and
further west to the Mad River bordering Kentucky country, to the Maumee River region and to
the series of Indian towns on the Miami River known as the Glaize. Eventually by 1789, a
splinter group of Delawares, together with a band of Shawnees, were invited by Baron de
                                                                                                                                                            
western nations, sold Indian hunting grounds south of the Ohio and opened up Kentucky for
settlers, squatters, and speculators from Virginia. This immigration into the hunting grounds of
the Shawnees precipitated Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774. For a solid analysis on the ramifications
of this treaty see McConnell, A Country Between, 244, 248-256, 261-263.
9 Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1784 with the Six Nations, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties,
Vol II, compiled and edited by Charles J. Kappler (Washington, D. C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1904), 2: 5-6; Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian
Policy 1783-1812 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967), 17-20.
10 Congressional Committee, 1783 in Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 25:
681-683.
11 Calloway, Crown and Calumet, 14; Downes, Council Fires on Ohio, 282-283.
162
Carondelot, the Spanish governor of Louisiana to settle in current day Cape Girardeau,
Missouri.12
Delawares and other Ohio Indians “entered into a formal league” with the Indians of the
Great Lakes and western regions. They united to block American expansion across the Ohio.13
The Delawares became immersed in the “village world” of mostly Algonquian-speaking nations,
all motivated by a commonality--the defense of their Ohio and Great Lakes homeland. Wyandots
and Ojibwas (Chippewas) comprised the Detroit towns, while Ottawas, Wyandots, and
Delawares lived in the Lower Maumee towns. The Big Cat’s and Buckongahelas’s Delawares
lived with Shawnees and Miamis in the Upper Maumee villages. Delawares, Mingos, Ottawas,
and Wyandots lived together in the towns of the Sandusky regions. To the extreme west,
Potawatomis and Miamis resided in the St. Joseph region (located west of the Wabash River),
and to the south of the Wabash, a large concentration of Potawatomi and Wea villages. British
traders lived in many of these towns and villages.14    
In these villages, political and ethnic cohesion was fluid; ever changing according to the
circumstances. Unity manifested itself when these Algonquian tribes felt the pressure of an
American invasion.15 The confederation existed in this northwest Indian environment to counter
American expansion. The land west of the Ohio River belonged to the Indian nations as a
collective whole. One group could not cede territory without confederation consent.16
During the Revolutionary War, settlers slowly assaulted the boundary line by crossing
the Ohio River. Congress realized that it could not restrain western movement. Embryonic land
ordinances in 1784 and 1785, pushed by Thomas Jefferson, laid the groundwork for territorial
expansion west of the Ohio and territorial self-government.17 To deal with the Northwestern
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tribes for land cessions and treaties, Congress instructed the appointed commissioners to avoid
and “discourage every coalition and consultation” that might encourage the Indian nations to unite
and push for a common agenda of resistance, whether passive through diplomacy or aggressive
through war.18
Against the “internal pact” of the confederation of tribes, which prohibited individual
negotiations, the Delawares, Wyandots, and a band of Ottawas and Chippewas met with
American commissioners at Fort McIntosh (Beaver, western Pennsylvania) in January of 1785 to
negotiate a treaty. The American representatives sought a new western boundary with the Ohio
tribes. They reminded the Indian leaders, who made the trek to Fort McIntosh, that the Six
Nations of Iroquois had been defeated and that the British would no longer protect the Ohio
tribes. A Delaware leader at the treaty talks tried to reason with American officials by pointing
out that “I think that . . . the country is mine; and as our children grow up, we will tell them that
the [Ohio] country is ours.” 19
The pleas did not have the effect hoped by Delaware leaders. In exchange for protection
of the United States government, the Delawares and Wyandots gave up northern sections of the
Muskingum Valley for white settlement and thus weakened the sanction of the Ohio River as a
boundary line. Part of the reduced boundary was to begin at the Cuyahoga River and run to the
“portage between [the Cuyahoga] and the Tuscarawas branch of Muskingum. . . .” The western
boundary ran to the Miami River.20 Article IV of the treaty recognized Delaware and Wyandot
claims to land for hunting and settlement.  Article VI prohibited all Indians to live on land ceded
to the government and gave the United States full rights to settle the “lands east, south and west
of the lines” outside of the Delaware-Wyandot reserve.21 
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The treaty at Fort McIntosh reveals much about the Delaware polity at that time.
Captain Pipe desperately attempted to retain Wolf preeminence in the post-war Delaware
council. Pipe, whose pro-British stance led the Delawares to defeat, had fallen out of favor in the
Delaware Great Council and was trying to reestablish his tarnished reputation. Leaders of the
Turtle and Turkey tribes accused Pipe of taking Delawares off the road of peace, leading them to
war, “diminishing and impoverishing them.” 22 John Heckewelder noted that the “Wolf Tribe,
with Captn. Pipe at their head, who had wrested the power of governing the Nation, from the
Turtle tribe, was accused both by the latter and the Turkey Tribe, of being incompetent to govern
the nation. . . .” 23 The Big Cat criticized Pipe of weakening the Delaware nation when he
deviated from the pro-American course of the Turtles and Turkeys and removed the Moravian
missionaries and their converts from the Muskingum.24 Pipe’s sudden pro-American stance did
not sit well with the Delaware Great Council. The growing popularity of the war leader
Buckongahelas indicated that Delaware consensus was drawn towards full participation in the
Indian Confederation. In a sense, the national agendas (individual peace treaties and diplomacy
with the United States) of the Delawares were stifled and shelved by adherence to the anti-
American stance of the federated western Indian nations and with this loyalty, the probability of
war.  
 In a complete reversal of political sentiment, Pipe sought out American commissioners to
sign a binding treaty of peace. Pipe, who still was bitter over British betrayal, believed that a
friendship with the United States would keep the Delaware nation away from the machinations
of the British and Northwestern Confederation. Pipe and the ancient Turtle leader Wingenund,
led the Delawares at the Fort McIntosh treaty talks. They negotiated with territorial governor
George Rogers Clark, and commissioners Richard Butler and Arthur Lee. Pipe ignored council
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protocol when he ceded Delaware land without consent of the Turkey and Turtle leaders. He was
eager to gain peace with the United States and even disregarded the objections of Buckongahelas,
who was the Wolf war captain and a prominent councilor.25
  United States officials attempted to reconcile the factions, and at the same time, increase
pro-American sentiments within the Delaware Lupwaaeenoawuk. They added a separate article
to the stipulations of the treaty of 1785. The Delawares, at the insistence of the United States
commissioners, agreed that Killbuck, The Big Cat, and Wicocalind, also known as Joseph White
Eyes, the son of Captain White Eyes, would be pardoned for taking “up the hatchet for the
United States, and their families, [would] be received into the Delaware nation, in the same
situation and rank as before the war.” They were also assured “their due portions of the lands”
would be given to the Delawares and Wyandots as a result of the treaty.26
The United States hoped to make a major treaty with the rest of the confederation. The
Delawares had an opportunity to reestablish themselves as the “Grandfathers”--the most ancient
and revered peacemakers among all Algonquians. General Richard Butler enlisted Wingenund to
serve as a mediator between the United States and western nations. Butler considered Wingenund
as “old, experienced, and sensible, to go to the nations . . . and use every effort to bring them to
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the treaty . . . in his artful manner.” 27 Butler also dispatched The Big Cat to the Wabash and
Miami towns of the Mahicans and Miamis to persuade them to come in to the treaty talks.28
Their attempts with these nations failed. Only the Shawnees listened to the overtures of the
Delawares and appeared at Fort Finney at the mouth of the Miami River to negotiate a treaty.
Tetapachksit (“One Who Has Been Split”) a chief headman of the Turtle Delawares, told the
Shawnee war captains that his people “had laid down the hatchet, and would never more take it
up.” He asked the Shawnees “to be strong and follow his example.” 29 The treaty, in essence,
reiterated the same conditions proposed at Fort McIntosh. The Shawnees were bullied into
acknowledging the United States as the “sole and absolute sovereigns” of land west of the Ohio
ceded by Great Britain.30
The Northwest Indian Confederation met in Detroit in December 1786 to denounce all
“separate treaties” made without confederation consent. The Northwestern tribes maintained that
“by the united voice of the Confederacy holding all partial treaties as void and of no effect.” This
in essence was an indictment aimed at the treaties at Fort McIntosh with the Delawares and
Wyandots and Fort Finney with the Shawnees. Both agreements were nullified by the
Confederation.31
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The United States government stood by these treaties and went further with regards to
their assertion of territorial rights in the Ohio. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 slowly altered
government response to Indian hostilities in the Ohio. The land ordinance authorized Congress to
make laws regarding Indian policy, “founded on justice and humanity.” Congress hoped that past
wrongs to the Indians would be made right and “peace and Friendship” would be preserved at all
costs.32
The Land Ordinance also released the floodgates of settlement into the Ohio. Those Ohio
Delawares who lived within the confines of the reserve as established by the concessions made at
Fort McIntosh in 1785, were slowly “hemmed in.” 33 Delawares also suffered from famine when
their corn crops failed during a cold snap and game became scarce. David Zeisberger lamented the
state of the Ohio Delawares who “a few years ago greatly flourished, but since the old chiefs,
Netawatwe[e]s and White Eyes, are dead, [the Delaware nation] goes with hasty steps to
ruin.” 34   
Zeisberger also reported that the Delawares who were dispersed throughout the
Northwest Territory were in a “grievous condition,” as they were without a “steadfast place” or
a traditional homeland. They asked the Six Nations for land and were denied by leaders of the
Iroquois who told the Delawares that after the Fort Stanwix Treaty in 1784, “they had
themselves not a foot of land they could call their own.” 35 They then made requests to the
Wyandots, who had originally given the Delawares land in the Ohio. The Wyandots told them
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they “would make them no more offers” for new land.36 Out of sympathy for displaced
Delaware bands, the Miami Indian nation gave them a tract of land that extended from the Miami
to the Wabash Rivers. Swamps surrounded this land.37
The American government hoped that the Delawares could serve as mediators and
peacemakers among the Northwestern Confederation. As the United States veered from its
“rights of conquest” ideology, it saw the diplomatic potential of the Delawares to bring peace to
the Ohio country. Charles Thomson, the Secretary of Congress, believed that it was necessary to
reach out to the principal Delaware leaders and their followers who had been “driven from the
Muskingum” and to “quiet the minds of the Delaware in Respect to the mournful Slaughter of
their friends” at Gnadenhutten. Thomson hoped that the Delawares would not condemn
Congress for actions taken by the Pennsylvania Militia and their slaughter of innocent Christian
Delawares.38
However, the United States government had to shelve its individual concern for the
Delaware nation and turn attention to confederation matters. In October of 1787, Congress
directed Arthur St. Clair, the territorial governor, to meet with the Confederation and to address
“all causes of controversy, so that peace and harmony may continue between the United States
and the Indian tribes.” 39 He was instructed to negotiate a “boundary advantageous to the United
States” and to extinguish, by purchase, Indian claims to land desired by Congress.40 St. Clair
addressed leaders of the western nations in council at the mouth of the Detroit River on July 13,
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1788, to chastise the actions of their warriors who raided along the Ohio River after peace treaties
had been concluded. He reminded them that the United States was “sincerely desirous of Peace,”
but also warned the chiefs: “if you will have War, why you shall have War.” 41
In January 1789, St. Clair, Josiah Harmar, and Richard Butler negotiated a treaty at Fort
Harmar with the Delawares, Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Sauks, and Potawatomis. In this
agreement the western tribes, after insisting that the boundary line be moved to the Muskingum,
reluctantly acknowledged the boundaries as determined at Fort McIntosh in 1785. The treaty
also gave the United States preempted rights over any lands that the Western Confederation
might sell in the future.42 To gain the confederation’s verification of the McIntosh Treaty, St.
Clair gave presents and goods valued at 6,000 dollars.43 
While St. Clair believed that the “confederacy [was] entirely broken” through the
Northwestern Confederation’s acceptance of the territorial cessions made by the Delawares and
Wyandots at Fort McIntosh in 1785, the treaty was not a binding agreement.44 He made a
diplomatic blunder when he presented the Indian headmen with black wampum belts and not the
white belts of peace that would have validated this agreement. St. Clair also received mostly the
                                                
41 Governor St. Clair to confederation Indians in council on the Detroit River, July 13,
1788, in ibid., 2: 127.
42 Articles Third and Fourth of the Treaty of Fort Harmar with the Western Indian
Nations, January 9, 1789, in Territorial Papers of the United States, ed., Carter, Northwest 2:
175-176. In the seventh article, the United States required all traders entering Indian country to
be licensed by the Northwest Territorial governor. See Article Seven in ibid., 2: 176-177. The
United States government carried out two separate treaty talks at Fort Harmar (current day
Marietta, Ohio) on January 9, 1789. One agreement was reached with the Six Nations, with the
exception of Joseph Brant and the Mohawks who refused to attend. The Six Nations
Confederation agreed to the terms of the Treaty of Stanwix in 1784, which set permanent
boundaries between the United States and the Six Nations. The treaty also required the Iroquois
to relinquish and cede to the United States “all Claim to the Country west of the said [western]
Boundary” of the Six Nations. See Articles First and Second of the Treaty of Fort Harmar with
the Six Nations, January 9, 1789, in Territorial Papers of the United States, ed., Carter,
Northwest, 2: 182-183.
43 Articles First and Second of the Treaty of Fort Harmar with the Western Indian
Nations, January 9, 1789, in ibid., 2: 174-175.
44 Governor St. Clair’s report on the Treaties of Fort Harmar to President George
Washington, New York, May 2, 1789, in Calloway, ed., Revolution and Confederation, vol. 18 of
Early American Indian Documents, 18: 511
170
signatures of men who were not established civil or war leaders within their respective nations.
There were only four principal leaders within the confederation who attended. Many of the
chiefs who signed their marks had never negotiated with Euro-Americans.45
While the Delawares had seasoned councilors at the treaty, the Lupwaaeenoawuk rejected
this treaty. The signatures of the Delawares included Captain Pipe and his councilors, Pekelan,
and Teataway, all representatives of the Wolf tribe. Wingenund, was the sole representative of
the Turtle/ Turkey tribes present at Fort Harmar. Consensus rejected Pipe’s continual push for
accommodating American demands. According to Heckewelder, the Delawares who followed the
popular Wolf war captain Buckongahelas “constituted two-thirds of the nation--not one of who
were present.” 46 The Great Council made reference to him as the “George Washington” of the
Delaware nation. 47
Buckongahelas, much like Captain Pipe a decade earlier, was leading Delawares down the
disastrous road of war. By the end of 1791, Captain Pipe’s Delawares on the Upper Sandusky,
together with bands of Wyandots, were the lone holdouts for peace with the Americans. They
asked, “What can we do? We are but two, and all other nations are for war. We must expect to
have the nations upon us, if we do not agree with them.” Out of sync with the Delaware political
mainstream, Pipe and his people left the Sandusky region and moved northwest to live with the
Ottawas and Wyandots in the Lower Maumee River villages. Other Munsee-Wolf people led by
Captain Snake left the Sandusky in 1791 to take refuge with Cornplanter’s Senecas in the
Allegheny country of northwestern Pennsylvania.48
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Despite the pressure exerted by St. Clair on the western nations to accept the previously
agreed upon boundaries, the Fort Harmar agreement marked a complete departure from the rights
of conquest mentality previously held by the United States. Both treaties confirmed the land
cessions of the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1784 and the Fort McIntosh Treaty of 1785 through
payment to the Indians, rather than taking the land through military force.49 During the
administration of George Washington, Secretary of War Henry Knox structured the United States
Indian policy in concordance with Washington’s vision that American expansion beyond the
Appalachians and into the Northwest should be gradual, orderly, and without harm to the
Indians. To reach this goal, Washington and Knox hoped to maintain peace between the two
cultures until land cessions could be secured from the tribes west of the Ohio.50 In this way land
could be “wrested from them without another struggle.” 51 The federated Indians would not cede
their land west of the Ohio River.
There was a paradoxical dilemma built into the Washington-Knox Indian policy. It became
increasingly obvious to the federal government that it could neither use the military to enforce its
Indian boundaries nor prevent frontiersmen from entering Indian land in the Ohio. Yet the
military was expected to protect American citizens who breached treaty boundaries.
Indians were quick to see the contradictions in the United States Indian policy and its
dualism of peace and war. At the Harmar talks in 1789, a Shawnee war captain remarked to
territorial judge and land speculator John Cleves Symmes, “if the United States were such lovers
of peace” as their leaders described themselves, they would not have chosen the eagle as a
symbol, he being the largest and most prideful of all birds--the “enemy of all birds.” The Shawnee
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further observed: “You have not only put one of the instruments of war, a bundle of arrows, into
one of his hands [talons], and rods in the other, but have painted him in the most fearful
guise, . . . in posture of attack upon his prey.” 52
The national government’s hopes for a humane policy were replaced by the grim realism
that Indians would resist territorial encroachment before they would peacefully yield their
country.53 Military resistance would be detrimental to the original intent of American national
honor in its treatment of native people. Indian policy would move into the realm of the ethnic
cleansing of a region.
The Northwestern Confederation refused to acknowledge any treaty between Americans
and Indians that specified a reduced boundary. In council, these nations decided that they would
unite in common cause and “assist in repelling the Enemy, who had come into their Country, to
take their Land from them.” They also agreed that the Moravian missionaries and their Christian
Indian followers could live and practice their faith throughout Indian country. They would,
however, be required to fight the whites if necessary. Indian leaders mandated that Christian
Indians who refused to fight, would be put to death, as would the missionary who influenced
them to be peaceful in times of war.54 Many Moravian missionaries appealed to the British at
Detroit for protection against the confederation Indians. The British permitted these missionaries
asylum on the Canadian side of the Detroit River.55 The Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, Miamis
and others looked to the confederation as a mechanism to “unite all their strength and forces, in
compelling the People of the United States, to keep within certain bounds.” The British, whose
traders supplied the Indians with goods while their military provided protection, were not
banned from Indian country.56 Alexander McKee, the British trader and Indian agent, encouraged
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this pan-Indian unity and promised the Indians that the British could be depended on for military
and economic assistance.57
  The Northwestern Confederation was highly successful in repelling the advances of the
United States military. Delaware warriors participated in a series of confederation victories over
American armies. On October 17, 1790, the Miami leader known as Little Turtle led a coalition of
Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee warriors and defeated General Josiah Harmar in the Wabash and
Maumee valleys.58 Then in mid October of 1791, The Miami warriors of Little Turtle, the
Shawnees of Blue Jacket, and Delawares led by Buckongahelas, together with an auxiliary force
of Canadians led by the white renegade Simon Girty attacked, surrounded, and thoroughly
defeated the army of Arthur St. Clair in the Wabash Valley.59
The defeats of Harmar and St. Clair did much to bolster the confidence of the Northwestern
Indians. David Zeisberger observed that the Indian nations of the Northwest Territory “labored for
unity” and vowed to “stand together, and hold fast by one another.” 60 Also in the aftermath of
these victories, Captain Pipe and The Big Cat, who spearheaded the peace faction in the Delaware
Great Council, failed to gain a footing and were shouted down. In futility, trying to maintain
authority, Captain Pipe sent word to Washington and assured him if the President could control
the actions of American settlers and remove the military from the “forts which stands on our land,”
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the peace chiefs could restrain the movement of Delaware war parties.61 At the council of Indian
nations which assembled at the Glaize River, Buckongahelas voiced both Delaware and
confederation unity when he stated: “all nations agreed . . . that if any one of us were struck, we
should consider it as if the whole of the Nations had received a blow and that the whole should join
in revenging it. . . .” Buckongahelas also revealed the sentiment of the federated Indians for the sake
of the Six Nations and Southern nations to take notice, when he urged Delawares, together with
their neighbors, to be of “one mind, one Head and one Heart, and we are resolved to stick close by
each other & defend ourselves to the last.” 62
The Washington administration was not discouraged at the misfortunes of Harmar and St.
Clair. Washington replaced St. Clair, who resigned his commission, with Revolutionary War hero
Major General Anthony Wayne on April 9, 1792. Wayne, after taking command, stressed to the
Secretary of War, Henry Knox, that “war must progress [for] the Savages have been confident,
haughty and insolent from reiterated success.” 63  Washington and Knox restrained Wayne from
taking immediate action. They still hoped for a peaceful solution and that the confederation Indians
would acknowledge, through continued negotiations, the 1789 Harmar Treaty and its boundary
stipulations. Both Washington and Knox took into consideration that public sentiment opposed a
major Indian war. Knox also wanted to give Wayne the time to train and discipline an efficient
military force to be ready in case of diplomatic failures.64 The Americans remained rigid with
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regard to the Ohio as a boundary line for they contended that the “settlements of the lands over the
Ohio founded on the Treaties of Fort McIntosh and Fort Harmar” made an Ohio River boundary
line impossible.65 They later reiterated by stating that the “Land was sold, & in part settled.” 66
On July 28, a delegation of Delawares, Shawnees, and Wyandots left the Auglaize for the
Maumee rapids near the Detroit River to meet with American commissioners. They joined a group
of principal headmen of the Ottawas, Miamis, Potawatomis, and Chippewas. Also in attendance at
the council were Joseph Brant and other representatives of the Six Nations, volunteering to serve
the Northwestern tribes as intermediaries. Brant temporarily persuaded the delegation to accept the
Fort McIntosh Treaty and with it, the Muskingum as a boundary. A few of the Indian leaders were
then swayed from this agreement overnight after they met with Alexander McKee, who encouraged
them to insist upon the Ohio River boundary as agreed upon at Fort Stanwix in 1768. Brant and his
delegation argued that the Ohio was an unreasonable demand, “by no means fair.” 67
There was dissent against Brant and his delegation. The war leader Buckongahelas
epitomized the defiant nature of both the Delawares and the confederated Indians towards the
Americans, British, and Six Nations. Bitter at Brant and the Six Nations for lack of support, he
violated protocol when he interrupted Brant in mid-speech by calling him a liar as Brant tried to
rationalize the Muskingum boundary.68 Later Buckongahelas rose in council when the Six Nations
insisted that the Muskingum boundary was “most reasonable” and pointed an accusing finger at
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McKee and charged that he was the “Person who advises us to insist on the Ohio River for the
line.” 69
Confederation leaders signed a document with the clan markings of their respective nations
and contended that the Ohio River, as determined at the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768, was the
boundary line. They asked the American commissioners, that in the interest of peace “you will
immediately remove all your People from our side of that River” and for a formal acknowledgement
that the Ohio would remain the dividing line “between your People and ours.” 70 By the end of
August, it became clear to the commissioners that peace with the Indian Confederation could not be
secured.71
John Heckewelder experienced both the cautious and the militant overtones of the
Delawares at this time. Four Delawares visited Heckewelder, who attended the council, and told
him that they found “much fault” with the United States sending the armies of Harmar and St. Clair
into Indian country. They claimed it was “some of their foolish young People” who fought the
Americans over the issues of the Ohio River as a boundary.72 A Munsee-Wolf warrior and a
Chippewa companion arrived at the talks and “charged both the Brittish & 5 Nations as the cause
of these troubles: they having put the tomahawk into their hands.” The Wolf warrior became
drunk, and during the night loafed outside of Heckewelder’s tent, proclaiming himself to be the
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Devil, who feared neither the “big Knifes, nor the English.” He condemned the peace talks and the
Indian leaders who leaned toward appeasing American territorial demands.73   
Delawares were desperate to reestablish the pre-McIntosh Treaty boundaries. The
Stockbridge Mohican known as Captain Hendrick Aupaumut contended that many Delawares were
uneasy in the Sandusky/Miami region and “anxious to get back to the waters running into the
Ohio,” where the “head of those waters afford the best-hunting grounds.” 74 Waiting for
diplomacy to settle the boundary dispute, many Delawares were in a “starving condition” and were
surviving by eating their dogs and milk cows.75 Other Delawares took sanction in the polyglot
Indian towns of the Auglaize River region. This was not the new homeland to the Delawares, but
rather a temporary military-political stronghold for confederation Indians.
Most importantly, this was evidence that the collective identity of the Delaware nation was
being subsumed by the confederation. The Glaize community comprised seven major Indian
towns--three of which were Blue Jacket’s Shawnees and the “Mingos of the Glaize,” who also
lived within the Shawnee towns. Also comprising the Glaize were two Delaware towns under the
leadership of Buckongahelas and The Big Cat, the Miami town of Little Turtle, and a town for
French and British traders. This was a multi-cultural region of Indians, British traders, mixed-
bloods, and Anglo and Negro captives. The Big Cat and his family lived in a bark-roofed cabin with
John Brickell, their adopted white son.76 The Grand Glaize towns became the center of Indian
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political and military power in the Northwest and of course, the continued target of the United
States military.
Indians remained adamant in their demands that the Ohio River be the boundary line
between Indian territory and white settlement.77 American commissioners withdrew their
demands for the entire Northwest. They agreed that the Indians retained certain territorial rights
and boundaries in the Northwest, excluding tracts west of the Ohio ceded by past treaties. They
assured the Indians that Congress would pay a “generous compensation; not only for a large sum
to be paid at once, but for a yearly rent for the benefit of yourselves and your children forever.”
The commissioners, however, remained rigid about the main issue. They flatly stated: “We have
explicitly declared to you that we cannot now make the Ohio River the boundary between us.” 78
The commissioners confronted the Delawares who objected to the land concessions made at Fort
McIntosh, and asked them why they had “never heard complaints” regarding past concessions
made in western Pennsylvania.79 Delawares argued that those treaties had been signed under
duress and “through fear”--in essence under pressure. Chiefs, seeking a peace treaty were
“obliged to sign any paper that was laid before them.” 80 Sawaughdawunk, a chief of the
Wyandots, exemplified the obstinate stance of the tribes on the boundary-line issue. He reminded
Commissioner Timothy Pickering that “Many years ago, we all know, that the Ohio was made
the boundary. It was settled by Sir William Johnson. This side is ours; we look upon it as our
property.” 81 The planned council on the Lower Sandusky was squelched by the unyielding
positions for a geographic boundary (the Ohio River) to partition the two races. This line meant
sanction and security for the western Indian nations. For Americans, it meant territorial restraint-
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-unacceptable as policy. Washington reluctantly authorized Wayne to launch an offensive against
the allied tribes on the Glaize.82   
The Northwestern Confederation received encouragement from many interested parties to
stand against the territorial desires of the United States. In May of 1794, a group of Delawares
who were living in Spanish Louisiana (Missouri country) passed on a message from Spanish
officials to deputies of the confederation. The Spanish reminded the “Grand Fathers the
Delawares” and the other nations of the Glaize, that the Americans “have too long disturbed
[your] Country and have extinguished many of [your] Council Fires. . . .” The Spanish were
confident that the united Indian nations could defeat Wayne’s army. 83
The Spanish also conveyed a message of encouragement from the Creeks, Cherokees,
Choctaws, and Chickasaws of the southeast. They reminded the Indians to remain strong and
united and that “their Hearts are joined to ours, and that there are eleven Nations of Southern
Indians now on their feet, with Hatchet now in their Hands ready to strike” the Americans.84
Lastly, the 1,500 to 2,000 warriors who amassed at the Glaize were offered support by the first
Governor of Upper Canada John Simcoe, known as the “Great Man of Canada” who urged them
“to go & take the first Fort after another & overturn General Wayne’s army and roll them into
the Ohio.” 85 Simcoe, especially sympathized with the plight of the Delawares, a people “having
already driven from their homes, may be considered as migratory Tribes.” He maintained that if
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the Delawares moved at the whims of the United States, they “would be totally at the mercy of
that People.” 86
In August of 1794, Wayne led his well-equipped and well-trained army of three thousand
into the Glaize. His last-minute peace overtures were not answered. On August 20, Wayne’s
army, known as “The Legion,” supported by detachments of dragoons and artillery, advanced
into the Maumee Valley. Confederation Indians led by Blue Jacket, Buckongahelas, Little Turtle
and Little Otter, Egushawa, and Turkey Foot of the Ottawas, attacked the Legion at the Indian
stronghold known as the Fallen Timbers (current-day Toledo, Ohio) on the western shore of
Lake Erie in the northern part of Ohio Territory. Wayne quickly repelled the Indian attack,
countercharged the warriors with fixed bayonets, forced them “into the open,” and turned defeat
into victory.87 As the Indians suffered defeat, many sought sanction at the British outpost of
Fort Miami--they were turned away. Buckongahelas took insult when the gates of the fort
slammed shut in the faces of his Delaware warriors. Joseph Brant commented that “when the
time came the gates were shut against them” as they would do to their enemies.88 An Ottawa
chief named Kinjoino remarked that “We could not stand against the sharp end of their guns and
we ran to the river, swamps, thickets, and to the islands. . . . Our moccasins trickled blood in the
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sand. Many of our braves were killed in the river.” 89 The army then went to the deserted Indian
towns and laid waste to villages and cornfields for fifty miles along the Miami River.90
The Indian losses at Fallen Timbers were minimal (fifty killed). The Indians may have
fought on, but they suffered a psychological blow. The Legion came within pistol shot of Fort
Miami and the British guns remained silent. Once again as demonstrated in the aftermath of the
American Revolution, the British had deserted the Indian cause.91 Individual Indian nations were
left to fend for themselves.
In the spring of 1795 Joseph Brant lamented that the Indians were “in much confusion-
owing to their late bad Success and in bad Temper by not receiving any assistance from the
English.” 92 There was dissension within the Indian ranks. Delawares disclosed, at a later date,
that Indian unity did not hold together at Fallen Timbers. They remarked that they, the
Shawnees, and Wyandots would always stand their ground and fight, while tribes such as the
Chippewas and Ottawas “always ran off when hard pressed, leaving them to bear the brunt of
battle. . . .” 93
The Northwest Confederation was broken, but not shattered beyond repair. It resurrected
itself once again under the pan-Indianism of the Shawnee leaders, Tenskwatawaw (the Prophet)
and Tecumseh in 1811. In the aftermath of Fallen Timbers, however, Indians within the
confederation were in a confused state. Many scattered bands of Delawares and Chippewas from
the Glaize arrived at the Moravian Christian-Indian town of Fairfield in Canada to seek refuge.
David Zeisberger believed that other Delawares “fully intended” to leave the Northwest and “flee
to the south and New Spain” [Louisiana Territory]. Others were prepared to meet with
Americans and to remain in whatever piece of Ohio country that the United States would permit.
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And yet the Delawares had not reached a council consensus on a destination for a new
homeland.94 Delawares became bitter at the geopolitical realities that once again emerged to
threaten their nation--as scattered as it was. In the Great Council of the Lupwaaeenoawuk,
warriors rose to spew vehement rhetoric against the British who had once again abandoned them
to the United States. They vented in the council houses:
Thou hast always hitherto urged us to go to war against the States.
We have followed thee to our great loss. Look at the graves on the
Miami, look further on, where the bones of the young folk
lie. . . . Thou art the cause of their death. We will no longer be
deceived by thee.95
The American victory for the Northwest left the Delawares in a confused and uncertain
state. Some of the Ontario Delawares wished to make peace, while other bands wished to fight
on. Some Delawares were not pleased that the Moravian missionaries had arrived on the Thames,
others wanted to reestablish the Christian William Henry (Killbuck) as chief of the nation.96
Remnant Ohio Delawares of the Glaize towns went to the peace talks at Greenville to meet with
Anthony Wayne and American officials and to learn their fate. At Greenville in 1795,
Tetapachksit, the “Grand Glaize King” of the Delawares and the aging Little Turtle of the
Miamis wanted to negotiate directly with General Wayne. Joseph Brant of the Six Nations
entered into the picture, despite the fact that he and the Iroquois did not offer military support
for the confederation at Fallen Timbers. Brant took the role of chief spokesman for the Indians.97
He tried to exploit the weakened state of the defeated Indian nations and the power vacuum
created in Indian leadership by 1795. The young warriors no longer respected Little Turtle, who
desired peace before Fallen Timbers. The fearless Blue Jacket of the Shawnees lacked the wisdom
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and statesmanship of Little Turtle. Little Otter of the Ottawas was killed and another war leader,
Egushawa was severely wounded at Fallen Timbers.98
The Delawares and Wyandots deplored Brant’s play for political dominance. To gain the
support of the Delawares, Brant acknowledged that the Delawares were once again men in the
eyes of the Six Nations. In a ceremony, Brant literally removed the petticoat from a young man
and in its place, “shorn [the] Indian’s head, leaving only a little hair at the top, adorned him with
white feathers, as the warriors are accustomed to do, and painted him.” He took from the Indian
the “grubbing axe and [corn] pestle,” [the tools of a woman] and replaced them with a breechclout
and war hatchet. It was noted by David Zeisberger that Brant “made the Delaware nation not
only into men, but into warriors.” 99
This was a latent and hollow gesture by Brant and the Six Nations, who were attempting
to assert influence in the Northwest region. The Delawares were not moved by Brant’s
diplomatic ploy. They remembered that Sir William Johnson had removed the petticoat from
them over thirty years earlier and that White Eyes had established their independence from
Onondaga before the American Revolution. Despite the fractured state of the Delaware nation,
the defiance towards Iroquois attempts of suppression remained. The Delawares, brushing aside
Brant’s declaration and demonstrating their disdain for the Six Nations who failed to support
them against the American military, remarked: “Peace shall be made [with Wayne]. What use
have we for the deadly musket in our house? We have no use for it, except we use it against our
uncles, who have already often deserved it of us.” 100
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The treaty talks at Greenville began on June 16, 1795. Over 1,100 confederation Indians
of the Delaware, Wyandot, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Miami, Kickapoo and
Piankashaw nations met with Wayne and American commissioners to determine boundaries, land
cessions, and proper annuity payments. Over 381 Delawares, the most from any nation,
attended. Principal leaders among the Delawares included the Turtle leader Tetapachksit,
Buckongahelas and Hockingpomska (“Hard Walker”), representatives of the Wolf tribe, and
Kikthawenund (William Anderson), who headed the Turkey division.101 Other Delaware leaders
included Lemantanquis (Black King), Maghpiway (Red Feather), Peekeelund, Kishkopekund
(Captain Buffalo), Amenahehan (Captain Crow), and Queshawksey (George Washington).102
These leaders represented both the old and the new within the Great Council.
Despite the large number of Delaware leaders in attendance, the new headmen within the
Lupwaaeenoawuk lacked the vision and skill to reconstruct the nation. A definitive feature in
national development was the leadership of such men as White Eyes, Tamaqua, and
Pisquetomen. There were no such leaders at Greenville. The compliant and elderly Tetapachksit
was recognized by the United States as the main Delaware chief, and by Buckongahelas as “our
King.” 103 The Delawares acknowledged that they, as a defeated nation, had to be more
accommodating to American demands. Confederation concerns were no longer considered as
relevant to the Delawares--attainment of an Ohio homeland and a reunited nation were no longer a
possibility.
 The treaty was signed on August 3, after months of negotiations. The federated Indian
nations agreed to cede to the United States the southern and northeastern part of the Northwest
Territory. The United States was also given access to key rivers (the headwaters of the Wabash
and Auglaize, to name a few) and principal portages “adjoining the Indian lands” and given free
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passage through Indian country, when “found convenient.”104 Article V of the treaty
acknowledged the Indians’ rights to certain areas for hunting and settlement.105 Any hopes that
the Ohio River would remain as a boundary between Indians and the United States were
squelched forever. Buckongahelas, humbled by defeat and reduced in stature by United States
officials during the negotiations, offered the sentiments of the Lupwaaeenoawuk and the
Delaware nation: “All who know me, know me to be a man and a warrior, and I now declare, that
I will, for the future, be as true and steady a friend to the United States as I have heretofore been
an active enemy.” 106
For the Delawares there was a prophetic finality to Buckongahelas’s rhetoric. They
would never again, as a nation, take up the hatchet against the United States. They would also
suffer continual territorial dislocations and migrations westward. In 1797, Zeisberger noted that
the Delaware nation was “scattered at present from Canada to the Mississippi, and their present
chief [Tetapachksit] has little weight and authority.” 107 John Heckewelder, ever the idyllic
promoter of Lenape national eminence and destiny, lamented that at the turn of the nineteenth
century Delaware nationhood was “brought down to such a low state;” a once “great and
powerful nation” in decline.108
In the aftermath of the Indians’ defeat at Fallen Timbers and the Greenville peace
settlement, the Delawares entered into an era of uncertainty and instability. Most importantly, a
strong national unity or consensus became even more difficult to attain as Delaware bands moved
to the new frontiers of the United States and the safe havens of Canada.
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The post-Revolutionary Delaware nation was in a state of flux. Factionalism in the Great
Council, the lack of a strong leader with vision, and a disastrous Indian war suspended national
development. Delaware unity and a sense of direction were sacrificed to participate in the pan-
Indian alliance of the Northwest Confederation. Most importantly, the homeland of the Ohio
country, the region that spawned the growth of a Delaware nation, was now a memory.  
Despite the weakened and dispersed state of the nation, Delawares pondered their future
as a nation. They embraced a hope--enhanced by their resilient nature as they entered a new
century. This quality could be found in a Delaware prayer that acknowledged:
We belong unto a nation
Which now shattered, wrecked, and severed,
Still belongs to the Great Spirit,
Who announces us His own,
And has pointed out a highway
We may travel to his realm,
And for this we’re very thankful.109
By the early 1800s, the Delaware nation was adrift, diplomatically and militarily unable
to stop the advances of American expansion. Fragments of the Delaware nation moved west,
once again in search of new thresholds, referred to by the Delawares as “Kwulakan.”
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Conclusion
For the Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes of Delaware Indians, the common self-interests
and similar challenges which resulted in nation building derived from the struggle for political
autonomy and union and for the defense of a new homeland. From 1730 to 1795, the Delaware
Indian nation slowly emerged and reached the apex of development, only to undergo a
fragmentation and quick decline.
Much of this national construction was the result of shared historical experiences. The
detrimental consequences of the Iroquois/Pennsylvania alliance of the early 1730s and European
settlement stifled Delaware independence among all the Delaware bands and served as a
contributing factor in the Delaware westward exodus--a migration that both accelerated the
process of a national identity and the need for a more centralized structure of leadership. The
Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes moved from their traditional homes in the Delaware and
Susquehanna river valleys to adopt a new regional homeland, first in the Allegheny and Beaver
valleys of western Pennsylvania, and then further west in the Muskingum Valley of Ohio.
The western migration into these regions enhanced the sense of ethnic commonality and
eventual political cohesion among the phratries. Leaders such as Shingas, Tamaqua, Pisquetomen,
and Custaloga epitomized strong leadership on a local level. At the same time, these phratry
loyalties contributed to a growing collective Delaware identity. These were innovative leaders
who gained influence and prominence as the voice of western Delawares. These leaders had the
diplomatic skill to veer the Delawares away from the subservient position that had been
established for them by the Covenant Chain, without destroying their ties with the British. The
appearance of these important leaders at places such as Kittanning, Shannopin’s Town, and the
Kuskuskies, combined with deference to phratry strength, was crucial to national progress.
 Delawares, who finally resided in the western reaches of Ohio country, were comprised
of two distinct entities, one being the Turtle-Turkey coalition of Unami speakers, the other being
the Wolf contingent of Munsee speakers. Eventually, when the historical circumstances of the
Seven Years’ War threatened the new homeland, western Delawares politically organized to
create a more unified and centralized structure. The Delaware animal tribes fused together as a
tribal nation by 1765. This is particularly evident during the negotiations of the phratry leaders
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with Colonel Bouquet and Sir William Johnson in the aftermath of Pontiac’s uprising. Despite
the lure of pan-Indian movements, the course of Delaware nationhood remained uninterrupted.
 In this process of national development, the Great Council of the Lupwaaeenoawuk
served as the lifeblood of national polity and helped to solidify the uniting of the three tribes.
Delaware bands and tribes eventually embraced a common vision of nation--a political entity,
nationalized in the Great Council House at Goschachgunk, structured in time of crisis to counter
Anglo-American power and aggression during the later part of the eighteenth century. In this
sense, the frontier expansion of British America intensified the Delaware the urgency for
unification and centralization and thus forced Anglo-Americans to take notice and respond
accordingly.
The Delaware nation, however, was forged in tension. While contact with Euro-
Americans spurred the call for Delawares to construct a political nation, this same contact also
created the factions that slowly destroyed any chance of a permanent and stable nation.
Delawares did not have the maturation, historical reference, or time to work out the snags in the
centralized structure. Delawares, despite the attempts of the civil leader White Eyes to lead a
pro-American nation and Moravian missionaries to guide the nation into a neutral stance, became
strongly polarized in the Great Council and could not escape military involvement in America’s
war for independence. Paradoxically, the political forum, that was a definitive feature of a
functioning political nation, pulled Delawares, in need of centralization, apart.
 In its theoretical context, nationhood was a result of an adjustment or adaptation made
by Indians in times of uncertainty. It was never a completed process. John Moore notes that the
Cheyenne nation comprised a collection of migrating Algonkian-speaking bands or “ bunches.”
Upon their entrance to the Great Plains in the early nineteenth century, these groups, to protect
and strenghthen themselves from neighboring Indian nations, pressed for social and
political consolidation. Most importantly, despite the attempt of Cheyennes to unify, full
integration and homogenization was “never completely successful” as political strife always
existed. As an example, the peace and war factions of the Cheyennes steadily clashed for
dominance in national policy. When immigrants, soldiers, and miners poured into Cheyenne
country after the 1850s, Cheyenne society underwent drastic change. Cheyennes became locked
in continual conflict with the United States. The equilibrium that had traditionally existed
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between the civil and military was shattered. The peace or civil chiefs were swept to the side and
the war leaders and military societies emerged as the national voice of the Cheyennes.1  
Moore’s analogy could be readily applied to the Delawares during the American
Revolution. At that time, Delawares struggled with factionalism as they tried to maintain
neutrality. Captain Pipe, a Wolf leader, opposed the Pro-American leanings of White Eyes in the
Great Council of the Delawares. In frustration, Captain Pipe and his Wolf tribe seceded from the
Delaware council fires. This schism was only temporary, but it demonstrated a fragile tribal
union during a time of crisis when Delawares in the Ohio strove to achieve peace and hold on to
their national homeland on the Muskingum River. According to Moore, Cheyenne factionalism,
despite its moments of disruption, reflected positive development and the even temperament
among leaders to work out and maintain a consensus on a national level. However, the Delaware
story is much different. The chasm between the Unami and Munsee contingents in the Great
Council demonstrated that consensus, through tempered diplomatic persuasion and debate, was a
fleeting ideal. In a time of crisis, there was now an intense power struggle between two important
leaders who advocated two different directions--a dangerous dilemma for a struggling nation.   
For the most part, the cohesiveness and vitality of a unified nation was short-lived. The
stress of a major war broke apart the fragile political unity that had been a continuous struggle for
the Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes to achieve. Without the anchoring guidance of White Eyes,
the Delawares were vulnerable to the machinations of the British and the militant goading of the
allied western Indian nations. Most importantly, the Wolf division gained preeminence over the
Unamis as the makers of policy. By 1780 and into the mid 1790s, the war policies of Captain
Pipe and Buckongahelas of the Wolf division swayed the Lupwaaeenoawuk down a devastating
course. The Gnadenhutten Massacre of 1782 broke the back of the Delawares and forever ended
a close, or at least trusting, relationship with the United States. In 1785, Pipe and a minority
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Wolf faction went against the grain of council consensus and attempted to appease Americans by
signing away more Delaware land during the treaty talks at Fort McIntosh.
 After 1795, the Indian defeat at Fallen Timbers and the land cessions of the Greenville
Treaty weakened the Delaware nation at a time when strength was needed to stop American
territorial expansion. Buckongahelas and Tetapachksit’s days were numbered. New leaders lacked
the spirit, will, and diplomatic sway to repel future territorial demands of the United States.
Delawares moved piecemeal further west to Missouri, Kansas, north to Wisconsin, and into
Canada. Like many Indian nations east of the Mississippi, the Delawares no longer exerted the
military and political presence and influence they had enjoyed during the Seven Years’ War and
American Revolution.
There is not an uplifting ending to the story of the emergence of the Delaware nation. Its
history, in essence, is typical of the Native American experience during the colonial and
expansionist eras of America. It is a story of futile adaptations in the face of overwhelming odds.
Many Indian nations and tribes underwent great transformation to counter the territorial designs
of the Anglo world--a form of political or cultural modification to counter a massive racial
invasion. Some, such as the Iroquois Confederation, expanded their military and diplomatic reach
to gain a long-standing preeminence in the colonial Indian world. The Seneca nation of the
Iroquois Confederation suffered decline and then a spiritual rebirth, through the Handsome Lake
religion. Others such as the Susquehannocks of central Pennsylvania and the Huron
Confederation of the Great Lakes were overwhelmed by European invasion, chronic military
conflict, and disease and were thus obliterated--their names swept from the continent. Still
others, such as the three tribes of Delawares, gravitated around their cultural and ethnic
commonalities and united under a national structure. They created a new, though tenuous,
political order.
This nation slowly evolved throughout the eighteenth century and yet rapidly fell apart.
By the 1800s, the Delawares were sapped of military and diplomatic strength and a homeland.
The Delaware development of nation demonstrates the irony of history. While Delaware western
migration during the eighteenth century served as the means for building a nation, relocation
during the nineteenth century had the opposite result. One migration can be seen as seeking a
renewal and revigoration, the later represents a flight from the continual territorial and cultural
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assaults by the United States. During the nineteenth century, the Delaware nation became further
diluted, as the various bands moved sporadically in many different directions throughout North
America. The Delawares became displaced wanderers and unwanted refugees as they moved west
to the prairies and plains. Other Indian tribes and nations west of the Mississippi had yet to face
the fate of the Lenape and Munsee people, collectively known as the Delaware nation.
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Epilogue-- The Delaware Migrations Continue
At the turn of the nineteenth century, bands of Delawares, along with Shawnees, and
Wyandots were restricted to the northwestern section of Ohio and the St. Mary’s and St.
Joseph’s region of Indiana.1 American settlers quickly breached the Greenville Treaty boundary
line, particularly the western boundary. Delaware leaders asked the United States government to
“have a great road Cut that it may prevent the White people from Settling on their hunting
grounds. . . .” 2  The Delaware nation was wracked by territorial dislocation, political
factionalism, and geographical fragmentation. Once again the Delawares became migrants and
wanderers, in search of a new homeland and desperate to reunify the nation.
From 1801 to 1808, the main body of the Delawares, at the invitation of the Miamis and
Potawatomis, relocated to a series of towns on the west fork of the White River (between
current-day Muncie and Indianapolis) deeper into Indiana Territory. Buckongahelas’s followers
lived at Wapicomemoke in the eastern region, while Chief Anderson lived to the west at
Wapeminskink, known by the Indians as the “chestnut tree place.” Other major Delaware towns
along the White River included Tetapachksit’s Town and Hockingpomska’s Town.3
Buckongahelas, recognized by most Delawares as the “leading person in the Council,”
worked closely with Tetapachksit in the attempts to “cement [the] nation more closely together”
during those uncertain times. In an old strategy to gain stability and unification, the Delaware
council invited the Moravians to establish missions among their people on the White River. This
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time, the missionaries were not permitted to attend council meetings. The Moravians were
brought back only to help strengthen a relocated Delaware society, not for political input.4
While the Delawares attempted to build stable communities on the White River, President
Thomas Jefferson became eager to open up new territories to fulfill his vision of an agrarian
America. He instructed territorial governor William Henry Harrison to gain more land cessions
from the nations of the Northwest. Harrison targeted, through forceful negotiations, the lands
surrounding the Wabash River.5 On August 18, 1804 at Vincennes, Tetapachksit, Buckongahelas,
and Hockingpomska, together with principal leaders of the Piankashaws, ceded their claims to a
“tract of country between the Ohio and the Wabash rivers,” which included a large section of
southern Indiana.6
This treaty was not well received by the confederated tribes, who once again argued that
individual nations could not cede land without the consent of all. At this time, the anti-American
rhetoric of the Shawnee leader, Tenskwatawa (the Prophet) and his followers located in multi-
tribal towns at Tippecanoe on the upper Wabash, reached the Delaware towns on the White
River. Traditionalists who favored the pan-Indianism of Tenskwatawa and his brother,
Tecumseh, turned on the signers of the Vincennes Treaty. Because of their agreement with
Americans, the ancient Tetapachksit and the once revered Buckongahelas fell out of favor among
the Delaware people. Buckongahelas died in 1805 and those Delawares who followed the
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Prophet accused Tetapachksit of performing the witchcraft that caused the death of
Buckongahelas. A group of Delawares, one the son of Tetapachksit, seized the chief,
tomahawked him and threw him alive into a fire. Billy Patterson, the nephew of Tetepachksit and
chief interpreter at Vincennes was also thrown into the fire. Hockingpomska, the third signer,
was rescued by a group of Delaware supporters.7
The Delaware Great Council weathered the storm of factionalism. Despite the overtures
of the Prophet and Tecumseh, only a handful of defiant Delaware warriors fought against the
United States military led by William Henry Harrison at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811.8
Delawares remained true to Buckongahelas’s promise never to fight the Americans. On August
19, 1813 over two hundred warriors led by Chief Anderson, together with Wyandots and
Shawnees fought pro-British Potawatomis at the mouth of the Maumee River in Ohio.9
In 1818 the Delawares ended their stay in Indiana by signing the Treaty of St. Mary’s.
Anderson, Big Bear, The Big Cat, Captain Killbuck and Captain White Eyes, the latter two being
descendents of the Revolutionary War leaders, ceded all land claims in Indiana and removed west
of the Mississippi River to Missouri. The United States government agreed to provide land for
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the Delawares and to furnish the boats and horses needed to cross the Mississippi.10 John
Heckewelder observed that the Delaware nation, particularly the Wolf phratry, was in disarray,
with settlements in Canada, Ohio, and “on the waters of the Wabash . . . A considerable number
of them [have] crossed the Mississippi.”11 Other Munsees moved into Wisconsin along with the
Stockbridge Mohicans to form a community that exists to this day.12 In 1829, Welsinqua, Billy
Montour, and Isaac Hill removed the last remnants of over one hundred and thirty Delawares and
Mingos in the Upper Sandusky region of the Ohio. They left to join other Delawares west of the
Mississippi.13 With regard to the western Delawares, Welsinqua (Captain Pipe) noted that the
Ohio Delawares were “desirous of following and uniting ourselves with them, that we might again
be one people.”14   
By the early 1820's Indiana and Illinois, for the most part, purged themselves of Indians
by removing Delawares, Kickapoos, Ottawas, Chippewas, Potawatomis, Peorias and other tribes
westward into the territories of Missouri, Kansas, and Spanish-controlled Texas. Illinois
eventually ejected the Sauk and Fox allies, in the aftermath of Black Hawk’s War in 1832.15
When Indiana wanted to open the Wabash Valley to white settlement, the Delawares migrated
westward on their own initiative. Indian agent and clergyman Jedediah Morse noted, “their
peculiar aversion to having white people for neighbors, induced them to remove to the
westward.” Sadly, he added, that a once “numerous and powerful” Delaware people were
reduced to a “mere handful.”16
                                                
10 Grant Foreman, The Last Trek of the Indians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1946), 37; Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians, 274; Weslager The Delaware Indians, 352.
11 Heckewelder, An Account of The Indian Nations, 68.
12 Jay Miller, “Delaware,” in Hoxie, ed., Encyclopedia of North American Indians, 159.
Another community of Munsees eventually moved with bands of Ojibwas to Kansas Territory.
13 Treaty between the United States and a “band of Delaware Indians,” January 2, 1830,
in  New American State Papers, 1789-1860: Indian Affairs, Cochran, ed., 4: 204-205, 225-226;
Foreman, Last Trek of the Indians, 56. Welsinqua, related to Captain Pipe, inherited the name of
the Wolf leader.
14 Welsinqua (Captain Pipe) to President John Quincy Adams, Camp near Upper
Sandusky, September 3. 1828, in New American State Papers, 1789-1860: Indian Affairs,
Cochran, ed., 4: 204-205.
15 Ibid., 38-44.
16 Jedediah Morse, A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian
Affairs (1822; reprint, New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970), 90. Indiana Delawares
196
Their residency in Missouri was both unpleasant and brief. Delawares, with other eastern
Indians, moved into the Ozark forests of Osage Indian homeland. Cherokees, Delawares,
Shawnees, and Choctaws swelled the region and by April 1824 there were over two thousand of
these hunters cutting into most of the regional game, leading to a frustration and “collective rage”
among Osage warriors.17 In the fall of 1824 Osages stole horses from the Delawares, and in the
chase to retake their horses, the Osages killed the son of Delaware Chief Anderson. In a “cycle of
revenge killings,” Delawares allied themselves with Shawnees and Kickapoos and preyed upon
Osage hunters along the Neosho and Verdigris rivers.18 Despite a peace council between the
eastern tribes and the Osages held in St. Louis in 1826, the violence in Missouri continued until
1827 when a greatly weakened Osage tribe sought a more binding peace.19
Delawares also suffered economic deprivation in their Missouri homes. In February 1824
Delaware chiefs, Anderson, Black Beaver, and Natcoming addressed William Clark the
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in St. Louis, on the plight of the Delawares:
Last summer a number of our people died just for want of something to live on.
We have got in a country where we do not find all as stated to us when we was
asked to swap lands with you and we do not get as much as was promised us at
the Treaty of St. Mary’s. . . . We have found a poor hilly stony country and the
worst of all no game to be found on it to live on.20
 
On September 24, 1829, the United States negotiated a new treaty with the Delawares.
The Treaty of Council Camp canceled Delaware claims to land in Missouri and allocated them
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tracts of land in Kansas Territory, land that had previously been ceded by the Osage and Kansa
Indians. Those Delawares and Shawnees who lived together in Cape Girardeau were moved west
to reservations on the Kansas River. The remainder of Delawares, who had previously settled in
Texas, “were driven back by the Texans to the Choctaw Territory” [Indian Territory].21
Kansas became a Mecca, or as James Merrell contends, an “Indian asylum in the West,”
for the eastern Indian nations of the government’s Removal Policy.22 These tribes were given a
“band of country nearly fifty miles wide” in eastern and western Kansas.23 The Delawares and
other dislocated tribes were thrust against the periphery of the American frontier. Residing in this
territorial environment of reservations, Delawares became caught between the colliding forces of
assimilation policies of the government and the traditionalism of the Great Plains Indian nations
to the west.
The Delawares were in a precarious position. The plains and prairies of the 1830s were
regions of competition and struggle among the established regional tribes and immigrant nations.
There was a lack of racial cohesion between the eastern immigrant and plains Indians, who were
competing for game on the massive bison ranges.24 The Delawares in Kansas were besieged by
both the pressures of assimilation into white society and negative interaction with the Great
Plains Indians. 
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The Delaware reservation was located on the eastern border of Kansas along the Missouri
and Kansas rivers in present day Wyandotte County. The line extended westward to Fort
Leavenworth, a total of 924,160 acres. An outlet was added which pushed Delaware land to over
2.8 million acres.25 This outlet was ten miles wide and extended from the northwest corner of the
Delaware reservation to the bison grounds of the plains, a distance of over 200 miles.26
The reservation represented a promised land for the Delawares, a place where they could
live without being crowded and pressured by white settlement. On the Delaware reservation, the
government constructed a sawmill, gristmill, and a blacksmith shop and supplied them with
wagons, tools, and a full year’s provisions.27 The Delaware Great Council permitted Methodists
and Baptists, and eventually Moravians, to build missions on the reservation. 28 The
Presbyterian Reverend Samuel Allis entered the Delaware reservation in July of 1835 and saw
about “1,000 souls,” plus a “Government teacher & blacksmith.” Allis noted that the Delawares
raised “some wheat, considerable corn & vegetables.” He saw that their land was rich and offered
ample space for their cattle, horses, sheep, and hogs.29
Delaware leaders hoped for a more stable and peaceful community than they had
experienced in Missouri. When Major Clifton Wharton of the 1st Regiment of United States
Dragoons met with Otos and Pawnees in 1844, he was asked by Delaware chiefs to deliver a
message to the Pawnees who lived to the north of the Delaware reserve: “They desire to be at
peace with you. They say that since they had ceased to make War their people lived happily--
that they raise plenty of corn for themselves & cattle-- and they urge you to follow their
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example.” Wharton then added that he knew how happy the Delawares were. He stated:
“Pawnees, imitate them and you will be happy and prosperous also.” 30
The dismembered Delaware nation was not in the happy state that many had hoped for.
Negative experiences awaited Delawares when they came in contact with the Indians to the west.
When Delawares lived in Missouri, their energetic young hunters chased the bison on the Great
Plains. This brought them in contact with Indian hunters who resented competitors for the rich
gaming herds of the Plains. Delaware hunters were constantly ambushed and “according to their
custom” and conceptions of manhood, they retaliated as a way to save face.31
The Delawares and other immigrant tribes were seen by the Great Plains Indian nations as
“a race between the whites, and their own Indian people.” 32 As a migratory tribe, new to the
plains, they hunted through the outlet between the Platte and Kansas rivers. The Pawnees
dominated this bison territory and defended their domain to such an extreme, that “it was death
for a strange hunter to intrude.” 33 When the United States placed the Delawares in the outlet,
the Delawares “could only maintain a footing in their new homes, by incessant fighting.” 34 By
doing so, they became bitter enemies of the Pawnees, Lakota Sioux, Cheyennes, and Comanches.
Artist George Catlin, who visited and painted portraits of Indian people from the prairies
of the mid-west to the Great Plains, noted that the Delawares and other migrant Indians were in a
difficult position, for they were scattered and driven westward and “planted . . . on the borders
of new enemies” where they were forced to “take up their weapons in self-defense, and fight for
the ground they have been planted on.” 35 He observed that they had “been left on the frontier,
surrounded by civilized neighbors-- [and] wilder tribes.” 36
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Though Catlin pitied these immigrants, he was astonished to discover that small groups of
Delawares, or, as he called them, “adventurous myrmidons,” visited “remote tribes” as much as
2,000 miles away and “solemnized the articles of everlasting peace with them.” 37 This
illustrated the ability of the Delawares to adapt to new circumstances when they relocated to the
Kansas plains. They became expert bison hunters and dedicated scouts for United States military
expeditions. The American author Washington Irving visited a Delaware hunting camp and
commented:
The expeditions of the Delawares, whether of war or hunting, are wide and
fearless. A small band of them will penetrate far into these dangerous and hostile
wilds, and will push their encampments even to the Rocky Mountains.38
Delawares also served as scouts and hunters for John Fremont's expeditions to the west
as he journeyed to the Rocky Mountains and California in 1842 and 1845. Fremont admired the
Delawares for “performing their duties with remarkable courage and fidelity.”39 Delawares were
considered by most of the Plains tribes to be “the best warriors amongst the Indians.” 40 The
American historian, Francis Parkman, visited the Delawares in the 1846 and noted that the
“Delaware, once the peaceful allies of William Penn, the tributaries of the Iroquois, are now the
most adventurous and dreaded warriors upon the prairie.” He added that they were fighting most
of the plains tribes and “sending out their little war parties as far as the Rocky Mountains, and
into the Mexican territories.” Unlike the prosperous Shawnees who “are tolerable farmers,” he
lamented that the Delawares who were wanderers and warriors “dwindle every year.”41  
 Delawares collided with the nomadic Cheyennes further to the west. These two
Algonquian people symbolized the meeting of east and west among American Indians on the
Great Plains. The Cheyennes were a relatively new nation, comprised of many bands that had
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grouped together in the Black Hills throughout the eighteenth century. The Delawares were the
“Grandfathers” of all Algonquians. Cheyennes, however, did not differentiate between the
different eastern nations. They called Delawares and Shawnees by the name of Savane (possibly
a misinterpretation of the English word Shawnee). Early contact between Cheyennes and
Delawares, occurred at Bent’s Fort, a trading post located outside of Kansas Territory in
southeastern Colorado. The owners of the trading company, Charles and William Bent hired
Delawares as teamsters, herders, and hunters.42 Eventually the Delawares and Cheyennes
became mortal enemies. After several violent confrontations between the two nations, the
Cheyennes informed Lieutenant J.W. Abert of Fremont’s command that they desired “to bear
pacific proposals to the Delawares, who they feared greatly.” In August of 1845 the two Indian
nations met in a peace council at Bent’s Fort.43
The Delawares opened the council by passing the pipe to the Cheyenne chiefs. All
members sat on buffalo robes and Bill Gurey acted as interpreter for both parties. Sign language
became an “important part” of this exchange. “The meeting was conducted throughout with great
decorum.” 44 Old Bark of the Cheyennes addressed the Delawares:
We have been in great dread less you should make war upon us, and, although our
women and children have been suffering for food, were afraid to venture forth, for
we are now weak and poor and our ground diminished to a small circle. The whites
have been amongst us and destroyed our buffalo, antelope, and deer . . . but we are
so desirous to keep peaceful that we take no notice of it, for we regard the
Delawares and whites as one people.45
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The two parties reached a temporary understanding, but intertribal animosity between the
two peoples continued and was inevitable as long as Delaware hunters infringed on Cheyenne
hunting grounds. It was part of the Delaware nation’s difficulties in adjusting to this new region.
The early years of the Delawares in Kansas Territory reflected a nation in transformation.
In Kansas Territory they straddled both worlds; that of white civilization as it settled on the
prairies and the horse Indian culture of the Great Plains. Their stay in Kansas, as in Missouri,
was brief. Demographic pressures regarding the bison herds, made many of the Plains tribes
resentful toward immigrant Indians. As early as 1843, the Lakota Sioux boasted that they would
“exterminate the tribes south of them--as the Pawnees, Delawares, Shawnees.” 46
It was, however, the United States government and not a pan-Indian movement of Plains
tribes that eventually removed Delawares and other migrant nations from Kansas. The
Manypenny Treaties, which started in 1854 and were concluded in 1866, opened the doors for
the building of railroads, towns, settlements, and farms in Kansas. The Delaware Great Council,
in what would be one of its last actions, agreed to sell the Delaware reserve to the Leavenworth,
Pawnee, and Western Railroad and the Missouri River Railroad Company. Representing the
Delaware nation was the head chief John Conner (Turtle), his assistants Sarcoxie (Turtle), and
Charles Journeycake (Wolf), and a group of councilors. The Turkey division was not represented
in this transaction.47    
 The Manypenny Treaty of 1866 allowed for Delawares to remove to Indian Territory
(current day northwestern Oklahoma) where the Cherokees gave them tracts of land.48 The
treaty also stipulated that family heads that “elected to dissolve their tribal relations and to
become citizens of the United States” could remain in Kansas and keep eighty acres of
reservation land. Those who insisted on keeping their tribal ties were forced to leave their
reservations and make the journey to Indian Territory on horseback and in buggies, wagons, and
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ox-carts.49 The dispersed Delawares, suffered constant loss of land and territorial dislocations at
the hands of the United States. Continually pushed westward, in the first half of the nineteenth
century, the Delawares reached their final destination in northwestern Oklahoma.
In Indian Territory, the Delawares, in order to live on Cherokee land, gave up their tribal
status and became part of the Cherokee nation. They were forced to recognize the Cherokee
headmen as their own leaders. All newborn Delaware children were considered to be Cherokee. In
1874, a band of Delawares from the Anadarko Indian Agency merged with and placed themselves
under the control of the Caddo tribe. Eventually, the Delaware Great Council lost relevance when
both the United States and Cherokee nation failed to acknowledge their principal leaders.
Throughout the ensuing years, Delaware leaders, such as James Conner, Black Beaver, Jim Bob,
John Secondine, and John Sarcoxie, served their people in the capacity of unofficial chiefs.50 In
1894 the Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the Curtis Act, abolished the title of chief among the
Delawares. A president presided over the Tribal Business Committee and its body of five
prominent men. This became the new governing body among the Delawares, despite their non-
tribal status.51      
More changes came, which further broke apart the Delaware nation. From 1902 to 1907,
Delaware lands in Oklahoma that were purchased from the Cherokees were placed under
allotment. Each head of the Delaware household received one hundred and sixty acres, while
excess land was sold to white ranchers and settlers. Delawares and Cherokees were continuously
embroiled in legal disputes over annuity payments and property rights. In 1979, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs once again dealt the Delawares a severe blow when it permanently terminated the
tribal status of the Delawares and Shawnees who lived among the Cherokees in eastern
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Oklahoma. After lengthy court battles of twenty years, eastern Oklahoma Delawares, as well as
all other Delawares, were given back their tribal status.52
The Delaware history is an epic of tragic dislocations, migrations, and the search for new
thresholds and opportunities. All previous migrations became mechanisms used to attain and
hold on to a sense of nation. After 1795, this unity became impossible to hold on to as Delawares
were scattered to the four corners of North America. The animal tribes of Turtle, Turkey, and
Wolf lost their political significance and were once again relegated to represent only ethnic and
clan bonds. In Kansas, United States officials diminished the significance of the individual
phratries and referred to them as mere “bands” of the Delaware nation.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Delawares of Oklahoma remained absorbed
into the Cherokee nation. The Delawares, however, remained committed to the concept of nation.
The promise of a unified nation is part of their persona, linking together the past with the present
and future. As they once removed themselves from the dominance of the Six Nations, Delawares
sought autonomy and recognition as a nation. In 1992, Delawares from Oklahoma, Wisconsin and
Ontario were brought together to form the Delaware Nation Grand Council of North America--a
reinvention and reemergence of the wise men known as the Lupwaaeenoawuk. Currently the
United States Bureau of Indian affairs recognizes the Delaware tribe of eastern Oklahoma and the
Delaware tribe of western Oklahoma. The Canadian government acknowledges the Delaware tribe
of the Thames in Ontario. The Stockbridge-Munsee tribe of Mohican Indians, residing in
Wisconsin, acknowledges that they are the “Wolf Sachem” of the Delaware Indian nation.53
While Delaware groups remain geographically dispersed, a sense of a common history and culture
unifies the Delawares into an awareness of themselves as being components of a prestigious and
influential Indian nation.
                                                
52 Lee Sultzman, website for the Delaware Tribe of Oklahoma, 26-27. Available from
lenape@cowboy.net, INTERNET; Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 440-456.
53 Bureau of Indian Affairs website on federally recognized tribes. Available from
http://www.doi.gov; INTERNET; The Stockbridge Munsee Tribe of Mohican Indians website.
Available from homepage/mohican; INTERNET.
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Appendix 1: An Ethno-Political Definition of the Delaware Indians
A key point of contention in the study of Delaware Indian history is the confusion and
historical debate on what ethnic and political groups comprised the Delaware peoples. Much of
the misunderstanding has been rooted on false information or careless observations and
assertions.
The Lenape “original people,” “common people,” or “original folk” were comprised
primarily of three distinct groups of Indians from the Algonquian (Algonkian) linguistic family.
They consisted of the proto-Lenapes, which included the northern Unamis (“People down the
river”), the southern Unamis (also referred to Unalachtigos, “People who live near the ocean”),
and the Munsees or Minisinks (“People of the stony country”). The Unami-speakers lived close
by one another on both banks of the Delaware River. The Munsee-speakers lived to the north, in
the lower Hudson River Valley and at the forks of the Delaware River.1 According to Paul A. W.
Wallace, the Unami and Munsee boundaries “were nebulous.” 2 These linguistic groups would
also be strongly identified with their respective extended clans or animal phratries. They included
the Turtle (Poko unko) and Turkey (Pele) tribes, who were Unami-speakers, and the Wolf tribe,
who were Munsees.3 In 1600, there was an estimated population of 8,000 Unami and Munsee
Indians.4
                                                
1 William A. Hunter, “Sub Divisions of the Delawares,” 28; Goddard, “Delaware” in
Trigger ed., Handbook of North American Indians, 215; Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 31-32,
43-47; Hitakonanu'laxk, Grandfathers Speak, 6. See the correspondence of Nora Thompson
Dean, a renowned Unami linguist, regarding the phrase “common folk” in Herbert C. Kraft, “The
Northern Lenape in Prehistoric and Early Colonial Times,” in Kraft, ed., The Lenape Indians, 1.
2 Paul A. W. Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania, second edition, revised by William A.
Hunter (Harrisburg: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission,
1993), 52.
3 The Moravian missionaries, David Zeisberger and John Heckewelder adhered to a
Unami=Turtle, Unalachtigo=Turkey, and Munsee=Wolf equation, with regards to the ethno-
political structure of the Delawares. This terminology has been debated for generations among
scholars. See Zeisberger in Schwarze and Hulbert, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,” 27, 92;
Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 51-52.
4 Swanton, ed., Indian Tribes of North America, 54-55. These numbers dwindled to 3,000
during the eighteenth century and during the Census of 1910, the Delawares were estimated at a
population of 985.
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The English eventually classified these people collectively as “Delaware” Indians--a
geographic, rather than ethno-political designation.5 Originally, the Lenape Indians resented the
term. To appease their discontent, the English reminded them that Virginia governor Thomas
West was “ a great white chief.” Ironically, West never met the native peoples who lived along
the “de la Warr Bay” and would be named as such in his honor. 6 
Throughout the mid to late eighteenth century, the Moravian missionaries, David
Zeisberger and John Heckewelder knew the Delawares on an intimate basis and were privy to the
social and political composition of the Delaware tribes. Both maintain that the Delaware nation
was ordered along totemic lines. They contend that the Turtle, Turkey, and Wolf tribes or
phratries were hierarchically ranked and comprised the Delaware nation. Unami or Packoango
was the Turtle tribe (“unfeathered animal”), Unalachtigo or Blem (“scratching fowl”) the Turkey
group, and Munsee or Ptucksit, (“round paws”), the Wolf tribe. Countless scholars, at times, out
of convenience, acknowledge this “tripartite geographical division” of Turkey, Wolf, and Turtle
tribes.7
Others have been deceitful in the application of Zeisberger’s and Heckewelder’s research.
The Wallam Olum, a pictographic chronicle of symbols drawn on sticks, is purported to be the
tribal history as recorded by the Lenape Indian people. Also referred to as the Red Record, this
epic saga tells of a time during the early 1600s when the Lenape population and territory
expanded. To accommodate this growth and to remain a cohesive nation, the sachem and the
council of these people decided to restructure the tribe by dividing the Lenape into three
divisions. The dividing line of the three groups became the “upstream, midstream, and
downstream regions of the Delaware River.” 8 The record states that to remain strong, the
Lenape formed three tribes which would constitute their nation, “Three were desired, so three
                                                
5 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 26; Weslager, The Delaware Indians,
31-32; Wallace, Teedyuscung,  6-7.
6  Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations, 26.
7 Zeisberger in Schwarze and Hulbert, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,” 92; Heckewelder, An
Account of the Indian Nations, 50-51, 110, 246; Wallace, Teedyuscung, 6-12.
8 David McCutchen, trans., The Red Record, The Wallam Olum: The Oldest Native
North American History (Garden City Park, New York: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1993),
137; Brinton, Lenape and Their Legends, 214.
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were to be: Unamini, Minsimini, Chikimini.” They became known as the Unamis, Munsees, and
Unalachtigos.9
The Red Record was the supposed written history of the Delaware people from their
existence in Siberia to the 1600s. The entries are fragmented in its explanation of Delaware
history from 1620-1820. This record was recorded by making pictographic drawings on sticks. I
say purported for Constantine Rafinesque translated this cryptic record from 1826-1833. This
scholar obtained these sticks from a medical doctor who, in turn, had received them earlier from
an elderly Delaware record keeper who gave the sticks to the doctor as payment for medical
treatment. Though Rafinesque was a professor of botany and natural history, and modern
languages at Transylvania University in Kentucky, the Red Score in most cases, should be
approached as Rafinesque’s literary embellishment, a fantasy, and a corruption of Delaware oral
history and the writings of Zeisberger and Heckewelder, rather than historical fact.10
This epic tale of tribal migration and reorganization was mythical in origin and not
grounded on historical evidence. It remains another piece of literature that contributes to the
confusion on what groups of people comprised the Delaware Indians. There are, however,
certainties. Many historians agree with the historical record and the assertion that the Delaware
tribes during most of the seventeenth century were “dispersed in numerous autonomous villages
and communities throughout the Delaware River drainage system” (eastern Pennsylvania and
New Jersey).11 These tribes were culturally and linguistically different at the time of first contact
with Europeans during the seventeenth century.12
An intense debate has raged among historians, ethnologists, and anthropologists regarding
the social and political organization of these Delaware tribes. Past and current scholars have
locked horns on the issue of what ethnic-political-geographic groups comprised the people
known collectively as Delawares.
                                                
9 Ibid., 136.
10 For a total (and scholarly) dismantling of the Wallum Olum see David M. Ostreicher,
“Unmasking the Walum Olum: A 19th Century Hoax.” Bulletin of the Archaeological Society of
New Jersey 49 (1994): 1-44.
11 C.A. Weslager, “More About the Unalachtigo,” Pennsylvania Archaeologist 44 (Sept.
1975): 41.
12 Sugrue, “The Peopling and Depeopling of Early Pennsylvania,” 30.
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 The crux of the argument revolved around the three main tribes of Delawares and their
significance to one another and whether the three tribes functioned as a distinct political group or,
as other scholars have questioned, whether three existed at all. C. A. Weslager, the Rutgers
scholar and specialist on Delaware Indian history, writes that the Munsee, southern Unami,
northern Unami (known as Unalimi), and Unalachtigo tribes designated geographic regions and
were not indicative of distinct political groups. The Delaware tribes in their eastern homeland did
not have a functioning political cohesion as a nation.13
The esteemed anthro-historian Anthony F. C. Wallace opposes the use of the three tribes
to explain the components of the Delaware nation. He considers this an “erroneous ascription of
political and territorial values to the sib system” of clans.14 Wallace notes that Heckewelder and
other Moravian missionaries observed three clans among the Delawares and made the haphazard
assumption that these clans were of a specific “geographical division to correspond to their social
organization.”15 Most importantly, he offers a rather strong definition of Delaware social units
from 1600-1763. Wallace considers Delaware society to be based on units of a maternal lineage,
each with defined hunting and fishing boundaries. Observers, such as Heckewelder, witnessed
several units locked together in group pursuit of sustenance, each comprised of “at least” the
three clans. Communities of Delawares also made “temporary alliances” among themselves in
times of war. This was a common occurrence among the Delawares at that time.16 Thus
Moravian missionaries concluded that Delawares, as a whole, were divided into three specific
groupings, when in reality the clans were interacting with one another.
Lewis Henry Morgan, the early American ethnologist, did extensive fieldwork with the
Delawares in Kansas Territory during the 1850s.  Morgan’s chief informants, Charles
Journeycake, a Turtle chief, and his wife, told Morgan that within the three animal groups there
were twelve subdivisions. For a great period of time, Delawares married within their animal
phratry, but could not marry within their individual clan or sub division. Eventually this changed
                                                
13 Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 43-47.
14 Wallace, Teedyuscung,  6-12.
15 Wallace, “Woman, Land, and Society,” 15.
16 Ibid., 20.
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and, people married outside of their animal tribe. Residency was always determined along the
female line.17   
Pennsylvania historian William Hunter offers the most tangible explanation regarding the
identification of the Delaware Indians. Hunter contends that there was a major difference between
Delaware tribe (groups who were ethnically linked) and Delaware nation (those who were
politically connected). Hunter concludes that the Munsees were not ethnic Delawares but were
politically linked. Many of the Moravian Christian Munsees attached themselves to the
Delawares who moved west of the Allegheny Mountains. At a later time, Munsees from the
upper Allegheny region followed their Christian Delaware brethren further west. These Munsees
eventually became a component of the political nation. By 1791, the remaining Munsees moved
north into Seneca country and were subsumed into the Seneca nation.18
The name Delaware has been used as a generic term and a term of convenience in reference
to the Lenape proper, northern and southern Unami speakers, and includes, and at various times
excludes, the Munsee group. The identification of the Delawares has transcended, either through
correct interpretation or erroneous observation, from a linguistical-geographical designation into a
political definition by the 1750s. The term Unalachtigo has been extremely problematic to rely
upon through historical documentation. For the most part, the term can be found in Moravian
mission records and was mentioned by Delawares such as Teedyuscung and Moses Tatamy. The
late nineteenth century ethnologist Daniel Brinton asserts that the Unalachtigos might have been
remnants of the Nanticokes who were known as Unechtigo mingled with groups of Delawares
and Mahicans on the Upper Susquehanna and later the Ohio country.19 Other scholars, such as
Hunter, Weslager, and anthropologist, Jay Miller further their views on the Delawares called the
Unalachtigos. Hunter concludes that the term Unalachtigo was in use from 1769 to 1785 to
designate certain New Jersey Lenapes who migrated to eastern Ohio.20 Weslager writes that
because of its close semblance to the Unami dialect, the term Unalachtigo was temporary,
“destined for obsolescence” and had different renditions such as Wunalachtikok, Wunalachtko,
                                                
17 Lewis Henry Morgan, The Indian Journals: 1859-1862, edited by Leslie A. White,
(1859; reprint, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1993), 57-59.
18 Hunter, “Sub Divisions of the Delawares,” 31, 35.
19 Brinton, Lenape and Their Legends, 88.
20 William A. Hunter, “A Note on the Unalachtigo,” in Kraft, ed., A Delaware Indian
Symposium, 150-151. Also see Hunter, “Sub Divisions of the Delawares,” 20-40.
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and Wunalachtico.21 Miller, a scholar of Lenape heritage, criticizes historians who are “shackled
to the written word” and argues that Unalachtigo was a “descriptive term” to identify the
Winetkoks, which he believes is the correct title for the third tribe of Delawares.22 While there
has only been scant reference to the Unalachtigo in historical documentation, the term is ingrained
in many modern-day definitions of the Delaware nation.
There is also a debate regarding the zoological classification of the phratries of Turkey,
Turtle, and Wolf as specific divisions as forwarded by Heckewelder and Zeisberger, though also
supported in part by current scholars such as Ives Goddard and Melburn D. Thurman. Goddard
acknowledges these three animal divisions, but rejects the classification of Heckewelder and his
equation of Unami=Turtle, Munsee=Wolf, and Unalachtigo=Turkey.23 Through his analysis of
the Delaware language, Goddard maintains that the three animal tribes constituted the Delaware
ethnic nation, not to necessarily imply a political nation. According to Goddard, the Delawares as
an ethnic-political entity were structured around two distinct dialects, Unami and Munsee.24
Thurman, in his ethnohistorical study of Delaware social structure, supports much of the
Moravian findings. He particularly adheres to the Munsee=Wolf equation of Heckewelder.25 In
response to Wallace’s contentions that the Unalachtigo never existed because there was no record
of current-day Unalachtigos in Oklahoma or Canada, Thurman concludes, “one cannot
demonstrate the non-existence of a social group in the past by showing that no members of that
group presently survive.”26   
Raymond Whritenour, the editor of A Delaware-English Lexicon is not as quick to dispel
the Heckewelder equation. Though Whritenour humbly refers to himself as “an armchair
enthusiast,” he rather eloquently argues on behalf of Heckewelder’s defense. Whritenour insists
that Heckewelder did not create this classification, but merely passed on the information of an
“aged Lenape informant” in the 1760s.27 Whritenour demonstrates that each Delaware phratry
had a series of clans within. The Wolf phratry contained a Wolf clan and a Crow clan and within
                                                
21 Weslager, “More About the Unalachtigo,” 42; Weslager, The Delaware Indians, 45.
22 Jay Miller, “The Unalachtigo?,” Pennsylvania Archaeologist 44 (Dec. 1974): 7-8.
23 Heckewelder, An Account of the Indian Nations , 50-51, 110, 246.
24 Goddard, “Delaware,” 213, 221.
25 Thurman, “Delaware Indians in Ethnohistory,” 106-116.
26 Ibid., 89.
27 Raymond Whritenour in correspondence with James Rementer, November 17, 1996, 2.
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the Turkey division there was a Big Turtle and Little Turtle clan. These groups functioned in a
“totemic system” in which “competitive clans would have to have lived in close proximity to
each other--further strengthening the idea that their combined identity (the phratry) designated a
collection of geographically contiguous bands.”28 Most importantly, he conveys a very
convincing and plausible argument regarding the Wolf division as being the Munsees. Whritenour
uses the formation of the Big House Ceremony (a national religious ceremony of the Delawares)
to prove his point. Each Delaware phratry took specific seats in the longhouse, which contained
the Big House Ceremony (Gamwing or Nkamwin). The Turkey men and women were seated
along the southeast wall of the longhouse and the Turtle men and women to the southwest. The
Wolf men and women lined the north wall of the ceremonial longhouse. Thus according to
Whritenour, the seating arrangement suggests a “microcosmic picture of the Lenapes' ancestral
homeland.” Munsee groups lived north (Lower Hudson and Upper Delaware rivers) of the
Unami-speakers.29 Whritenour’s analysis certainly supports the Heckewelder equation regarding
Delaware divisions and the often-disputed tri-partite classification.
 Weslager, ever the skeptic, concludes that by using the terminology of a three-division
Delaware nation pertaining to 1769, “does not necessarily mean that there was an eternal 3-fold
division of the Delaware” which pre-dated western migration.30 While he makes a salient point,
Weslager fails to take a position. Delawares who migrated west throughout the eighteenth
century were in a state of crisis. They possibly increased social and political organization to meet
those challenges in their new homeland of the Ohio country. This is most evident in the
observations of Colonel Henry Bouquet, the Swiss-born British officer. In his papers, Bouquet
acknowledges the importance of the three animal divisions as vital components of the collective
Delaware nation. He treated each tribe as a sovereign entity when he sought the release of English
captives by the Ohio tribes in November 1764. Bouquet makes ample references to the Turtle,
                                                
28 Ibid., 5.
29 Ibid., 5. For more details on the mechanics and significance of the Big House Ceremony
see Robert S. Grumet, ed., Voices from the Delaware Big House Ceremony: In Native Text
Dictated by Witapanoxwe (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001; Frank Speck, A Study
of the Delaware Indian Big House Ceremony (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum
Commission, 1931). For drawings and diagrams of the outside and inside of the traditional
ceremonial longhouse see Grumet, ed., Voices from the Big House Ceremony; Weslager, The
Delaware Indians, 13, 18, 70.
30 Weslager, “More About the Unalachtigo,” 41.
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Turkey, and “Wolfe” phratries of Delaware Indians as he negotiated separately with the principal
leaders of these tribes.31
The Papers of Henry Bouquet serves as an invaluable tool in removing the confusion. In
my research, while I have seen many separate references to the Turtle and Turkey tribes as
autonomous entities, the Wolf tribe is seldom mentioned at the same time as the Munsees. In
many treaty talks, such as the Bouquet talks in 1764, the Wolf or Munsee tribe is dealt with
separately from the Unami-speaking Turtle and Turkey Delawares. At other councils with the
Delawares when acknowledging the three animal tribes, the Munsees are not mentioned. Also the
two principal Delaware leaders during the Seven Years’ War and American Revolution, Custaloga
and Captain Pipe are referred to at various times as Munsees and at other times as chiefs of the
Wolf tribe, to verify that the Wolf tribe and Munsees were the same. Throughout this
dissertation, I have presented further evidence. I believe the Turtle and Turkey tribes (northern
and southern Unami speakers) were the proto-Lenape and the Wolf tribe was the Munsees.
Together these ethnic-linguistic-political groups made up the Delaware Indian nation during the
eighteenth century.
                                                
31 Stevens and Kent, eds., The Papers of Henry Bouquet.
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Appendix 2: A Historiography of the Delawares as “Women”
With this supposed tributary status of the Delawares as members of the Covenant Chain
of Friendship, came the confusing and misinterpreted metaphor of “woman.” David Zeisberger
and John Heckewelder rely steadfastly on their Delaware sources. They believe that the
Delaware designation as “women” was predicated on their strength and reputation as the
foremost prominent of all Algonquian warriors and diplomats.1 As the women in the Covenant
Chain, the Delawares were “entrusted with the charge of the great belt of peace and the chain of
friendship.” They were responsible with preserving and bearing the chain of peace on their
shoulders, “at its middle,” while the other Indian nations and the English held up the ends.2
Since the days of Zeisberger and Heckewelder, scholars have been engaged in intense
debates and discussions regarding how perceptions shaped the application of the term between
the Iroquois Confederation and the Delawares. They have also attempted to explain or rationalize
how the metaphor of “woman” regressed into a term of weakness and subservience.
The assumption that the Delawares were a conquered people came largely as a result of
Francis Parkman’s inexhaustible study of the seventeenth-century North American frontier.
During the 1870s and 1880s, Parkman, Americas preeminent historian, spent an academic career
branding the Iroquois Six Nations as merciless predators whose warriors raided, burned, and
leveled everything in their path. Parkman, swayed by Jesuit sources and gifted with a nineteenth-
century sense of literary flair, emphasizes and embellishes Iroquois ruthlessness. He portrays the
Iroquois tribal environment and its rituals, similar to that of a medieval horror chamber; a
Hieronymous Bosch painting come to life, complete with boiling cauldrons filled with amputated
limbs, blood-drenched scalps, and human remains being devoured by remorseless cannibals.
Parkman sees the Iroquois as a people who were addicted to conquest and who used conflict as a
device to vent out intense emotions of animal rage. He helps to produce a legend that all
surrounding Indian tribes trembled at the mention of these “tyrants of all the intervening
                                                
1 Zeisberger in Schwarze and Hulbert, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,” 34-35; Heckewelder,
An Account of the Indian Nations, 58.
2 Zeisberger in Schwarze and Hulbert, eds., “Zeisberger’s History,” 35.
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wilderness.” 3 Parkman and other observers of the Iroquois, such as Lewis Henry Morgan, use
their imaginations to transform the Iroquois into a political and military juggernaut, which gained
more power with each military victory over enemy tribes, with the Delawares as one of their
victims.4
Francis Jennings, in The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, is very willing to down play any
notion that the Delawares were conquered women. He adamantly assaults any notions of
Iroquois supremacy as a colonial empire. Jennings dismantles the myth of this empire by
illustrating how the Iroquois imperial reputation was built around a series of concoctions,
distortions, and convolutions5--all by-products of English invention and perpetuated in the
future by scholars such as Parkman and Morgan. As Jennings illustrates, the historical reality
refuted the imperial status of the Iroquois.
According to Jennings, the Five Nations aligned themselves with Edmund Andros and the
New York colony in 1677 and served to replace the Chesapeake colonists and Susquehannock
Indians who had declined in influence and power in the Susquehanna and Delaware valleys.6
Jennings demonstrates how the Iroquois had little to do with the Susquehannock Indian defeat
and dismantling. Jennings believed that the Iroquois merely stepped into a power vacuum created
after the frontier violence of 1675 and 1676. In 1663, Iroquois war parties (mostly Senecas)
suffered continuous defeats at the hands of the Susquehannocks. At the same time, Maryland
officials fired an ultimatum that the Susquehannocks move farther south--which in essence let the
flood gates open as Marylanders and Virginians overwhelmed and slaughtered these Indians. The
Iroquois then reentered the Susquehanna Valley to claim victory.7 Their empire was strengthened
by default and not necessarily through political and military skill.
Using this instance as the model for further Iroquois and English contrivances regarding
empire building, Jennings also attempts to demonstrate how the Iroquois had not conquered the
Delawares. The distortion of an Iroquois-dominated Delaware nation became a reality when the
                                                
3 Francis Parkman, France and England in North America, 2 vols. (1885; reprint, New
York: The Library of America, 1983), 1: 710.
4 Also see Lewis Henry Morgan, League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee, Iroquois  (1851;
reprint, New York: Corinth Books, 1962).




Iroquois orator, Canasatego, building his own political reputation, berated the Delaware leaders at
the council in Pennsylvania in 1742.8
Jennings comes to the defense of Zeisberger and Heckewelder by pointing out that in the
“Indian sense,” the status of woman was honorable--the intended designation of tributary was
fluid. Metaphorically the Delawares were women to the Iroquois men (a relationship based on
prestige and honor), but Delawares were also called “nephews, cousins, and grandfathers.”
Grandfather was the Iroquois acknowledgement of the Delawares as the foremost ancient of all
Algonquian people.9 In general, the tributaries of the Iroquois were both allies and subordinates.
They were locked into a reciprocal relationship of “responsibilities as well as privileges” within
the Confederation.10 Regarding the Confederation and domination of its tributaries, Jennings
reminds us that “no multitudes groaned underneath the hobnailed moccasin” of the Iroquois.11
The anthropologist Frank Speck has aptly sifted through the confusing meanings of the
woman metaphor, by analyzing kinship relations. According to Speck, a distinct characteristic of
Eastern Woodland tribes was the “tendency to give each other ratings of relationships according
to a kind of sanguinity that one would find in the extended branches of a large family.” 12 Speck
asserts that the Iroquois eventually came to believe that they had the right to place the Delawares
in a position of social and political subservience. Delaware status had changed from that of the
respected and revered “Grandfather” to that of “women” signifying female captives who were
taken in war. The Delawares, as women, were forbidden to go to war or act as diplomats in treaty
talks. “Their entire political organization,” through this gender designation, was “deprived of
masculine prerogatives” such as war making and diplomacy.13
                                                
8 Ibid., 22-24. Pennsylvania Secretary James Logan also believed this fallacy. In 1712, he
conferred with a Delaware delegation on its way to Iroquoia with wampum presents. Not
understanding Indian diplomatic protocol, Logan assumed that the exchange of wampum meant
that the Delawares were paying tribute to the Iroquois. The Delawares in fact were political
equals and the exchange of wampum was customary etiquette among Indian nations.
9 Ibid., 160-161. Also see Wallace, Weiser, 271, 450.
10 Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 8.
11 Ibid., 94. Jennings notes that there was no evidence of a battle or war in which the
Iroquois conquered the Delawares. See Francis Jennings, “Pennsylvania Indians and the
Iroquois,” in Richter and Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain, 79-80.
12 Speck, “The Delaware Indians as Women,” 379.
13 Ibid., 377.
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Jay Miller maintains that despite this emasculation, it was by Delaware consent. In the
late 1670s, the Lenape bands had bore the “brunt of contact” with Europeans and desired to
“minimize intercourse” in the future. Thus the status of women became preferable to Delawares
who favored a neutral position in the escalating conflict became Europeans and Indian nations.
The designation of warriors and diplomats appealed to the more-isolated Iroquois. Miller writes:
“Iroquois vanity, if not superiority, would have espoused the status of men.” 14     
Jane T. Merritt, who has studied language and metaphor on the Pennsylvania frontier,
cautions the reader to know that in the Iroquois construct the word woman, as it corresponded to
the Delawares, meant a “restricted public role.” While Iroquois women had a degree of “economic
autonomy” within domestic spheres (they owned the longhouse and controlled the resources of
agriculture) and could attend treaty talks, they had “limited power to speak in political
forums.” 15 In its application to the Delawares, the Iroquois used the term “woman” as a
diplomatic tool of restraint. The Iroquois eventually altered the perception to fit the European
concept of female in which women had no legal right to land. The Iroquois corrupted the
metaphor as a way to “delineate Delawares’ subordinate position in terms that Euramericans
would clearly understand.” 16 Regarding the public role limitations placed upon the Delawares by
the Iroquois, Anthony F. C. Wallace concludes that the Delawares, despite the lack of male
prerogative regarding war making, could overcome the restrictions and go to war if they secured
sanction from the Iroquois council fire at Onondaga.17
A clique of current-day scholars, driven by political correctness, romanticization, and
radical feminism, disagree and have elevated Iroquois women to a prominence that has probably
transcended historical reality. By doing so, they also unintentionally change the status of
Delawares in their relationship with the Iroquois. They maintain that any corruption of the term
to signify weakness was conjured by chauvinistic Euramericans and not Indians. 
                                                
14 Jay Miller, “The Delaware as Women: A Symbolic Solution,” American Ethnologist 1
(August 1974): 511.
15 Jane T. Merritt, “Language and Power on the Pennsylvania Frontier,” in Cayton and
Teute eds., Contact Points, 79.
16 Ibid., 79. For more on gender, language, and the meaning of words among the
Delawares see Gunlog Fur, ‘“Some Women Are Wiser than Some Men’: Gender and Native
American History,” in Nancy Shoemaker, ed., Theorizing the Past in Native American Studies
(New York: Routledge, 2002). 75-103.
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In her critically acclaimed literary work Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in
American Indian Traditions, the native writer Paula Gunn Allen, like many revisionists, contends
that Iroquois polity was structured solely on matriarchal prerogative and power. Allen writes
that the Iroquois, under the old laws before white contact, were a “mother-centered, mother-right
people whose political organization was based on the central authority of the Matrons, the
Mothers of the Longhouses,” also known as clan mothers. She acknowledges the “Red Roots of
White Feminism” when she crafts a “gynocratic” nexus between Deganawidah, the prophet who
gave the Iroquois the Great Law, and Susan B. Anthony, the leader of the early American
suffragette movements.18
Other writers, such as Barbara Mann, follow suit. Mann is particularly leery of and
hypersensitive to traditional western scholars who approach Indian history and culture in a
“linear mode,” where “information is packaged and stacked in neat categories.” She believes that a
true understanding of Indian history should be extracted through a “Native framework”--through
a trusting reliance on native oral traditions, where data “scatters naturally, however it happens to
fall.” 19 Mann is quite adamant in her beliefs regarding the power of women in Indian societies,
both past and present. Without historical documentation, she maintains that it was the Iroquois
Clan Mothers who ordered Captain Pipe to remove the Christian Delawares from the
Muskingum to the Upper Sandusky region in 1782.20 Mann concludes that the “Euro-Forming”
of Indian studies has reduced the role of women and the symbolic meaning of the term and how it
was applied to the tributary nations, such as the Delawares.
Joy Bilharz in her study of Seneca women, stresses that Iroquois society embraced
“complimentary gender roles” in accordance with a horticultural society in which males were
                                                                                                                                                            
17 Wallace, “Woman, Land, and Society,” 25.
18 See Paula Gunn Allen, The Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in American Indian
Traditions (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), 33, 213.
19 Barbara A. Mann, “Epilogue: Euro-Forming the Data,” in Bruce E. Johansen, ed.,
Debating Democracy: Native American Legacy of Freedom (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Clear Light
Publishers, 1998), 185-186.
20 Mann, “‘I Hope You Will Not Destroy,” in Mann, ed., Native American Speakers,
148-149. She bases this assertion on her belief that the Delawares during the American
Revolution were still subservient to the Six Nations. Throughout her essay, she continually refers
to the “League” and its powerful influence upon the “Lenape.” In her views, at the apex of this
power were the Clan Mothers.
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frequently hunting or on the war trail. Iroquois women took greater control of the village in the
absence of the men. Regarding Iroquois women and power, Bilharz cautions that “while women
were instrumental in naming Confederacy chiefs, it is important to note that this prerogative of
women in certain clans cannot be extrapolated to infer political power for all women” in Iroquois
society.21 The point here is that the Iroquois and many other Indian societies embraced a
philosophy of equilibrium and cooperation between men and women. Each gender had role
expectations and responsibilities relative to the welfare of the collective whole.
This belief that women were at the center of the Indian universe is an image that
anthropologists Daniel Maltz and Joallyn Archambault, the latter of whom is a Standing Rock
Lakota Sioux, refer to as “Utopian Fantasies.” In this academic distortion, American Indians and
their cultures are romanticized to unrealistic and unattainable standards. Maltz and Archambault
point to writers such as Paula Gunn Allen as proliferating the historical distortions of the power
of Iroquois women in the colonial world.22 Such a misinterpretation of the Iroquois as the
ultimate feminist society is a romantic stereotype--a return to the days of Jean-Jacques Rosseau
and his “cult of the Noble Savage.” This view is also as extremist as confirming the early
European stereotype that all Indian women were beasts of burden. These utopian feminist
fantasies do not reflect the true historical relationship between the Six Nations and their Delaware
tributary. To reiterate, in its ideal form the Iroquois and Delawares had a relationship of
obligations, responsibilities, and cooperation toward one another. Historical forces destroyed the
ideal. 
                                                
21 Joy Bilharz, “First Among Equals?: The Changing Status of Seneca Women,” in Laura
F. Klein and Lillian A. Ackerman, eds., Women and Power in Native North America (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 107. This cooperation between the genders extends to the
oral traditions of the Iroquois Confederacy. In Iroquois cosmology, Sky Woman was the first
human to land on the Earth. She was considered to be Mother of the Earth. Equally important to
the history of the Iroquois, the Great League of Peace (the Five Nations Confederation) was
founded by the prophet Deganawidah and his disciple Hiawatha. Thus the beginning of the Earth
has a feminine origin, while the political genesis of the Iroquois League has a masculine influence.
For superb works on the foundation, function, and structure of the Iroquois Confederation see
Donald A. Grinde, Jr., The Iroquois and the Founding of the American Nation (San Francisco:
The Indian Historian Press, Inc., 1977); Fenton, Great Law and Longhouse.
22 Daniel Maltz and Joallyn Archambault, “Gender and Power in Native North
America,” in Klein and Ackerman, eds., Women and Power in Native North America, 243.
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These relationships were also not set in stone. Indian symbolic relationships were fluid
and ever changing. Delawares themselves decided when and where they would adhere to or reject
their status as women. In October of 1755, the Delawares declared war against Pennsylvania and
asserted that they were no longer tributaries of the Six Nations. Months later, to avoid the wrath
of Sir William Johnson and the British, the Delawares “wrapped themselves in their identity as
women to exonerate themselves.” Two years later in the spring of 1757, Delawares and Shawnees
shed their petticoats and threatened an Iroquois delegation that they would retaliate and make
women of them. Jane Merritt concludes that the Delawares as well as the Six Nations
manipulated the flexible term of women “for their own ends.” 23 Merritt has also demonstrated
that the term had a dual meaning in Indian society. On one hand it could be used to denote the
respected role as a peacemaker, while the term woman could also be hurled in contempt to shame
males or tribes who lacked military prowess.24
By wearing the diplomatic symbol of a petticoat, the Delawares became fully
Europeanized to signify the weakness of a woman, rather than the peace-making ability once
attributed to them. By the mid 1700s the Iroquois, using Anglo rationalization and to bolster
their waning status in the eyes of the British, started to believe their own press. Regarding the
metaphor, it continued to lose its original expression of respect and alliance and through gradual
and continuous misinterpretation and political manipulation, it became a title of derision. This
corrupted metaphor placed a humiliation upon the Delawares and forced them westward into
new regions. With this migration, the Delawares removed the burden of subservience, placed
upon them by an intrusive Six Nations of Iroquois.
                                                
23 Merritt, “Language and Power on the Pennsylvania Frontier,” in Cayton and Teute,
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